Works in progress

Abstract

The relationship between policy intensity and policy effectiveness remains uncertain. Increases in policy intensity—whether via higher penalties for noncompliance or greater incentives for compliance—may improve compliance but can also encourage loophole exploitation, potentially undermining policy effectiveness. This paper posits that, within certain ranges, greater policy intensity does not necessarily translate into higher effectiveness.

Numerous cities around the world have adopted vehicle control policies—such as low-emission zones and congestion pricing—to reduce air pollution. This paper focuses on this widely implemented policy type in Seoul, South Korea,  where driving restrictions were imposed on high-polluting vehicles. We take advantage of the fact that the vehicle control policy in Seoul has been intensified gradually over the years, providing an ideal context to examine how policy effectiveness responds to incremental changes in policy intensity at each stage of ratcheting.

Ratcheting, as observed in Seoul’s vehicle control policy, is a common feature of many transportation and environmental measures. Such policies often begin with a pilot phase and gradually expand in coverage and intensity. However, how compliance and loophole-exploiting behavior respond to this ratcheting process has received limited attention in the existing policy evaluation literature.

We model individuals’ decisions—whether to comply fully, exploit loopholes, or engage in outright noncompliance—and examine how these choices vary with changes in policy intensity. This framework enables us to test not only whether compliance rises linearly with policy intensity, but also how loophole exploiting behavior responds to rising regulatory pressure.

In Seoul, we found that loophole-exploiting tactics, such as taking detour routes or driving at unregulated times (before 6 a.m. or after 9 p.m.), evolved in tandem with policy ratcheting. To empirically test the theoretical predictions, I exploit several ratcheting events in Seoul, order them by stringency, and compare the magnitude of loophole exploitation—measured by increased non-crackdown-hour traffic resulting from shifted travel to unregulated times (i.e., immediately before and after the crackdown). I found that the event in which the policy was most stringently ratcheted witnessed the largest increase in loophole exploitation (23%), while the next most stringent event was accompanied by a 12% increase, and the least stringent one saw a 7% increase. This cross-event comparison confirms my theoretical prediction that higher policy intensity can lead to greater loophole exploitation. These results are robust when tested with other loophole-exploiting behaviors, such as detour use, and the impacts translated into worsened air quality (O3, PM10, PM2.5) during non-crackdown hours.

Abstract

Pedestrian deaths in the U.S. decreased until 2010, after which they began to rise. Our research aims to investigate the causes behind this recent increase in pedestrian fatalities, which is unique to the U.S., and to interpret this trend in terms of pedestrian-driver inequality. Our hypothesis is that the rising popularity of smartphones and heavy vehicles, such as SUVs, since 2010 has contributed to more frequent traffic accidents and more severe crashes, leading to an increase in pedestrian deaths. 

We found that increased smartphone penetration is associated with an increase of 0.02 to 0.05 in the average crash frequency. Furthermore, an additional 1,000 pounds (lb) increase in vehicle weight raises the risk of immediate fatality for a non-occupant by 12\% in the event of a traffic accident. Distraction from smartphone usage also increases this risk; conversely, a smartphone network outage was found to lower a non-occupant's probability of immediate death by 3.5\%.

Using smartphones while driving distracts drivers and lowers their driving performance, resulting in more frequent traffic accidents.  Heavy and large vehicles are more detrimental to non-occupants because the points of impact are more likely to strike the upper body, including the head, which is directly linked to the victim’s survival in the event of a collision. However, heavy and large vehicles provide greater safety for drivers, as they act as a shield in the event of a collision.

We emphasize the necessity of laws and regulations to protect non-occupants marginalized by U.S. transportation and automobile policies. We propose modifying the Corporate Average Fuel Economy (CAFE) standard, and we advocate for regulations that incentivize the production of lighter electric vehicles (EVs) and stricter regulations on smartphone use while driving in the U.S.

Abstract

The problem of asymmetry and presence of temporally diffused goods can be assessed by the framework described by the Dictator Game. We suggest two “multigenerational” versions of the basic game: sequential dictator game (SEQ) and simultaneous dictator game (SIM), both of which are characterised by a sequence of players who represent the fictitious generations in an intergenerational allocation problem. In the SEQ, a decision is made in each round where the current dictator (generation) allocates the endowment (that is passed down from the previous generation) between himself and all future generations. This contrasts with the SIM where only the initial dictator (generation) gets to make a decision by simultaneously allocating the initial endowment between himself and every other future generation. This simple paradigm allows to investigate the effect of different settings on the decision process of resource allocation. In particular, we seek to study whether giving the current "dictator" control over all future generations induces them to be more fair than if they had control over only themself. Additionally, we intend to measure correlation between these differences and basic sociodemographic information, collected with a questionnaire at the end of the experiment. The results of the study will give new insights about generosity and fairness in absence of reciprocity, and provide insights about possible strategies to increase fairness in intergenerational coordination problems.

Abstract

This study investigates the effect of additional federal government transfers to municipal governments on deforestation in Legal Amazon in Brazil. Depending on how the government budget is spent, the impact on forests can be negative or positive. The government transfers from the federal government to municipal governments change discretely at given population thresholds, opening the possibility of using a regression discontinuity design (RDD). Using fuzzy regression discontinuity design, the regression results show that increase in municipal budget exacerbate deforestation especially for the municipalities located in the higher population thresholds and with higher forested land ratio.