Co-Authors: Pulak Ghosh, Arkodipta Sarkar, and Nishant Vats
Abstract: This study examines the impact of political institutions on firm creation, focusing on how governance structures influence spatial distribution of entrepreneurship. We exploit a unique natural experiment in India, where haphazard overlaps of electoral and administrative boundaries create quasi-random variation in the number of politicians, often from different political parties, governing different regions. This setting allows us to implement a geographic regression discontinuity design, comparing new firm creation rates across boundaries separating areas governed by single versus multiple politicians. We further leverage temporal variation induced by electoral redistricting to employ a differences-in-discontinuities approach. Our findings reveal that regions governed by multiple politicians experience significantly higher rates of new firm formation and increased economic activity. We attribute these outcomes to improved governance efficiency, streamlined regulatory processes, and reduced cronyism, likely resulting from mutual checks and balances among multiple non-aligned politicians. These results suggest that political power-sharing can foster a more conducive environment for entrepreneurship by improving governance quality and reducing entry barriers for small firms.
Presentations: CEPR/IFS/UCL/BREAD/TCD Workshop in Development Economics, European Finance Association Annual Meeting, BREAD Conference on Development Economics, 100 Years of Economic Development Conference, Finance Down Under, NSE-NYU Conference on Indian Capital Markets 2021, Workshop on Empirical Finance and Industrial Development, Trans-Atlantic Doctoral Conference, National University of Singapore (NUS), Inter-finance PhD Seminar, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology (HKUST), Chicago Booth School of Business
Media Coverage: VoxDev
(Solo Authored)
Abstract: I examine how revenue shocks alter production choices by studying the response of Mexican Drug Trafficking Organizations (DTOs) to U.S. recreational marijuana legalization, as a natural laboratory. Using homicide data and newspaper reports to track DTO activity, I document significant shifts in illicit drug production. DTOs reduced marijuana production, as evidenced by sharp declines in both homicides and presence in areas suitable for marijuana cultivation. Drug seizure patterns indicate DTOs shifted toward harder drugs instead of scaling down operations. This shift translated into severe public health consequences in the U.S., where regions more exposed to Mexican trafficking networks experienced larger increases in overdose deaths from harder drugs following marijuana legalization. My findings show how market disruptions can have severe unintended effects when regulators attempt to sanction organizations without taking down their distribution or production capabilities.