Writings

1991, Reduktion und Revision: Aspekte des nichtmonotonen Theorienwandels, European University Studies, Series XX, Vol. 290, Frankfurt a.M., Berne, New York, Paris: Peter Lang Publishing Group, 360 pp. ►

2014, Fiktion, Wahrheit, Interpretation: Philologische und philosophische Perspektiven, co-editors Eva-Maria Konrad, Thomas Petraschka and Jürgen Daiber, Münster: Mentis, 322 pp. ▷

2012, Multiple Belief Change, Iterated Belief Change and Preference Aggregation, co-editors Giacomo Bonanno and James Delgrande, special issue of the Journal of Philosophical Logic 41, no. 1, pp. 1–286. ▷

2012, Understanding Fiction: Knowledge and Belief in Literature, co-editors Jürgen Daiber, Eva-Maria Konrad and Thomas Petraschka, Münster: Mentis, 238 pp. ▷

2009, Formal Models of Belief Change in Rational Agents, co-editors Giacomo Bonanno, James Delgrande and Jérôme Lang, special section of the Journal of Applied Logic 7, no. 4, pp. 363–402. ▷

2008, Ignoranz: Nichtwissen, Vergessen und Missverstehen in Prozessen kultureller Transformationen, co-editor Achim Geisenhanslüke, Bielefeld: Transcript-Verlag, 260 pp. ▷

2008, Belief Change in Rational Agents: Perspectives from Artificial Intelligence, Philosophy, and Economics, co-editors James Delgrande and Jérôme Lang, special issue of the Journal of Logic and Computation 18, no. 5, pp. 697–813. ▷

2003, Possibility and Reality: Metaphysics and Logic, co-editor Vítězslav Horák, Frankfurt and London: Ontos Verlag, 299 pp. ▷

2002, Belief and Meaning, co-editor Wolfram Hinzen, Frankfurt a.M.: Hänsel-Hohenhausen, 252 pp.

2001, Frontiers in Belief Revision, co-editor Mary-Anne Williams, Dordrecht: Kluwer, 451 pp. ▷

1995, Logic, Action and Information. Essays on Logic in Philosophy and Artificial Intelligence, coeditor André Fuhrmann, Berlin/New York: Walter de Gruyter Publishers, 476 pp. ▷

2025, ‘The Dynamics of Non-Belief (With Modesty)’ (with Wei Zhu), Journal of Philosophical Logic, 399–427. ►

2023, ‘Threshold-based Belief Change: Rankings and Semiorders’ (with Eric Raidl), Australasian Journal of Logic 20, 429–477. ►

2021, ‘Belief Revision’, in Handbook of Rationality, eds. Markus Knauff and Wolfgang Spohn, Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 327–335. ►

2019, ‘Probability, Coherent Belief and Coherent Belief Changes’ (with John Cantwell), Annals of Mathematics and Artificial Intelligence 87, 259–291. ►

2014, ‘Belief Revision and Dynamic Logic’ (with Patrick Girard), in Johan F.A.K. van Benthem on Logical and Informational Dynamics, eds. Alexandru Baltag and Sonja Smets, Series Outstanding Contributions to Logic, Vol. 5, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 203–233. ▷ (ms)

2014, ‘Four Floors for the Theory of Theory Change: The Case of Imperfect Discrimination’, in Logics in Artificial Intelligence: 14th European Conference (JELIA 2014), eds. Eduardo Fermé and João Leite, Cham: Springer, pp. 366–382. ▷ (ms)

2014, ‘Three Floors for the Theory of Theory Change’, in The Logica Yearbook 2013, eds. Vít Punčochář and Michal Dančák, London: College Publications, pp. 187–205. (ms)

2014, ‘Two Concepts of Plausibility in Default Reasoning’, Erkenntnis 79, Issue 6 Supplement, 1219–1252. ▷ (ms)

2014, ‘Safe Contraction Revisited’ (with Sven Ove Hansson), in David Makinson on Classical Methods for Non-Classical Problems, ed. Sven Ove Hansson, Series Outstanding Contributions to Logic, Vol. 3, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 35–70. ▷ (ms)

2012, ‘Bounded Revision: Two-Dimensional Belief Change Between Conservatism and Moderation’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 41, 173–200. ▷ (ms)

2011, ‘Odd Choices: On the Rationality of Some Alleged Anomalies of Decision and Inference’, Topoi 30, 59–69. ▷ (ms)

2009, ‘Shifting Priorities: Simple Representations for Twenty-Seven Iterated Theory Change Operators’, in Towards Mathematical Philosophy, eds. David Makinson, Jacek Malinowski and Heinrich Wansing, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 269–296. ▷ (ms)

2009, ‘Seltsame Wahlen: Zur Rationalität vermeintlicher Anomalien beim Entscheiden und Schlussfolgern’, in Formen der Irrationalität – Formes d'irrationalité, Studia Philosophica 68 (eds. Anton Hügli and Curzio Chiesa, Basel: Schwabe Verlag), pp. 43–63. ►

2008, ‘Information Structures in Belief Revision’, in Philosophy of Information, eds. Pieter Adriaans and Johan van Benthem, Vol. 8 of the Handbook of the Philosophy of Science, Amsterdam: Elsevier, pp. 457–482. ▷ (ms)

2008, ‘A New Psychologism in Logic? Reflections from the Point of View of Belief Revision’, Studia Logica 88, 113–136. ▷ (ms)

2008, ‘Belief Revision’, in Reasoning: Studies of Human Inference and its Foundations, eds. Jonathan Adler and Lance Rips, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 514–534. ▷ (ms)

2006, ‘Revisione delle Credenze, Teoria della’, in Enciclopedia Filosofica, third edition, vol. 10, Fondazione Centro Studi Filosoci di Gallarate, Milano: Bompiani, pp. 9668–9680. ►

2006, ‘Revision by Comparison as a Unifying Framework: Severe Withdrawal, Irrevocable Revision and Irrefutable Revision’, Theoretical Computer Science 355, 228–242. ►

2004, ‘Revision by Comparison’ (with Eduardo Fermé), Artificial Intelligence 157, 5–47. ►

2004, ‘A Counterexample to Six Fundamental Principles of Belief Formation’, Synthese 139, 225–240. ▷ (ms)

2003, ‘Basic Entrenchment’, Studia Logica 73, 257–280. ▷ (ms)

2003, ‘Economics and Economy in the Theory of Belief Revision’, in Knowledge Contributors, eds. Vincent F. Hendricks, Klaus F. Jørgensen and Stig A. Pedersen, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 57–86. ▷ (ms)

2003, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Part II: Iterated Belief Change without Dispositional Coherence’, Journal of Logic and Computation 13, 111–145. ▷ (ms)

2002, ‘Logique et Choix’, in Révision des Croyances, ed. Pierre Livet, Paris: Hermès Science, pp. 111–128. ►

2000, ‘Two Dogmas of Belief Revision’, Journal of Philosophy 97, 503–522. ▷ (ms)

1999, ‘Coherence and Conservatism in the Dynamics of Belief. Part I: Finding the Right Framework’, Erkenntnis 50, 387–412. ▷ (ms)

1999, ‘Severe Withdrawal (and Recovery)’ (with Maurice Pagnucco), Journal of Philosophical Logic 28, 501–547. ▷ (ms)

1998, ‘Logic and Choice’, in Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge. Proceedings of the Seventh Conference (TARK 1998, Evanston/Illinois), ed. Itzhak Gilboa, San Francisco: Morgan Kaufmann, pp. 235–248. ►

1998, ‘A Plea for Accuracy’ (with Sven Ove Hansson), Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logic 8, 221–224. ▷ (ms)

1998, ‘Beyond Recovery? A Reply to Tennant’ (with Sven Ove Hansson), Erkenntnis 49, 387–392. ▷ (ms)

1995, ‘How Not to Change the Theory of Theory Change: A Reply to Tennant’ (with Sven Ove Hansson), British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 46, 361–380. ▷ (ms)

1995, ‘Belief Revision’ (with Peter Gärdenfors), in Handbook of Logic in Artificial Intelligence and Logic Programming. Volume IV: Epistemic and Temporal Reasoning, eds. D.M. Gabbay, C.J. Hogger and J.A. Robinson, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 35–132. (ms)

1993, ‘Belief Contraction in the Context of the General Theory of Rational Choice’, Journal of Symbolic Logic 58, 1426–1450. ►  (Corrected reprint, with a new appendix, in Readings in Formal Epistemology: Sourcebook, eds. Horacio Arló-Costa, Vincent F. Hendricks and Johan van Benthem, Cham: Springer 2016, pp. 269–302. ►)

1992, ‘Modellings for Belief Change: Prioritization and Entrenchment’, Theoria 58, 21–57. ►

1992, ‘Preferential Belief Change Using Generalized Epistemic Entrenchment’, Journal of Logic, Language and Information 1, 45–78. ►

1992, ‘On the Logic of Theory Change: More Maps Between Different Kinds of Contraction Function’, in Belief Revision, ed. Peter Gärdenfors, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 122–141. ►

