Abstract: Governments in economic hardship that borrow from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) under strict conditionalities are commonly expected to scapegoat the Fund to prevent domestic protest and electoral punishment. But we know little about the micro-level mechanisms underpinnings this scapegoating hypothesis. This paper theoretically specifies and empirically assesses two strategies that governments can employ to shape whom citizens hold responsible for the contested economic policies in IMF programs. After entering IMF programs, governments may deflect responsibility for contested economic policies by either actively shifting blame onto the IMF; or by laying low and hoping on other actors to take the bait. We examine these expectations empirically by employing a survey experiment in Pakistan in June 2023. While this setting constitutes a typical case for the scapegoating hypothesis, both strategies fail to deflect responsibility to the Fund. This surprising non-finding warrants further research on the scapegoating hypothesis and its scope conditions.