Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation problems with money: Decreasing incremental valuations with income effects (joint with Tomoya Kazumura and Shigehiro Serizawa) forthcoming Economic Theory
Characterizing group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money Social Choice and Welfare, 2025, 64, 721-764
Robust group strategy-proof rules in the object allocation problem with money: The role of tie-breaking rules Journal of Mathematical Economics, 2024, 115: 103066
Efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences: A positive result Economics Letters, 2023, 223: 110989
Constrained efficiency and strategy-proofness in package assignment problems with money (joint with Shigehiro Serizawa) The 26th ACM Conference on Economics and Computation (EC'25)
A maximal domain for efficiency and strategy-proofness in multi-unit object allocation problems without quasi-linearity
Non-obvious manipulability in package assignment problems with money (R&R at Int. J. Game Theory)
previously circulated as "Non-obvious manipulability and efficiency in package assignment problems with money for agents with income effects and hard budget constraints"
Shutting-out-proofness in object allocation problems with money (accepted with minor revisions at Int. J. Game Theory)
Strategy-proof rules in object allocation problems with hard budget constraints and income effects (joint with Yuya Wakabayashi and Ryosuke Sakai) (R&R at J. Math. Econ.)
Shill-proof rules in object allocation problems with money (under review)
Endowments-swapping-proof object reallocation with transfers (R&R at Games Econ. Behav.)
Constrained efficiency and strategy-proofness in package assignment problems with money (joint with Shigehiro Serizawa) (under review)
Egalitarian-equivalence and strategy-proofness in the object allocation problem with non-quasi-linear preferences Games, 2022, 13(6) (in the special issue Strategy-proof Mechanism Design)
Efficient and strategy-proof multi-unit object allocation under constraints
Obviously fair object allocation with money
On strategy-proofness of the uniform-price rule for preferences with nondecreasing incremental valuations
Two-sided collusion, self-enforcing manipulations, and the first-price rule
Two-sided collusion-proofness in object allocation problems with money
Optimal shill bidding by the seller under private valuations
Regret-free truth-telling and efficiency in multi-unit object allocation problems with non-quasi-linear preferences
Local incentive compatibility with non-quasi-linear preferences