Publications

• Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences: A positive result Economics Letters, 2023, 223: 110989

Working paper

• Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation problems with money: Decreasing incremental valuations with income effects (joint with Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa) 

    (previously circulated as "Multi-unit object allocation problems with money for (non-)decreasing incremental valuations: Impossibility and characterization theorems")

• No price envy in the multi-unit object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences 

• Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money (R&R at SCW) 

(previously circulated as "Characterizing pairwise strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with money")

• A maximal domain for efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems without quasi-linearity

• Efficiency and strategy-proofness in object allocation problems with payments: Externalities with income effects 

      An extended working paper with additional results.

• Non-obvious manipulability and efficiency in package assignment problems with money for agents with income effects and hard budget constraints (submitted)

• Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money (under review)

• Shill-proof rules in object allocation problems with money (under review)

• Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: The role of tie-breaking rules (R&R at JMathE)

• Strategy-proof allocation problem with hard budget constraints and income effects: weak efficiency and fairness  (joint with Yuya Wakabayashi and Ryosuke Sakai)

Other publications

• Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences Games, 2022, 13(6) (in the special issue Strategy-proof Mechanism Design)

Work in progress

• Efficiency and strategy-proofness in package assignment problems with income effects (joint with Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa) 

• Efficiency, fairness, and strategy-proofness in constrained object allocation problems with money (joint with Shigehiro Serizawa)

• Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation under constraints

• Obviously fair object allocation with money

• On strategy-proofness of the uniform-price rule for preferences with nondecreasing incremental valuations

• Two-sided collusion, Self-enforcing manipulations, and the first-price rule

• Two-sided collusion-proofness in object allocation problems with money

• Optimal shill bidding by the seller under private valuations

• Regret-free truth-telling and efficiency in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences