JOB MARKET PAPER
I study how a long-lived sender can provide informative advice to a myopic receiver who observes only the recommendation history. Observable, nonbinding restrictions—such as rolling quotas on favorable recommendations—create a cost of self-restraint by reserving capacity for future opportunities. With two actions, when receiver obedience requires a positive cost of self-restraint, I derive a ceiling on the sender’s normalized equilibrium payoff at every discount factor. The ceiling equals the payoff from the best credible partitional signal minus the expected cost of self-restraint. Under an upper-tail condition, rolling quotas approach this ceiling as the sender becomes patient. A sufficiently valuable opportunity can also induce an informative violation that ends future communication.
With Yangguang Huang
We develop a model of syndication among venture capital investors financing competing startups. We examine how product-market competition and investment costs shape syndication incentives, with empirical analysis using biotech financing data from Crunchbase.
Presented at the Chinese Economists Society North American Annual Conference, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, March 2025.
With Yangguang Huang and Liang Zhao
We study learning and strategic bidding in vehicle license auctions in China. Using auction data and a model of bidding under a first-come-first-serve tie-breaking rule, we examine how bidders learn from historical data and published average bids, and how information disclosure affects bidding behavior and auction revenue.