1991, ‘Is it Impossible to Keep Up to Date?’ (with Michael Morreau), in Nonmonotonic and Inductive Logic: 1st International Workshop 1990, eds. J. Dix, K.P. Jantke and P.H. Schmitt, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 543, Berlin: Springer, pp. 233–343. ►

1991, ‘Two Methods of Constructing Contractions and Revisions of Knowledge Systems’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 20, 149–173. ►

2025, ‘Suspending Judgment and Withdrawing Belief’, in Suspension in Epistemology and Beyond, eds. Verena Wagner and Alexandra Zinke, Abingdon: Routledge, pp. 60–79. ▷ (ms)

2022, ‘ “Das wüsste ich aber!” Zur Ehrenrettung des argumentum ad ignorantiam’, Philosophieblog Praefaktisch, Thema 'Nichtwissen', eds. Andrea Klonschinski and Tim Kraft. ►

2019, ‘Was ist Nichtwissen?’ (with Tim Kraft), in Das sogenannte Recht auf Nichtwissen: Normatives Fundament und anwendungspraktische Geltungskraft, eds. Gunnar Duttge and Christian Lenk, Münster: Mentis, pp. 21–48. ▷ (ms)

2019, ‘Unstable Knowledge, Unstable Belief’, Logos and Episteme 10, 395–407. ►

2018, ‘From Probabilities to Categorical Beliefs: Going Beyond Toy Models’ (with Igor Douven), Journal of Logic and Computation 28, 1099–1124. ▷ (ms)

2017, ‘Stability and Skepticism in the Modelling of Doxastic States: Probabilities and Plain Beliefs’, Minds and Machines 27, 167–197. ►

2017, ‘Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the Concept of Belief’, Synthese 194, 2695–2720. ►

2014, ‘Unvergleichbarkeit und unabhängige Bedeutung’, contribution to a book symposium on Wolfgang Spohn’s The Laws of Belief, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 68, 237–241. ▷ (ms)

2014, ‘Von der Mühe, nicht zu glauben: Fiktionale Texte und Negativer Doxastischer Voluntarismus’, in Fiktion, Wahrheit, Interpretation: Philologische und philosophische Perspektiven, eds. Eva-Maria Konrad, Thomas Petraschka, Jürgen Daiber and Hans Rott, Münster: Mentis, pp. 65–106. ▷ (ms)

2012, ‘Einführung’ [Introduction to the Colloquium “Reasons in Logic – the Logic of Reasons”], in Welt der Gründe, eds. Julian Nida-Rümelin and Elif Özmen, Hamburg: Felix Meiner, pp. 1007–1013. ▷ (ms)

2009, ‘Degrees All the Way Down: Beliefs, Non-beliefs and Disbeliefs’, in Degrees of Belief, eds. Franz Huber and Christoph Schmidt-Petri, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 301–339. ▷ (ms)

2009, ‘Der Negationsbegriff des Nichtwissens’ (invited criticism of Peter Wehling, 'Nichtwissen: Bestimmungen, Abgrenzungen, Bewertungen'), Erwägen, Wissen, Ethik 20, 147–148. ▷

2008, ‘Negative Doxastic Voluntarism and the Ethics of Belief’, in Truth and Judgement, ed. Patrick Nerhot, Milan: FrancoAngeli, pp. 27–49. ▷ (ms) 

2006, ‘The Value of Truth and the Value of Information: On Isaac Levi’s Epistemology’, in Knowledge and Inquiry: Essays on the Pragmatism of Isaac Levi, ed. Erik J. Olsson, Series Probability, Induction and Decision Theory, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 179–200. ▷ (ms)

2005, ‘Meinen und Wissen’, in Logik in der Philosophie, eds. Wolfgang Spohn, Peter Schroeder-Heister and Erik Olsson, Heidelberg: Synchron Publishers, pp. 179–200. ▷ (ms)

2005, ‘Das Ende vom Problem des methodischen Anfangs: Descartes’ antiskeptisches Argument’ (with Verena Wagner), in Homo Sapiens und Homo Faber – Epistemische und technische Rationalität in Antike und Gegenwart, Festschrift für Jürgen Mittelstraß, eds. Martin Carrier and Gereon Wolters, Berlin: de Gruyter, pp. 133–145. ▷ (ms)

2004, ‘Stability, Strength and Sensitivity: Converting Belief into Knowledge’, Erkenntnis 61, 469–493. ▷ (ms)

2003, ‘Lehrer’s Dynamic Theory of Knowledge’, in The Epistemology of Keith Lehrer, ed. Erik Olsson, Philosophical Studies Book Series, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 219–242. ▷ (ms)

2003, ‘Der Wert der Wahrheit’, in Kulturen der Lüge, ed. Mathias Mayer, Cologne/Weimar/Vienna: Böhlau-Verlag, pp. 7–34. (ms)

2001, ‘The Ethics of Belief Revisited’, Anales de la Academia Nacional de Ciencias de Buenos Aires 35, 247–276.

