Contact information:
Email:
jonas.hamang@kristiania.no
Current position:
Associate Professor at Kristiania University College
CV:
On request
Ongoing projects:
Optimal Tax Depreciation Rules under Limited Classes, joint with Magnus Våge Knutsen (BI)
Abstract: Tax depreciation systems apply a limited number of statutory rules to a heterogeneous set of capital assets. A common approach is to match economic depreciation as closely as possible for each asset. We show that this principle is generally not aligned with efficiency maximization under the given constraint. By assigning statutory depreciation rates, the tax depreciation system affects relative user costs and thereby the economy-wide allocation of capital across assets. Efficiency therefore depends not only on asset-specific deviations from true user costs, but also on interactions among tax-induced wedges and the economic importance of the affected assets. As a result, optimal policy departs from asset-by-asset accuracy. Instead, it prioritizes coordinating user-cost wedges among interacting assets and allocating more precise treatment to economically important inputs. This perspective yields several implications. Assets with identical economic depreciation may optimally receive different tax treatment, and even when a first-best depreciation rate is available for an asset, it need not be optimal to assign it to that class. Conversely, assets with different depreciation rates may be optimally grouped together. Moreover, improving the accuracy of a given asset in isolation can increase overall inefficiency if it worsens the pattern of wedges across interacting inputs. In fact, there exist cases in which a policy that is strictly less accurate for every asset generates lower efficiency loss by better coordinating wedges across the production system.
Working paper
Quantifying supply-side climate policies, joint with Lassi Ahlvik (University of Helsinki), Jørgen Juel Andersen (BI) and Torfinn Harding (University of Stavanger).
Abstract: What are the effects of supply-side climate policies? We use global firm-level data to estimate the impact of 130 oil-tax reforms between 2000 and 2019 on oil production, exploration and discoveries. Higher taxes are found to reduce firms’ exploration expenditures and oil discoveries. We quantify the oil market implications and show that the existing production-based taxes, averaging at 21%, reduce the long-term emissions by 1.3-2.7 GtCO2 annually. Increasing the global tax rate would reduce emissions almost linearly, by 0.16 GtCO2 per percentage point, while further shifting the distribution of rents from consumers to producers and governments.
Accepted by the Review of Economic Studies
Economic development and known natural resource endowment: Discovery rate differentials of oil (single author).
Abstract: The location of oil reserves plays an essential role in policymakers’ incentives to coordinate supplyside climate policy. In this paper I use data on the location of all historic onshore petroleum discoveries to establish a new stylized fact: Economically developed areas are many times more likely to contain an oil or gas discovery, compared to undeveloped areas. I show that this result is not driven reverse causality or confounding geology. By implication, there exist large additional undiscovered oil and gas deposits in currently undeveloped areas, mainly located outside of Europe and North America. I quantify these deposits to be about 50% of total discovered onshore oil reserves.
Accepted by the Journal of Development Economics
Declining oil production leads to more democratic governments, joint with Jørgen Juel Andersen (BI) and Michael Ross (UCLA).
Abstract: Many oil-rich countries -such Russia, Saudi Arabia, Iran and Venezuela - are ruled by authoritarian governments. How will they be affected by a global transition away from fossil fuels? We address this question with a novel approach, analyzing political change in 36 oil producing countries that passed their historical production peak and experienced at least 10 years of declining production. Using new proprietary data on oil field life cycles and an event-study design, we find that once production began to fall these countries became significantly more democratic, relative to both the overall sample trend and the parallel pre-peak trends. Ten years after their oil peak, 33 of the 36 countries had become more democratic. After 15 years, their relative democracy scores increased by an average of 9 percentage points. For countries that transitioned after 1980, these scores rose about 13 percentage points, and for larger producers, by about 20 percentage points. Our findings suggest that a global transition toward renewable energy may make the governments of oil-rich countries significantly more democratic. It may also cast light on the long-term effects of economic sanctions on oil-exporting countries like Russia.
Working paper