Egger, Hartmut and Christian Fischer-Thöne (2026): "Trade Policy in a Model of Sequential Production," in Economic Theory, forthcoming.
We develop a two-country trade model with sequential production in which a technologically backward economy exports intermediates in exchange for final goods from a technologically advanced economy. The advanced country can raisewelfare by imposing import tariffs on intermediates, whereas export tariffs on intermediates or import tariffs on final goods are ineffective for the backward economy. Instead, the backward economy resorts to a quantitative export constraint, diverting part of its labor force into a less efficient autarkic production process. We show that non-cooperative policy choices reduce trade and lower welfare in both countries, underscoring the need for a trade agreement. To sustain mutually beneficial liberalization after prior tariff reductions, however, an agreement may have to link tariff cuts to the removal of export constraints, particularlywhen lifting these constraints is costly for the backward economy.
Egger, Hartmut, Elke Jahn, and Udo Kreickemeier (2026): "How Border and Distance Effects Shape the Multinational Wage Premium," in American Economic Journal Microeconomics, forthcoming.
The multinational wage premium is well documented across countries. Using a new German dataset, we identify two previously overlooked determinants. First, wages paid by foreign multinationals in German plants increase with the distance between headquarters and the plant location. Second, foreign multinationals headquartered near their German plants pay lower wages than domestic multinationals, implying a negative border effect. We develop a model with plant-specic wages and rms choosing between exporting and foreign production. Distance reduces the attractiveness of exporting, making rms more willing to accept higher wages in more distant foreign locations.
Egger, Hartmut, Peter Egger, and Douglas Nelson (2025): "International Trade and Income Distribution: The Effect of Corporate Governance Regimes," in Review of International Economics, 33(1) Published Version
This paper introduces a model of corporate governance into the general oligopolistic equilibrium theory of international trade. Corporate governance denes the influence of workers and capital owners on manager contract and, through this contract, the scope of these two groups for subsequent rent extraction in the wage/employment negotiation between firms and unions. If capital owners have dictatorship over the manager contract, they can extract the full bargaining surplus and eliminate the union wage premium. If workers have dictatorship over the manager contract they can achieve a wage premium, driving the income of capital owners down to zero. In this setting, opening up to trade is to the detriment of the income group whose interests are decisive for the manager contract. This shows that distributional conflicts materializing from trade can be considerably different for countries with differing corporate governance regimes. Foreign investment allows capital owners in unionized industries to flee from disadvantageous corporate governance regimes at home, eliminating union wage premia and lowering manager remuneration in countries with corporate governance regimes that give workers dictatorship over manager contracts.
Egger, Hartmut, Udo Kreickemeier, and Jens Wrona (2025): "Monopsony Power, Offshoring, and a European Minimum Wage," in Review of International Economics, 33(1), 78-98. Published Version
This paper sets up a two-country model of offshoring with monopolistically competitive product and monopsonistically competitive labour markets. In our model, an incentive for offshoring exists even between symmetric countries, because shifting part of the production abroad reduces local labour demand and allows firms to more strongly execute their monopsonistic labour market power. However, offshoring between symmetric countries has negative welfare effects and therefore calls for policy intervention. In this context, we put forward the role of a common minimum wage and show that the introduction of a moderate minimum wage increases offshoring and reduces welfare. In contrast, a sizable minimum wage reduces offshoring and increases welfare. Beyond that, we also show that a sufficiently high common minimum wage cannot only eliminate offshoring but also inefficiencies in the resource allocation due to monopsonistic labour market distortions in closed economies.
Egger, Hartmut, Udo Kreickemeier, Christoph Moser, and Jens Wrona (2024): "Offshoring and Job Polarisation between Firms," in Journal of International Economics, 148, 103892. Published Version
Using linked employer-employee data for Germany, we provide evidence for job polarisation between firms and identify offshoring as an important determinant of these employment changes. To accommodate these findings, we set up a model in which offshoring to a low-wage country can lead to job polarisation in the high-wage country due to a reallocation of labour across firms that differ in productivity and pay wages that are positively linked to their profits. Offshoring is chosen only by the most productive firms, and only for those tasks with the lowest variable offshoring costs. A reduction in those variable costs increases offshoring at the intensive and at the extensive margin. Well in line with our evidence, this causes domestic employment shifts from the newly offshoring firms in the middle of the productivity distribution to firms at the tails of this distribution, paying either very low or very high wages.
Egger, Hartmut, Udo Kreickemeier, Christoph Moser, and Jens Wrona (2022): "Exporting and Offshoring with Monopsonistic Competition," in The Economic Journal 132, 1449–1488. Published Version / Working Paper
We develop a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms and monopsonistically competitive labour markets. We show that due to monopsonistic competition our model makes sharply different predictions about the effects of the export of goods and the offshoring of tasks. Trade in goods is unambiguously welfare increasing as domestic resources are reallocated to large firms with high productivity and firms with low productivities exit the market thereby reducing the monopsony distortion present in autarky. Offshoring, however, gives firms additional scope for exercising monopsony power by reducing their domestic size and therefore can lead to welfare losses.
Egger, Hartmut, Elke Jahn, and Stefan Kornitzky (2022): "How Does the Position in Business Group Hierarchies Affect Workers' Wages?," in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 194, 244-263. Published Version / Working Paper
We merge firm-level data on ownership linkages with administrative data on German workers to analyze how the position in a business group hierarchy affects workers’ wages. To acknowledge that ownership linkages are not one-directional, we propose an index of hierarchical distance to the ultimate owner that accounts for the complex network structure of business groups. After controlling for unobserved heterogeneity, we find a positive effect of larger hierarchical distance to the ultimate owner of a business group on workers’ wages. To explain this finding, we develop a monitoring-based theory of business groups. Our model predicts higher wages to prevent shirking by workers if a larger hierarchical distance to the ultimate owner is associated with lower monitoring efficiency.
