Automotive Security

Contemporary vehicle can be thought of as a collection of cyber-physical systems (CPS) working together to provide (i) safety and comfort to the occupants, (ii) efficient performance in terms reduced energy consumption and (iii) entertainment as well. However, this have only been possible at cost of more attack surfaces. Ample number of literature can be found where researchers have exploited these attack surfaces to launch denial-of-service (DoS), false data injection (FDI), replay attacks.

Other than the external access points (telematics, OBD, Bluetooth, etc.), compromised ECUs with malicious code inserted (e.g. at service points) also pose as possible attack surfaces. The control units of such rogue ECUs may be programmed to malign the intra-vehicular network by injecting false data packets into it and thus, can hinder the performance of various automotive control systems.

We focus on developing verification methods that analyse if automotive CPSs ensure safety in the presence of an adversary.