Publications :
A note on “Necessary and sufficient conditions for the perfect finite horizon folk theorem”. With Andrea Wilson, Econometrica (online), 2019.
A complete perfect folk theorem for finitely repeated games [abstract] [working paper version]. International Journal of Game Theory, 2020, 49, 1129–1142.
Farsighted rationality in hedonic games. With Dominik Karos. Dynamic Games and Applications, 2022. https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00474-8
Justice, inclusion, and incentives. With Roland Pongou and Jean-Baptiste Tondji. Journal of Theoretical Politics, 2024, 36, 101--131.
Working papers
Did partisan voters spoil the country? A randomized-thought experiment. With Roland Pongou and Victoria Barham. [abstract] [full text]
Repetition and cooperation: a model of finitely repeated games with objective ambiguity. [abstract] [full text]
Ambiguity-averse political designer. With Roland Pongou and Issofa Moyouwou. [abstract]
A Free and Fair Economy: A Game of Justice and Inclusion. With Roland Pongou and Jean-Baptiste Tondji. [abstract][full text]
Work in progress
Infinitely repeated games with discounting. What changes if players are allowed to conceal their intensions in imprecise devices? [abstract]
Payoffs to strategies protected against renegotiation.
Demographic changes and asset prices in an overlapping generations model, with Frank Riedel and Beatrice D. Simo-Kengne