Egger, Hartmut and Simone Habermeyer (2022): "How Preferences Shape the Welfare and Employment Effects of Trade," in Review of World Economics 158, 815-853. Published Version
We set up a trade model with two countries, two sectors, and one production factor, which features a home-market effect due to the existence of trade costs. We consider search frictions and firm-level wage bargaining in the sector producing differentiated goods and a perfectly competitive labor market in the sector producing a homogeneous good. Consumers have price-independent generalized-linear preferences over the two types of goods, covering homothetic and quasi-homothetic preferences as two limiting cases. Due to the specific functional forms of indirect utility, homothetic preferences lead to risk aversion, while quasi-homothetic preferences lead to risk neutrality in our model. We show that trade between two countries that differ in their population size leads to an expansion of the differentiated goods sector and a contraction of the homogeneous good sector in the larger economy. This induces the larger country to net-export differentiated goods at the cost of a higher economy-wide rate of unemployment in the open economy (with the effects reversed for the smaller country). The welfare effects of trade depend on the preference structure. Looking at the two limiting cases, we show that the larger country is likely to benefit from trade if preferences are homothetic, whereas losses from trade are possible if preferences are quasi-homothetic. The opposite is true in the smaller country. This reveals an important role of preferences for the welfare effects of trade in the presence of labor market imperfection, a result we further elaborate on by considering more general preferences as well as differences of countries in their per-capita income levels.
Egger, Hartmut, Udo Kreickemeier, and Philipp M. Richter (2021): "Environmental Policy and Firm Selection in the Open Economy," in Journal of the Association of Environmental and Resource Economists 8, 655-690. Published Version
In this paper, we analyze the effects of a unilateral change in an emissions tax in a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms. We find a positive effect of tighter environmental policy on average productivity in the reforming country through reallocation of labor toward exporting firms. Domestic aggregate emissions fall, due to both a scale and a technique effect, but we show that the reduction in emissions following the tax increase is smaller than in autarky. Moreover, general equilibrium effects through changes in the foreign wage rate lead to a reduction in foreign emissions and, hence, to negative emissions leakage. In case of transboundary pollution this exerts in turn a positive feedback effect on the domestic environment.
Egger, Hartmut, Peter Egger, Peter, Udo Kreickemeier, and Christoph Moser (2020): "The Exporter Wage Premium when Firms and Workers Are Heterogeneous," in European Economic Review 130, 103599. Published Version / Working Paper
In this paper, we develop a new model of international trade, in which workers featuring higher innate abilities match with firms featuring higher innate productivities. This model allows us to quantify the effect of trade on labour income inequality when workers have heterogeneous abilities within the broad groups of skilled and unskilled workers. Self-selection of the most productive firms into exporting generates an exporter wage premium, and our framework with skilled and unskilled workers allows us to decompose this premium into its skill-specific components. We employ linked employer-employee data from Germany to structurally estimate the parameters of the model. These parameter estimates imply an average exporter wage premium of 6 percent, with exporting firms paying no wage premium at all to their unskilled workers, while the premium for skilled workers is 15 percent. Measured by the Theil index, moving the economy to autarky would reduce wage inequality within the group of skilled workers by 29 percent, and it would reduce overall labour income inequality by 8 percent.
Egger, Hartmut and Christian Fischer (2020): "Increasing Resistance to Globalization : The Role of Trade in Tasks," in European Economic Review 126, 103446. Published Version / Working Paper
Based on empirical evidence from cross-country survey data, we argue that the surge of trade in tasks over the last decades can explain increasing resistance to globalization in industrialized countries. In a traditional trade model of a small open economy, we demonstrate that public education provides protection against losses from trade in goods and services if trade increases the relative price of skill-intensive goods. Furthermore, increasing public schooling expenditure may help securing support for trade reform by a majority of voters. However, if education provides task-specific skills and trade in tasks makes some of these skills obsolete in the open economy, raising public schooling expenditure is of limited help to secure support for trade reform by a majority of voters, even if the reform is welfare-improving. Therefore, our analysis indicates that, in contrast to past episodes of globalization, public education does not shield workers from losses from trade in tasks and that drastic changes of the education system are needed in order to counter the increase of protectionist sentiments. To preserve majority support for trade reform, policy makers should adjust public education to provide broader, less-specialized skills. Although broader skills are less productive in a closed economy, acquiring them pays off as they increase the likelihood that a proposal for welfare-improving trade reform can be successful in a referendum.
Capuano, Stella, Hartmut Egger, Michael Koch, and Hans-Jörg Schmerer (2020): "Offshoring and Firm Overlap : Welfare Effects with Non-Sharp Selection into Offshoring," in Review of International Economics 28, 138-167. Published Version / Working Paper
Using German establishment data, we provide evidence for selection of larger, more productive producers into offshoring. However, the selection is not sharp, and offshoring and nonoffshoring producers coexist over a wide range of the revenue distribution. To explain this overlap, we set up a model of offshoring, in which we decouple offshoring status from revenues through heterogeneity in two technology parameters. In an empirical analysis, we employ German establishment data to estimate key parameters of the model and show that disregarding the overlap has large quantitative effects. It lowers the estimated gains from offshoring by almost 50% and, at the same time, exaggerates the role of the extensive margin for explaining the evolution of German offshoring since the 1990s.
Egger, Hartmut and Elke Jahn (2020): "Ownership and the Multinational Wage Premium," in Applied Economics Letters 27, 422-425. Published Version
Combining administrative data on German workers at the plant level with detailed global ownership information, we provide evidence that the multinational and hierarchical structure of networks matters for wages paid by plants. We find that both network characteristics are equally important for the wage premium paid by multinationals. Moreover, the hierarchical distance is also important for wages paid by plants in national networks.
Egger, Hartmut, Elke Jahn, and Stefan Kornitzky (2020): "Reassessing the Foreign Ownership Wage Premium in Germany," in The World Economy 43, 302-325. Published Version / Working Paper
This paper evaluates the effect of foreign takeover on wages of workers in German establishments, using rich linked employer–employee data from 2003 to 2014. To identify a causal effect of foreign takeover, we combine propensity-score matching with a difference-in-difference estimator. We find that a takeover by a foreign investor leads to a wage premium of 4.0 log points in the year after ownership change, which further increases to 6.3 log points 3 years after acquisition. The wage premium is largest for high-skilled workers, which is consistent with three theoretical arguments, namely rent appropriation by managers, technology protection and training on new technology. We also show that the wage premium does not pick up an exporter effect due to a platform investment of the foreign owner, that it takes about 4 years before it fully develops, that it does not vanish after foreign divestment and that the wage increase is specific to foreign acquisition instead of ownership change per se.
Eckel, Carsten and Hartmut Egger (2017): "The Dilemma of Labor Unions : Local Objectives vs. Global Bargaining," in Review of International Economics 25, 534-566. Published Version
It is a widespread concern that multinational enterprises improve their disagreement profits by setting up foreign production facilities, with adverse consequences for negotiated wages and union utilities. In this paper, we take a new angle on this issue and analyze whether unions can improve their situation by cooperating internationally. Our results show that cooperation is clearly beneficial for unions if their preferences regarding wages and employment are similar across countries. If these preferences differ, however, potential production reallocations by multinationals create winners and losers among unions, and this may impede cooperation of unions within the multinational production network.
