I have imported a new Client/Server certificate (EndPointCert) in the truststore (cacerts) of this tool and the corresponding private key in its keystore. This EndPointCert is signed by an intermediateCA.
Now, if I have not pinned/imported the RootCA certificate of our company in the truststore of this tool, the LDAPS fails. However, SSL/TLS connection to the webserver part works fine.If I include the RootCA certificate also LDAPS authentication works.
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In the AIA attribute of the EndPointCert the url to a intermediateCA cert is included. If I chase this down, I can download the intermediateCA cert and then with using this AIA field I can download a RootCA certificate.I am using jks.
It is pretty common that the trust store is for CA certificates only, hence the name "cacerts". This means leaf certificates like server and client certificates which are not a CA certificate (basic constraints CA:true in the certificate properties) will be ignored. That's at least the behavior with OpenSSL.
It is also pretty common that it is expected that the trust chain can be created up to a locally trusted root certificate. Such root is self-signed, i.e. the signature is by the root CA certificate itself. This is also the default behavior with OpenSSL. If intermediate CA certificates or leaf certificates should be accepted as final trust anchor then the X509_V_FLAG_PARTIAL_CHAIN option need to be set.
As for "track down the chain using URL in AIA attribute" - the trust anchor must be actually trusted. Loading something from somewhere on the internet (i.a. following AIA) does not make it trusted, but having it pre-installed in the local trust store does. AIA can be used to track down missing intermediate certificates which are needed to build a path to a local root CA, but it must still end in an explicitly trusted CA.
Windows Hello for Business replaces password sign-in with strong authentication, using an asymmetric key pair. This Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ) article is intended to help you learn more about Windows Hello for Business.
Windows Hello represents the biometric framework provided in Windows. Windows Hello lets users use biometrics to sign in to their devices by securely storing their user name and password and releasing it for authentication when the user successfully identifies themselves using biometrics. Windows Hello for Business uses asymmetric keys protected by the device's security module that requires a user gesture (PIN or biometrics) to authenticate.
When using Windows Hello for Business, the PIN isn't a symmetric key, whereas the password is a symmetric key. With passwords, there's a server that has some representation of the password. With Windows Hello for Business, the PIN is user-provided entropy used to load the private key in the Trusted Platform Module (TPM). The server doesn't have a copy of the PIN. For that matter, the Windows client doesn't have a copy of the current PIN either. The user must provide the entropy, the TPM-protected key, and the TPM that generated that key in order to successfully access the private key.The statement "PIN is stronger than Password" is not directed at the strength of the entropy used by the PIN. It's about the difference between providing entropy versus continuing the use of a symmetric key (the password). The TPM has anti-hammering features that thwart brute-force PIN attacks (an attacker's continuous attempt to try all combination of PINs). Some organizations may worry about shoulder surfing. For those organizations, rather than increase the complexity of the PIN, implement the Multifactor Unlock feature.
When a user wants to access protected key material, the authentication process begins with the user entering a PIN or biometric gesture to unlock the device, a process sometimes called releasing the key. Think of it like using a physical key to unlock a door: before you can unlock the door, you need to remove the key from your pocket or purse. The user's PIN unlocks the protector key for the container on the device. When that container is unlocked, applications (and thus the user) can use whatever IDP keys reside inside the container.These keys are used to sign requests that are sent to the IDP, requesting access to specified resources. It's important to understand that although the keys are unlocked, applications cannot use them at will. Applications can use specific APIs to request operations that require key material for particular actions (for example, decrypt an email message or sign in to a website). Access through these APIs doesn't require explicit validation through a user gesture, and the key material isn't exposed to the requesting application. Rather, the application asks for authentication, encryption, or decryption, and the Windows Hello layer handles the actual work and returns the results. Where appropriate, an application can request a forced authentication even on an unlocked device. Windows prompts the user to reenter the PIN or perform an authentication gesture, which adds an extra level of protection for sensitive data or actions. For example, you can configure an application to require re-authentication anytime a specific operation is performed, even though the same account and PIN or gesture were already used to unlock the device.For more information about the different authentication flows used by Windows Hello for Business, see Windows Hello for Business and Authentication.
Windows Hello generates a new public-private key pair on the device. The TPM generates and protects this private key; if the device doesn't have a TPM, the private key is encrypted and stored in software. This initial key is referred to as the protector key. It's associated only with a single gesture; in other words, if a user registers a PIN, a fingerprint, and a face on the same device, each of those gestures will have a unique protector key. Each unique gesture generates a unique protector key. The protector key securely wraps the authentication key. The container has only one authentication key, but there can be multiple copies of that key wrapped with different unique protector keys. Windows Hello also generates an administrative key that the user or administrator can use to reset credentials, when necessary (for example, when using the PIN reset service). In addition to the protector key, TPM-enabled devices generate a block of data that contains attestations from the TPM.At this point, the user has a PIN gesture defined on the device and an associated protector key for that PIN gesture. That means the user is able to securely sign in to the device with the PIN and thus be able to establish a trusted session with the device to add support for a biometric gesture as an alternative for the PIN. When you add a biometric gesture, it follows the same basic sequence: the user authenticates to the system by using the PIN, and then registers the new biometric, after which Windows generates a unique key pair and stores it securely. Future sign-ins can then use either the PIN or the registered biometric gestures.
There are no physical containers on disk, in the registry, or elsewhere. Containers are logical units used to group related items. The keys, certificates, and credentials that Windows Hello stores, are protected without the creation of actual containers or folders.
Anytime key material is generated, it must be protected against attack. The most robust way to do this is through specialized hardware. There's a long history of using hardware security modules (HSMs) to generate, store, and process keys for security-critical applications. Smart cards are a special type of HSM, as are devices that are compliant with the Trusted Computing Group TPM standard. Wherever possible, the Windows Hello for Business implementation takes advantage of onboard TPM hardware to generate and protect keys. Administrators can choose to allow key operations in software, but it's recommended the use of TPM hardware. The TPM protects against a variety of known and potential attacks, including PIN brute-force attacks. The TPM provides an additional layer of protection after an account lockout, too. When the TPM has locked the key material, the user will have to reset the PIN (which means the user will have to use MFA to reauthenticate to the IDP before the IDP allows re-registration). Resetting the PIN means that all keys and certificates encrypted with the old key material will be removed.
Windows Hello for Business provides a PIN caching user experience by using a ticketing system. Rather than caching a PIN, processes cache a ticket they can use to request private key operations. Microsoft Entra ID and Active Directory sign-in keys are cached under lock. This means the keys remain available for use without prompting, as long as the user is interactively signed-in. Microsoft Account sign-in keys are transactional keys, which means the user is always prompted when accessing the key.
Organizations that have the on-premises deployment of Windows Hello for Business, or those not using Windows 10 version 1903 and later can use destructive PIN reset. With destructive PIN reset, users that have forgotten their PIN can authenticate by using their password and then performing a second factor of authentication to reprovision their Windows Hello for Business credential. Reprovisioning deletes the old credential and requests a new credential and certificate. On-premises deployments need network connectivity to their domain controllers, Active Directory Federation Services, and their issuing certificate authority to perform a destructive PIN reset. For Microsoft Entra hybrid joined devices, destructive PIN reset is only supported with the certificate trust model and the latest updates to Active Directory Federation Services. ff782bc1db
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