Published papers

Bargaining  in the Shadow  of  Uncertainty  (with Marina Agranov and Chloe Tergiman), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics (forthcoming) 

Optimal Group Testing with Heterogeneous Risks (with Nina Bobkova and Ying Chen), Economic Theory, forthcoming

“Dynamic Legislative Bargaining” (with Kirill Evdokimov and Jan Zápal), 2022, 151-75, in “Current Research and Future Directions in Bargaining”, Kyle Hyndman and Emin Karagozoglu (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan. (link to longer working paper version).

Learning While Setting Precedent (with Ying Chen), Rand Journal of Economics, 2020, 51 (4), 963-1196.

Legislative and Multilateral Bargaining (with Kirill S.  Evdokimov), Annual Review of Economics, 2019,  11, 443-472.

An Anatomy of U.S. Personal Bankruptcy Under Chapter 13 (with Gizem Koşar, Wenli Li and Pierre Sarte), International Economic Review, 2017, 58(3).

Some Unpleasant Bargaining Arithmetic? (with Antonio Merlo), Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 171, 293-315.

Efficiency of Flexible Budgetary Institutions (with Renee Bowen, Ying Chen and Jan Zapal), Journal of Economic Theory, 2017, 167, 148-176.

Dynamic Agenda Setting (with Ying Chen), American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, 2017, 9(2), 1-32.

Uniqueness of Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining Among Risk Averse Players, International Journal of Economic Theory, 2015, 12, 29-40.

Mandatory vs. Discretionary Spending: The Status Quo Effect(with Renee Bowen and Ying Chen), American Economic Review, 2014, 104(10): 2941-2974.  [Appendix containing additional analysis].

Rhetoric in Legislative Bargaining with Asymmetric Information (with Ying Chen), Theoretical Economics, 2014, 9:2, 483-513.

Informational Loss in Bundled Bargaining (with Ying Chen), Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2013, 25:3, 338-362.

Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in Coalitional Bargaining (with Andy McLennan), Journal of Economic Theory, 2013, 148:6, 2196-2222.

Information-Based Trade (with Philip Bond), Journal of Economic Theory, 2010, 145, 1675-1703. [Appendix containing additional analysis].

Strategic Voting over Strategic Proposals (with Philip Bond), Review of Economic Studies, 2009, 77:2, 459-490.  [Slides/Appendix containing omitted proofs].

Corporate Bankruptcy Reorganizations: Estimates from a Bargaining Model, International Economic Review, 2008, 49:2, 659-681.

Bicameralism and Government Formation (with Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo), Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2007, 2, 227-252.

Strategic Candidacy for Multivalued Voting Procedures (with Andy McLennan), Journal of Economic Theory, 2004, 117, 29-54.

A Structural Model of Government Formation (with Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo), Econometrica, January 2003, 71, 27-70.

Coalition Governments and Comparative Constitutional Design(with Daniel Diermeier and Antonio Merlo), European Economic Review, May 2002, 46, 893-907.

Majority Rule in a Stochastic Model of Bargaining (with Antonio Merlo), Journal of Economic Theory, March 2002, 103, 31-48.

Uniqueness of Stationary Equilibrium Payoffs in the Baron-Ferejohn Model,  Journal of Economic Theory, March 2002, 103, 11-30.