Egger, Hartmut and Josef Falkinger (2016): "Limited Consumer Attention in International Trade," in Review of International Economics 24, 1096-1128. Published Version / Working Paper
This paper introduces a model of limited consumer attention into an otherwise standard new trade theory model with love-of-variety preferences and heterogeneous firms. In this setting, we show that international integration needs not be welfare enhancing if the consumers' capacity to gather and process information is limited. Rather, it intensifies competition for scarce consumer attention, which causes mutual overbidding of producers in their advertising expenditures. The mutual overbidding renders advertising—which is informative in principle—wasteful and diverts purchases to imported goods at an inefficient scale. Wasteful advertising provides scope for policy intervention in the form of an advertising tax. However, if the tax instrument is not allowed to discriminate against foreign producers, it cannot eliminate inefficient diversion of consumer purchases to imports; hence it needs not be successful in securing gains from international integration in this framework.
Egger, Hartmut, Frode Meland, and Hans-Jörg Schmerer (2015): "Differences in the Degree of Unionization as a Source of Comparative Advantage in Open Economies," in Canadian Journal of Economics 48, 245-272. Published Version
This paper considers two integrated countries that differ only in their labour markets: one country hosts unions, whereas the other one pays competitive wages. These institutional differences are a source of comparative advantage, which crucially impact inter-industry trade and welfare in the open economy. In this setting, deunionization exerts opposing welfare effects in the two economies. Increasing product market competition is beneficial for the unionized country and detrimental for its trading partner. Finally, we conduct an empirical analysis that provides strong support for the main hypotheses of our theoretical model.
Egger, Hartmut, Peter Egger, and Tobias Seidel (2015): "Firm Integration Strategies and Imperfect Labour Markets," in Canadian Journal of Economics 48, 1883-1901. Published Version
This paper introduces labour market imperfections into a three-country model to study the determinants of firm integration strategies in an open economy. Accounting simultaneously for the decision upon in-house production versus international outsourcing and the decision upon exporting versus horizontal foreign investment, the analysis points to a crucial role of labour market frictions for the interaction of vertical and horizontal aspects of firm integration strategies in a general equilibrium environment. Beyond that, the analysis sheds light on the consequences of integrating developing countries into the global market, thereby pointing to hitherto unexplored effects arising from adjustments of firm integration strategies. In a welfare analysis, we show that the existence of gains from trade crucially depends on whether firm integration strategies are endogenous or not.
Egger, Hartmut, Udo Kreickemeier, and Jens Wrona (2015): "Offshoring Domestic Jobs," in Journal of International Economics 97, 112-125. Published Version / Working Paper
We develop a two-country general equilibrium model, in which heterogeneous firms offshore routine tasks to a low-wage host country. In the presence of fixed costs for offshoring the most productive firms self-select into offshoring, which leads to a reallocation of domestic labor towards less productive uses if offshoring costs are high. As a consequence domestic welfare may fall. The reallocation effect is reversed and domestic welfare rises if offshoring costs are low. The aggregate income distribution, comprising wages and entrepreneurial incomes, becomes more unequal with offshoring.
Egger, Hartmut and Daniel Etzel (2014): "Union Wage Setting and International Trade with Footloose Capital," in Regional Science and Urban Economics 48, 56-67. Published Version / Working Paper
This paper sets up a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with two countries that differ in the centralization of union wage-setting. Being interested in the consequences of openness, we show that, in the short run, trade increases welfare and employment in both locations, and it raises income of capital owners as well as workers. In the long run, capital outflows from the country with the more centralized wage-setting generate winners and losers and make the two countries more dissimilar in terms of unemployment or welfare. Decentralization of wage-setting can successfully prevent capital outflow and the export of jobs.
Egger, Hartmut, Peter Egger, and Udo Kreickemeier (2013): "Trade, Wages, and Profits," in European Economic Review 64, 332-350. Published Version / Working Paper
This paper formulates a structural empirical model of heterogeneous firms whose workers exhibit fair-wage preferences, leading to a link between a firm's operating profits and wages of workers employed by this firm. We estimate the parameters of the model in a dataset of five European economies. The model predicts an exporter wage premium, which we find to be sizable in all countries, with nearly 6% on average. The estimates enable us to conduct counterfactual exercises. We find that openness to international trade has quantitatively important effects, leading to higher wage inequality and lower aggregate employment.
Egger, Hartmut, Josef Falkinger, and Volker Grossmann (2012): “Brain Drain, Fiscal Competition, and Public Education Expenditure,” in Review of International Economics 20(1), 81-94. Published Version
A two-country model is developed in this paper to examine the implications of fiscal competition in public education expenditure under international mobility of high-skilled labor. The authors allow for educational choice, asymmetry of countries with respect to total factor productivity, and tax base effects of migration in source and host country. As the latter may give rise to multiplicity of equilibrium, alternative belief structures of mobile high-skilled workers are carefully taken into account. The paper also looks at the consequences of bilateral policy coordination. While in line with other studies on tax competition, bilateral coordination can reduce the under-investment problem in public education spending, it also tends to hinder migration or may even reverse the direction of the migration flow that materializes under non-cooperative policy setting. As a result of its potentially adverse effects on migration patterns, bilateral coordination may therefore reduce global welfare and bring the world economy further away from the social planner's solution.
Egger, Hartmut and Udo Kreickemeier (2012): “Fairness, Trade, and Inequality,” in Journal of International Economics 86(2), 184-196. Published Version
We develop a model of international trade between two symmetric countries that features inter-group inequality between managers and workers, and also intra-group inequality within each of those two groups. Individuals are heterogeneous with respect to their managerial ability, and firms run by more able managers have a higher productivity level and make higher profits. There is rent sharing at the firm level due to fair wage preferences of workers, and hence firms with higher profits pay higher wages in equilibrium in order to elicit their workers' full effort. We show that in this framework international trade leads to a self-selection of the best firms into export status, with exporting firms having to pay a wage premium. Aggregate welfare increases, but there is also larger inequality along multiple dimensions: Involuntary unemployment and income inequality between managers and workers increase, and so does inequality within these two subgroups of individuals, as measured by the respective Gini coefficients.
