Research

Joint work with Matz Dahlberg, Mikael Lundholm and Mattias Nordin
(Submitted)

A core question in economics is how to sell an object in a way that maximizes revenue. We study a field experiment, run in collaboration with the Swedish Enforcement Authority over three years, that randomly assigns foreclosed properties to auction or brokered sale, to examine how the two sales modes affect prices. Brokered sales outperform auctions, selling for 15% higher prices, and there is a discount in auction sales only. We theoretically explain the discount with barriers to participation in the auctions, which lead to the presence of professional buyers. Individual-level historical data on foreclosure sales support the proposed mechanism.

Please click here to read the current version (October 8, 2025)

Joint work with Ola Andersson
(Submitted)

We study two-player all-pay auctions with binary signals allowing arbitrary correlation and interdependent values. Under a mild generic condition, we prove existence and uniqueness of equilibrium. The equilibrium is weakly monotone, which orders bid supports by the strong set order, and fully characterize four equilibrium forms that partition primitives.  A preregistered lab experiment exogenously varies signal correlation. Consistent with the theory, we find that bidding differs sharply in accordance with the unique underlying equilibrium and that bids are increasing in signal and the level of correlation. Our theory–evidence package provides a clean baseline for contests with correlated information. 

Please click here to read the current version (September 23, 2025)

Online Appendix

This paper explores a conflict mediation model wherein an endogenous war ensues following failed peace negotiations. Two players vie for control over natural resources with an uncertain but common value, each possessing a correlated signal regarding this value. When the players' military power is equal, there exists an essentially unique perfect Bayesian equilibrium that is entirely peaceful. Implying that differences in the expectation about the value of the resources alone can not lead to war. However, if we introduce differences in military power or make military power uncertain, war may occur within the equilibrium.

Please click here to read the current version (May 12, 2025)

Recently, the all-pay auction literature has characterized equilibria that are not monotone in the traditional sense for a setting with two types. However, no such characterizations have been made for a general N-type space. This is because the binary type space allows for a guess-verify approach. Since the amount of possible guesses increases rapidly, such an approach is infeasible for larger type spaces. I characterize the set of symmetric equilibria in a general N-type two-player all-pay auction with arbitrary type dependency and interdependent valuations. My approach is centered around linear algebra techniques and a novel notion of a weakly monotone equilibrium. In a weakly monotone equilibrium the bid supports are ordered by the strong set order, but not necessarily separated like the traditional monotone equilibrium. I classify these weakly monotone equilibria into four primary forms. I characterize each form and find sufficient conditions for their existence. Furthermore, for the model used in Rentschler and Turocy (2016), I provide a novel necessary and sufficient condition for the existence of a traditional monotone equilibrium.

Please contact me for a current version: henk.schouten@nek.uu.se

This paper investigates a class of multi-stage conflict games in which the final stage of the game is an all-pay auction. In this class of games, two possibly asymmetric players compete over a prize whose value may depend on both players’ private information. The actions played in the finitely many communication stages may increase the dependence between the players’ private information. This increased dependence can lead to the non-existence of a monotone equilibrium in the all-pay auction stage game. I provide a sufficient condition on the primitives that bounds this dependence. Thus, all equilibria in the final stage game are guaranteed to be monotone without endogenous restriction on the player’s actions.

Please contact me for a current version: henk.schouten@nek.uu.se