Egger, Hartmut and Daniel Etzel (2012): “The Impact of Trade on Employment, Welfare, and Income Distribution in Unionized General Oligopolistic Equilibrium,” in European Economic Review 56(6), 1119-1135. Published Version
This paper sets up a multi-sector general oligopolistic equilibrium trade model in which all firms face wage claims of firm-level unions. By accounting for productivity differences across industries, the model features income inequality along multiple lines, including inequality between firm owners and workers as well as within these two groups of agents, and involuntary unemployment. We use this setting to study the impact of trade liberalization on key macroeconomic performance measures. In particular, we show that a movement from autarky to free trade with a fully symmetric partner country lowers union wage claims and therefore stimulates employment and raises welfare. Whether firms can extract a larger share of rents in the open economy depends on the competitive environment in the product market. Furthermore, the distribution of profit income across firm owners remains unaffected, while the distribution of wage income becomes more equal when a country opens up to trade with a fully symmetric trading partner. We also analyze how country size differences and technological dissimilarity of trading partners affect the results from our analysis.
Egger, Hartmut, Peter H. Egger, and James R. Markusen (2012): “International Welfare and Employment Linkages Arising from Minimum Wages,” in International Economic Review 53(3), 771-790. Published Version
We formulate a two-country model with monopolistic competition and heterogeneous firms to reconsider labor market linkages in open economies. Labor market imperfections arise by virtue of country-specific real minimum wages. Abstracting from selection of just the best firms into export status, standard effects on marginal and average firm productivity are reversed in our model, yet there are significant gains from trade arising from employment expansion. In addition, we show that with firm heterogeneity an increase in one country’s minimum wage triggers firm exit in both countries and thus harms workers at home and abroad.
Egger, Hartmut and Michael Koch (2012): “Labour Unions and Multi-Product Firms in Closed and Open Economies,” in Canadian Journal of Economics 45(4), 1456-1479. Published Version
This paper sets up a general oligopolistic equilibrium model with multi-product firms and union wage setting. In this model, we conduct two policy experiments. First, we show that deunionization induces a general decline in firm scale and scope, the respective reduction being more pronounced in non-unionized industries. Second, we study the consequences of trade liberalization, and show that access to foreign markets lowers firm scope in all industries as well as the scope differential between unionized and non-unionized firms. Adjustments in firm scale turn out to be less clear-cut and, inter alia, depend on the degree of product differentiation.
Egger, Hartmut, Peter H. Egger, and Michael Ryan (2010): “Bilateral and Third-Country Exchange Rate Effects on Multinational Activity,” in Review of International Economics 18(5), 1012–1027. Published Version
In an earlier paper, we showed that bilateral exchange rates are important determinants of multinational activity of both the US and Japan and that increases in the bilateral and third-country exchange rates exert opposing effects on bilateral multinational activity. Furthermore, the signs of the exchange rate coefficients differ between Japan and the US. In this paper, we formulate a three-country model with coexisting exporters and multinational firms that engage in Cournot competition to rationalize these effects. In this model, we identify two counteracting effects which govern the bilateral and third-country effects of an exchange rate increase on bilateral multinational activity. Our theoretical framework is flexible enough to explain the Japanese as well as the US patterns of exchange rate effects and it allows us to identify those factors that are responsible for the respective differences.
Egger, Hartmut, Peter H. Egger, Josef Falkinger, and Volker Grossmann (2010): “The Impact of Capital Market Integration on Educational Choice and the Consequences for Economic Growth,” in The World Economy 33(10), 1241-1268. Published Version
This paper examines the impact of capital market integration on higher education and the link to economic growth. The analysis takes into account that participation in higher education is non-compulsory and depends on individual choice. Due to capital–skill complementarity, integration increases (reduces) the incentives to participate in higher education in capital-importing (-exporting) economies, all other things equal. From a national policy point of view, public education expenditure should increase after integration of similar economies in order to attract mobile capital. Using foreign direct investment as a measure of capital flows, we present empirical evidence which largely confirms our main hypothesis: an increase in net capital inflows in response to capital market integration raises participation in higher education. In addition, we show that the adjustment in educational attainment is an empirically relevant channel through which capital inflows foster economic growth.
Davies, Ronald B., Hartmut Egger, and Peter H. Egger (2010): “Profit Taxation and the Mode of Foreign Market Entry,” in Canadian Journal of Economics 43(2), 704-727. Published Version
This paper studies the role of profit taxation for an international firm's decision upon how to penetrate a foreign market – through exports or through foreign direct investment (FDI) and local supply. We show that with harmonized taxes the international firm may choose FDI even though this has welfare costs from a global point of view. With tax competition, the host country can enforce exporting instead of FDI. This leads to a Nash equilibrium associated with higher world welfare than harmonized taxes. Thus, because of the effect on entry mode, tax competition provides heretofore unexplored benefits as compared to tax harmonization.
Egger, Hartmut and Peter H. Egger (2010): “The Trade and Welfare Effects of Mergers in Space,” in Regional Science and Urban Economics 40(4), 210-220. Published Version
This paper analyzes the consequences of cross-border mergers in a spatial framework, thereby distinguishing three channels of influence: a price increase due to the elimination of product market competition, an adjustment in plant location which reduces overall transportation cost expenditures, and a harmonization in production costs due to a technology transfer within the firm. The analysis illustrates that cross-border mergers raise world welfare over its level in an already open economy with free trade but no foreign investment. In particular, larger countries benefit from the additional investment opportunities, while smaller countries may lose, if the pre-merger production cost differential across firms is negligible and/or a post-merger technology transfer across production sites is infeasible. Furthermore, the analysis provides novel insights into the trade pattern effects of a merger. One important result in this respect is that an adjustment of plant location in space can reverse the direction of (net) trade flows between two countries.
Egger, Hartmut and Udo Kreickemeier (2010): “Worker-Specific Effects of Globalisation,” in The World Economy 33(8), 987-1005. Published Version
This paper sets up a general equilibrium model, in which firms are heterogeneous due to productivity differences and workers have fairness preferences and hence provide full effort only if their factor return is sufficiently high. With the wage considered to be fair by workers depending on the operating profits of the firm in which they are employed, more productive firms in this setting are not only larger and make higher profits but they also have to pay higher wages due to rent-sharing. This mechanism leads to wage differentiation even if all workers share the same individual characteristics. We use this framework to study worker-specific effects of trade between two symmetric countries. Exporters in this setting make higher operating profits and hence have to pay higher wages than non-exporters. This exporter wage premium provides a source for losses from trade and, all other things equal, makes a negative employment effect of trade more likely. Furthermore, it contributes significantly to a general increase in intra-group income inequality among production workers when a country moves from autarky to trade.
Egger, Hartmut and Gabriel Felbermayr (2009): “Endogenous Skill Formation and the Source Country Effects of Skilled Labor Emigration from Developing Countries,” in Journal of Economics and Statistics 229(6), 706–729. Published Version / Working-Paper Version
In this paper we set up a simple theoretical framework to study the possible source country effects of skilled labor emigration from developing countries. We show that for given technologies, labor market integration necessarily lowers GDP per capita in a poor source country of emigration, because it distorts the education decision of individuals. As pointed out by our analysis, a negative source country effect also materializes if all agents face identical emigration probabilities, irrespective of their education levels. This is in sharp contrast to the case of exogenous skill supply. Allowing for human capital spillovers, we further show that with social returns to schooling there may be a counteracting positive source country effect if the prospect of emigration stimulates the incentives to acquire education. Since, in general, the source country effects are not clear, we calibrate our model for four major source countries - Mexico, Turkey, Morocco, and the Philippines - and show that an increase in emigration rates beyond those observed in the year 2000 is very likely to lower GDP per capita in poor economies.
Egger, Hartmut and Udo Kreickemeier (2009): “Firm Heterogeneity and the Labor Market Effects of Trade Liberalization,” in International Economic Review 50(1), 187–216. Published Version
This article develops a model that incorporates workers' fair wage preferences into a general equilibrium framework with heterogeneous firms. In a setting where the wage considered to be fair by workers depends on the productivity of the firm they are working in, we study the determinants of profits, involuntary unemployment and within-group wage inequality. We use this model to investigate the effects of globalization, thereby pointing to distributional conflicts that have so far not been accounted for: a simultaneous increase of average profits and involuntary unemployment as well as a surge in within-group wage inequality.
Egger, Hartmut and Udo Kreickemeier (2009): “Redistributing Gains from Globalisation,” in Scandinavian Journal of Economics 111(4), 765–788. Published Version
This paper analyses the effects of redistribution in a model of international trade with heterogeneous firms in which a fair-wage effort mechanism leads to firm-specific wage payments and involuntary unemployment. The redistribution scheme is financed by profit taxes and gives the same absolute lump-sum transfer to all workers. International trade increases aggregate income and income inequality, ceteris paribus. If, however, trade is accompanied by a suitably chosen increase in the profit tax rate, it is possible to achieve higher aggregate income and a more equal income distribution than in autarky, provided that the share of exporters is sufficiently high.
Eckel, Carsten and Hartmut Egger (2009): “Wage Bargaining and Multinational Firms,” in Journal of International Economics 77(2), 206–214. Published Version / Working-Paper Record
We set up a general equilibrium model with heterogeneous firms to study the interaction between wage bargaining and foreign direct investment. Thereby, we highlight the incentives of firms to invest abroad in order to improve their bargaining position vis-á-vis local unions and we show how changes in the bargaining power of unions affect the share of multinational firms in an open economy. In addition, taking into account this relationship between wage bargaining and foreign direct investment, our analysis provides novel insights on how labor income and the unemployment rate adjust to economic integration and how changes in the bargaining power of unions affect these two labor market variables.
Egger, Hartmut and Udo Kreickemeier (2008): “International Fragmentation: Boon or Bane for Domestic Employment?,” in European Economic Review 52(1), 116–132. Published Version
In this paper, we introduce the fairness approach to efficiency wages into a standard model of international fragmentation. This gives us a theoretical framework in which wage inequality and unemployment rates are co-determined and therefore the public concern can be addressed that international fragmentation and outsourcing to low wage countries lead to domestic job-losses. We develop a novel diagrammatic tool to illustrate the main labour market effects of international fragmentation. We also explore how preferences for fair wages and the size of unemployment benefits govern the employment effects of outsourcing and critically assess the role of political intervention that aims to reduce unemployment benefits under internationally fragmented production.
Egger, Hartmut, Peter H. Egger, and David Greenaway (2008): “The Trade Structure Effects of Endogenous Regional Trade Agreements,” in Journal of International Economics 74(2), 278–298. Published Version
This paper formulates an empirical model to estimate the impact of endogenous new regional trade agreement (RTA) membership on trade structure. The likelihood of new RTA membership is influenced by economic fundamentals such as country size, factor endowments, and trade and investment costs. In a sample of country-pairs covering mainly the OECD economies we find a particularly strong effect of endogenous RTAs on intra-industry trade in a difference-in-difference analysis based on matching techniques. The associated trade volume effects are similar to the ones found in previous research on the effects of endogenous RTAs. Overall, this indicates that RTA membership might reduce inter-industry trade not only in relative but also in absolute terms and that the trade volume effect is due to the associated growth in trade within industries.
Egger, Hartmut, Peter H. Egger, and David Greenaway (2007): “Intra-Industry Trade with Multinational Firms,” in European Economic Review 51(8), 1959–1984. Published Version
Recent developments, including the analysis of firm-level adjustment to falling trade costs, have contributed to a revival of interest in intra-industry trade (IIT). Most empirical work still relies on the standard Grubel–Lloyd measure. This however refers only to international trade, disregarding income flows stimulated by repatriated profits of multinational firms. Given the overwhelming importance of the latter, this is a major shortcoming. This paper provides a guide to measurement and estimation of the determinants of bilateral IIT shares from the perspective of new trade theory with multinational firms. We develop an analytically solvable general equilibrium model to investigate the impact of investment costs, multinational activities and income flows from repatriated profits. We also discuss and quantify the bias of the Grubel–Lloyd index associated with repatriated profit flows of multinationals. Using bias-corrected versions of the Grubel–Lloyd index as the dependent variable, we demonstrate that the determinants motivated by our theoretical analysis offer important insights into variations in IIT shares.
Egger, Hartmut and Peter H. Egger (2007): “Outsourcing and Trade in a Spatial World,” in Journal of Urban Economics 62(3), 441–470. Published Version
This paper provides an analysis of outsourcing and trade in a spatial model à la Hotelling. In this setting, we discuss the trade-off between transport-cost-related disadvantages and outsourcing-related production cost advantages of a large economy and we investigate how the existence of national transport costs influences both the structure of industrial production and the pattern of final goods trade. In addition, the model gives a rich picture of the possible welfare effects of trade liberalization. In particular, we show that a final goods exporting country definitely gains from economic integration, while a final goods importing country may lose. Finally, when lowering domestic outsourcing activities, trade liberalization may reduce world welfare, even if pro-competitive effects lead to a decline in consumer prices.
Egger, Hartmut and Peter H. Egger (2006): “International Outsourcing and the Productivity of Low-Skilled Labour in the EU,” in Economic Inquiry 44(1), 98–108. Published Version
This article presents first insights into the role of international outsourcing on the productivity of low-skilled workers in EU manufacturing. Whereas in the short run international outsourcing exhibits a negative marginal effect on real value added per low-skilled worker, the long-run parameter estimates reveal a positive impact. This may be explained by imperfections in European labor and goods markets, which prohibit an immediate adjustment in the factor employment and the output structure. The change in the outsourcing intensity since 1993 alone acounts for a long-run increase of about 6.0% in the real value added per low-skilled worker.
Egger, Hartmut and Josef Falkinger (2006): “The Role of Public Infrastructure and Subsidies for Firm Location and International Outsourcing,” in European Economic Review 50(8), 1993–2015. Published Version
This paper presents a model in which final goods producers outsource intermediate input production. Intermediate inputs are differentiated and their production can be located at home or abroad. The model is used to examine competitive location policy in a (two-country) free trade area (FTA). It is shown that national public infrastructure investment has a positive effect on both the number of intermediate input producers and the return to the immobile factor in the home country. International outsourcing from home declines. Opposite effects are triggered in the partner country. In a welfare analysis we characterize national infrastructure policies that aim to maximize national income (net of tax costs) and compare the non-cooperative FTA-equilibrium with optimal policies from an integrated point of view. We show whether or not there is a need for policy coordination. Firm subsidies are discussed as an alternative to public infrastructure investment.
Egger, Hartmut and Peter H. Egger (2005): “The Determinants of EU Processing Trade,” in The World Economy 28(2), 147–168. Published Version
This paper assesses the determinants of European outward and inward processing trade. Thereby, it distinguishes between size, relative factor endowment, (other) cost factors and infrastructure variables. Using a large panel of bilateral processing trade flows of the EU12 countries at the aggregate level over the period 1988–1999, we find that infrastructure variables, relative factor endowments and other cost variables are important determinants for the EU's outward processing trade. Costs also play a key role for the EU's inward processing trade.
Egger, Hartmut and Volker Grossmann (2005): “The Double Role of Skilled Labor, New Technologies and Wage Inequality,” in Metroeconomica 56(1), 37–57. Published Version
We examine the relationship between the supply of skilled labor, technological change and relative wages. In accounting for the role of skilled labor in both production activities and productivity- enhancing ‘support’ activities we derive the following results. First, an increase in the supply of skilled labor raises the employment share of non-production labor within firms, without lowering relative wages. Second, new technologies raise wage inequality only in so far as they give incentives to firms to reallocate skilled labor towards non-production activities. In contrast, skill-biased technological change of the sort usually considered in the literature does not affect wage inequality.
Egger, Hartmut and Peter H. Egger (2005): “Labor Market Effects of Outsourcing under Industrial Interdependence,” in International Review of Economics & Finance 14(3), 349–363. Published Version
The consequences of international outsourcing in traditional models of trade are already well understood. However, with regard to empirical research there seem to be still some important shortcomings. Empirical studies on the labor market effects of outsourcing are mainly based on the same techniques that have been used for years. In terms of the adopted econometric specifications, one assumption is typical and – as we will show – critical in this regard. Practically all studies we are aware of assume independence between industries and neglect any spillover and feedback effects across industries. In fact, this is at odds with multi-sector general equilibrium models of trade. It is this paper's focus to relax this restrictive assumption and to suggest the use of different econometric methods. We consider national input–output linkages and cross industrial flows of workers as two important channels of inter-industrial spillovers in labor market effects. We focus on these transmission channels in an Austrian panel data set of 21 two-digit industries in the 1990s and find that industrial interdependencies induce a multiplier effect for changes in industry-specific variables such as international outsourcing. Disregarding spillover effects, therefore, leads to a substantial underestimation of the labor market implications of international outsourcing.
Egger, Hartmut and Volker Grossmann (2005): “Non-Routine Tasks, Restructuring of Firms, and Wage Inequality Within and Between Skill-Groups,” in Journal of Economics 86(3), 197–228. Published Version
This paper argues that endogenous restructuring processes within firms towards analytical and interactive non-routine tasks (like problem-solving and organizational activities, respectively), triggered by advances in information and communication technologies (ICT) and rising supply of educated workers, are associated with an increase of wage inequality within education groups. We show that this may be accompanied by a decline or stagnation of between-group wage dispersion. The mechanisms proposed in this research are not only consistent with the evolution of the distribution of wages in advanced countries, but also with the evolution of task composition in firms and a frequently confirmed complementarity between skill-upgrading, new technologies and knowledge-based work organization.
Beissinger, Thomas and Hartmut Egger (2004): “Dynamic Wage Bargaining if Benefits Are Tied to Individual Wages,” in Oxford Economic Papers 56(3), 437–460. Published Version / Working Paper
In dynamic wage bargaining models it is usually assumed that individual unemployment benefits are a fraction of the average wage level. In most countries, however, unemployment benefits are instead tied to the previous level of individually earned wages. We show how the analysis has to be modified if this fact is taken into account and compare our findings for the wage-setting curve with outcomes under other unemployment compensation schemes. From this comparison it becomes evident how the shape and position of the wage-setting curve depends on the specification of the unemployment benefit system. We also demonstrate that a reduction of unemployment benefits of those who become unemployed after the bargaining period leads to higher equilibrium unemployment.
Egger, Hartmut and Peter H. Egger (2004): “On the Relationship Between International Outsourcing and Price-Cost Margins in European Industries,” in Review of Industrial Organization 25(1), 45–69. Published Version
This paper sets up a model, where multinationals compete in quantities and domestic firms form a competitive fringe. Within this framework, we analyse the relationship between market concentration, international outsourcing and the industry price-cost margin. The empirical results of a panel of 66 industries and the EU12 countries in the 1990s strongly confirm our theoretical hypotheses. Market concentration and international outsourcing are positively related to industry price–cost margins. In a thought experiment, we show that industry price–cost margins would have decreased by 0.4 percentage points more in the 1990s, if international outsourcing had not changed since 1990. In addition, international outsourcing accounts for a convergence in margins across industries in the last decade.
Egger, Hartmut and Josef Falkinger (2003): “The Distributional Effects of International Outsourcing in a 2×2 Production Model,” in The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 14(2), 189–206. Published Version
This paper examines the distributional effects of international outsourcing in a two-sector, two-factor model. The analysis allows for switches between diversified and specialized equilibria. Also, equilibria in which only some firms of a sector outsource (incomplete or partial outsourcing) are considered. It is the interplay of the cost-saving and substitution effects of international outsourcing that determines the nature of the outsourcing equilibrium and its distributional consequences.
Egger, Hartmut and Peter H. Egger (2003): “On Market Concentration and International Outsourcing,” in Applied Economics Quarterly 49(1), 49–64. Published Version / Working Paper
This paper shows that market concentration is positively related to outsourcing activities in a framework of Cournot competition with strategic outsourcing in a first stage. The theoretical priors are confirmed by rank correlation coefficients between the intermediate goods import intensity and market concentration in the EU12 countries.
Egger, Hartmut and Peter H. Egger (2003): “Outsourcing and Skill-Specific Employment in a Small Open Economy: Austria after the Fall of the Iron Curtain,” in Oxford Economic Papers 55(4), 625–643. Published Version
We set up a model, in which firms in a small industrialized country outsource part of their production to a foreign economy, which is rich in low‐skilled labour. We analyse, how a decline in trade costs affects outsourcing activities and the production structure in the small economy. A stimulation of cross‐border outsourcing raises wage dispersion and, if labour markets are unionized, also the employment of high‐skilled relative to low‐skilled labour. Using a panel of Austrian industries, we find, first, that decreasing trade barriers—as observed after the fall of the Iron Curtain—indeed stimulate outsourcing to Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union, and, second, that outsourcing to these countries significantly shifts relative employment in favour of high‐skilled labour.
Egger, Hartmut and Peter H. Egger (2002): “How International Outsourcing Drives Up Eastern European Wages,” in Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 138(1), 83–96. Published Version
How International Outsourcing Drives Up Eastern European Wages. — This paper analyzes the effects of intermediate goods trade on the development of real wages in Central and Eastern European manufacturing. The empirical findings show that world exports in intermediate goods of the CEEC exhibit a negative impact on wages, and imports a positive one. Since 1993, intermediate goods trade between the EU and the CEEC accounted for an increase in wages being most pronounced in Slovakia, Poland and the Czech Republic.
Egger, Hartmut (2002): “International Outsourcing in a Two-Sector Heckscher–Ohlin Model,” in Journal of Economic Integration 17(4), 687–709. Published Version
This paper analyzes the distributional effects of international outsourcing in a two sector Heckscher-Ohlin type model if both sectors get economical access to cost-saving international outsourcing. Thereby, it is shown that if both sectors are engaged in international outsourcing in equilibrium, the cost-saving effects of outsourcing as well as the factor contents of the outsourced fragments are relevant for the factor price effects. Concerning the Pareto-criterion the main finding is that a Pareto-improving factor price impact of international outsourcing cannot be excluded from a theoretical point of view.
Egger, Hartmut (2002): “Unemployment May Be Lower if Unions Bargain over Wages and Employment,” in Labour 16(1), 103–133. Published Version
This paper addresses the question under which circumstances unemployment can be lower if unions bargain over wages and employment in a general equilibrium framework. Thereby, it turns out that the unemployment rate may negatively depend on the wage rate, if the unemployment compensation scheme contains a constant real term in addition to the replacement ratio component. This is, compared with a pure replacement ratio scheme, the more plausible formalization of the real world’s compensation systems, at least for European countries. Besides the theoretical analysis, the paper also derives political implications by identifying the relevant parameters for the decision on whether weakening unions will be a good strategy for an economy to overcome its unemployment problem.
Egger, Hartmut and Peter H. Egger (2001): “Cross-Border Sourcing and Outward Processing in EU Manufacturing,” in The North American Journal of Economics and Finance 12(3), 243–256. Published Version
With the help of a standard 2 × 2 trade model, we develop several hypotheses on the effects of cross-border sourcing on skill intensity in production. The focus is on cross-border sourcing of low-skill-intensive components of exports and import-competing products. We test the aforementioned hypotheses with panel data for manufacturing in the European Union (EU). We find that outward processing is more prevalent in import-competing industries, which are also the EU’s relatively intensive users of low-skilled labor. Outward processing in export industries is found to reduce the skill-to-low-skill ratio in EU industries, while outward processing in import-competing industries has more ambiguous effects.
Becker, Sascha O., Hartmut Egger, Michael Koch, and Marc-Andreas Muendler (2025): “Division of Labor in the Global Economy,” in NBER Working Paper No. 34549 (also CEPR DP 20860 and CESifo WP 12284). NBER Version / CESifo Version
We document empirically and model theoretically how internal labor market organization determines worker efficiency and wage inequality and show how both respond to globalization. Using German plant--worker data and information on the task content of occupations, we find that larger plants (i) use more occupations, (ii) assign fewer tasks per occupation, and (iii) exhibit greater wage dispersion within occupations. Plants endogenously bundle tasks into occupations, improving worker-task matching at the expense of higher fixed span-of-control costs. Embedding this choice into a Melitz framework, we show that trade increases worker efficiency and wage inequality in exporting plants. Structural estimation and simulations confirm the model's predictions and point to non-monotonic economy-wide effects.
Egger, Hartmut, Elke Jahn and Philipp Meier (2025): “Trade Policy along the Global Value Chain: A Rationale for the Existence of Deep Trade Agreements.” Working Paper (revision requested at Regional Science and Urban Economics)
This paper analyses the multinational productivity premium and its variation between urban and rural areas. Using administrative data for Germany, we confirm previous research findings that multinational firms are more productive than their national counterparts. Additionally, we identify an urban productivity premium for national firms and a previously unexplored rural productivity premiumfor multinational firms. Employing a two-stage treatment effects estimator, we show a positive causal effect of foreign takeover on the productivity of German firms, which is more pronounced in rural than in urban areas. Finally, we identify local competition as a key factor in explaining the observed productivity patterns. Stronger competition potentially increases the negative effects of outgoing knowledge spillovers on foreign technology leaders, making rural locations an attractive choice for them.
Egger, Hartmut, Peter Egger, Katharina Erhardt Egger, and Leandro Navarro (2026): “Hedging Trade Cost Uncertainty.” Under Construction
This paper studies how international firms hedge against trade cost uncertainty. We analyze two margins of adjustment: foreign market entry (exporting versus foreign direct investment) and invoicing in free-on-board (FOB) or cost-insurance-freight-inclusive (CIF) prices. In a model with oligopolistic competition and price rigidity, trade cost volatility jointly shapes entry and invoicing choices. Firms with small market shares prefer exporting and FOB-price invoicing, while firms with large market shares favor foreign investment and CIF-price invoicing. Using a novel transaction-level measure of trade cost volatility constructed from French customs data, we provide empirical support for these mechanisms and document joint determination of entry and invoicing decisions. Counterfactual analyses based on the structurally estimated and calibrated model indicate that trade cost uncertainty has quantitatively sizable effects on these decisions.
Egger, Hartmut and Elke Jahn (2026): “Creation and Appropriation of Surplus in Multinational Firms: Production vs. Financial Networks.” Under Construction
This paper studies the relationship between multinational ownership and wages paid by German manufacturing plants. We document a sizable multinational wage premium that is significantly smaller when plants are owned by financial investors. This observed wage gap is particularly pronounced in environments with collective bargaining and cross-border production structures.
Evidence on patent citations further suggests that technology linkages within ownership networks are associated with higher wages in general, but less so when plants are owned by financial investors. To interpret these patterns, we develop a general equilibrium model of trade with oligopolistic product market competition and collective wage bargaining. In the model, multinational ownership can shape wages through two channels: it strengthens firms’ outside options in wage negotiations, facilitating surplus appropriation in financial networks, and it can create additional surplus through the exploitation of cross-border production synergies in production networks. The latter channel is relevant only if the owner is not a financial investor, highlighting the central role of ownership structure for the labor market effects of multinational activity.
Egger Hartmut and Udo Kreickemeier (2026): "Trade and Wages," in Priyaranjan Jha and Devashish Mitra (eds.): Elgar Encyclopedia of International Trade, ch. 43, 221-224. Published Version
Egger, Hartmut and Boris Hirsch (2025): “Monopsonistic Labour Markets,” in German Economic Review 26(4), 305-313. [Editorial] Published Version
Egger, Hartmut and Nora M. Strecker (2024): “The 25th Anniversary of the German Economic Review 2.0,” in German Economic Review 25(4), 241-246. [Editorial] Published Version
Egger, Hartmut (2020): “Stehen globale Lieferketten nach der Krise vor einem Rückbau?,” in ifo Schnelldienst 73(5), 10-12. [Non-peer-reviewed policy article] Published Version
Egger, Hartmut and Jürgen Meckl (2015): “Globalisierung und Arbeitsmarkt," in: Hans-Jürgen Ramser and Manfred Stadler (HRSG): Entwicklung und Perspektiven der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Schriftenreiche, Mohr Siebeck, 2015.
Egger, Hartmut and Daniel Etzel (2011): “Koordinierung nationaler Lohnpolitik: Ein Kochrezept für die europäische Wirtschaftspolitik,” in ifo Schnelldienst 64(2), 3-5. [Non-peer-reviewed policy article] Published Version
Egger, Hartmut and Udo Kreickemeier (2007): “Globalisierung, Firmenselektion und Arbeitsmärkte,” in Wolfgang, Franz, Hans-Jürgen Ramser and Manfred Stadler (HRSG): Dynamik internationaler Märkte, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Schriftenreiche, Mohr Siebeck, 123-142. [Book chapter]
Egger, Hartmut, Peter H. Egger, and Volker Grossmann (2006): “Does Capital Mobility Promote Economic Growth? The Link to Education,” in Journal of Financial Transformation 17, 28-31. [Opinion article] University Record
Brief opinion article discussing education as a key channel through which international capital mobility can influence economic growth.
Egger, Hartmut (2004): “Review of Global Production and Trade in East Asia, edited by Leonard K. Cheng and Henryk Kierzkowski,” in Review of International Economics 12(2), 295-296. [Book review]
Book review.
Egger, Hartmut (2003): “Review of Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade, by James R. Markusen,” in Review of World Economics 139(2), 379-382. [Book review]
Egger Hartmut and Udo Kreickemeier (2026): "Trade and Wages," in Priyaranjan Jha and Devashish Mitra (eds.): Elgar Encyclopedia of International Trade, ch. 43, 221-224. Published Version
Egger, Hartmut and Boris Hirsch (2025): “Monopsonistic Labour Markets,” in German Economic Review 26(4), 305-313. [Editorial] Published Version
Egger, Hartmut and Nora M. Strecker (2024): “The 25th Anniversary of the German Economic Review 2.0,” in German Economic Review 25(4), 241-246. [Editorial] Published Version
Egger, Hartmut (2020): “Stehen globale Lieferketten nach der Krise vor einem Rückbau?,” in ifo Schnelldienst 73(5), 10-12. [Non-peer-reviewed policy article] Published Version
Egger, Hartmut and Jürgen Meckl (2015): “Globalisierung und Arbeitsmarkt," in: Hans-Jürgen Ramser and Manfred Stadler (HRSG): Entwicklung und Perspektiven der Wirtschaftswissenschaft, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Schriftenreiche, Mohr Siebeck, 2015.
Egger, Hartmut and Daniel Etzel (2011): “Koordinierung nationaler Lohnpolitik: Ein Kochrezept für die europäische Wirtschaftspolitik,” in ifo Schnelldienst 64(2), 3-5. [Non-peer-reviewed policy article] Published Version
Egger, Hartmut and Udo Kreickemeier (2007): “Globalisierung, Firmenselektion und Arbeitsmärkte,” in Wolfgang, Franz, Hans-Jürgen Ramser and Manfred Stadler (HRSG): Dynamik internationaler Märkte, Wirtschaftswissenschaftliche Schriftenreiche, Mohr Siebeck, 123-142. [Book chapter]
Egger, Hartmut, Peter H. Egger, and Volker Grossmann (2006): “Does Capital Mobility Promote Economic Growth? The Link to Education,” in Journal of Financial Transformation 17, 28-31. [Opinion article] University Record
Brief opinion article discussing education as a key channel through which international capital mobility can influence economic growth.
Egger, Hartmut (2004): “Review of Global Production and Trade in East Asia, edited by Leonard K. Cheng and Henryk Kierzkowski,” in Review of International Economics 12(2), 295-296. [Book review]
Book review.
Egger, Hartmut (2003): “Review of Multinational Firms and the Theory of International Trade, by James R. Markusen,” in Review of World Economics 139(2), 379-382. [Book review]