202∗ ‘Suppositional Biconditionals: An Exercise in Conditional Perfection’, to appear in The Logica Yearbook 2025, ed. Igor Sedlár. (ms)

2025, ‘Conditionals, Support and Connexivity’, in 60 Years of Connexive Logic, eds. Hitoshi Omori and Heinrich Wansing, Cham: Springer, pp. 149–199. ▷ (ms)

2024, ‘On the History and Motivations of Connexive Logic (Extended Abstract)’, Booklet of Abstracts of the 9th Workshop on Connexive Logics, Łódź, Poland, 8–9 September 2024, pp. 37–41. ►

2024, ‘Towards a Logic for “Because” ’ (with Eric Raidl), Philosophical Studies 181 (9), 2247–2277. ►

2024, ‘Evidential Support and Contraposition’, Erkenntnis 89 (6), 2253–2271. ►

2024, ‘Difference-Making Conditionals and Connexivity’, Studia Logica 112 (1–2), 405–458. ►

2023, ‘On the Logical Form of Evidential Conditionals’, Logic and Logical Philosophy 32, 475–493. ►

2022, ‘“A Formula Which I Derived Many Years Ago” – Boole, Reichenbach and Popper on Probability and Conditionals’, History and Philosophy of Logic 43 (4), 383–390. ▷ (ms)

2022, ‘Difference-Making and the Relevant Ramsey Test’, Review of Symbolic Logic 15, 133–164. ▷ (ms)

2021, ‘The Logic of Conditionals’ (with Paul Égré), in Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. ► 

2020, ‘Inductive Reasoning with Difference-making Conditionals’ (with Meliha Sezgin and Gabriele Kern-Isberner), in: 18th International Workshop on Non-Monotonic Reasoning (NMR 2020 Workshop Notes), eds. Maria Vanina Martínez and Ivan Varzinczak, pp. 83–92. ►

2020, ‘Notes on Contraposing Conditionals’, Philsci Archive 17092, April 2020, 15 pp. ►

2017, ‘Preservation and Postulation: Lessons from the New Debate on the Ramsey Test’, Mind 126 (502), 609–626. ▷ (ms)

2016, ‘“If Oswald Had Not Killed Kennedy”: Spohn on Counterfactuals’, in Von Rang und Namen: Philosophical Essays in Honour of Wolfgang Spohn, eds. Wolfgang Freitag, Hans Rott, Holger Sturm and Alexandra Zinke, Münster: Mentis, pp. 379–399. ▷ (ms)

2011, ‘Reapproaching Ramsey: Conditionals and Iterated Belief Change in the Spirit of AGM’, Journal of Philosophical Logic 40, 155–191. ▷ (ms)

2000, ‘ “Just Because”: Taking Belief Bases Seriously’, in Logic Colloquium ’98, eds. Samuel R. Buss, Petr Hájek and Pavel Pudlák, Lecture Notes in Logic, Vol. 13, Urbana, Ill.: Association for Symbolic Logic, pp. 387–408. ▷ (ms)

1999, ‘Moody Conditionals: Hamburgers, Switches, and the Tragic Death of an American President’, in: Essays Dedicated to Johan van Benthem on the Occasion of his 50th Birthday, hrsg. v. Jelle Gerbrandy, Maarten Marx, Maarten de Rijke und Yde Venema, Amsterdam: Vossiuspers, Amsterdam University Press. ►

1997, ‘Drawing Inferences from Conditionals’, in Logic, Action and Cognition. Essays in Philosophical Logic, eds. Eva Ejerhed and Sten Lindström, Series Trends in Logic, Vol. 2, Dordrecht u.a.: Kluwer, pp. 149–179. ▷ (ms)

1991, ‘A Nonmonotonic Conditional Logic for Belief Revision I’, in The Logic of Theory Change, eds. André Fuhrmann and Michael Morreau, Lecture Notes in Artificial Intelligence 465, Berlin u.a.: Springer, pp. 135–183. ►

1989, ‘Conditionals and Theory Change: Revisions, Expansions, and Additions’, Synthese 81, 91–113. ►

1986, ‘Ifs, Though and Because’, Erkenntnis 25, 345–370. ► 

2017, ‘Fiktive Gegenstände’ (mit Eva-Maria Konrad), in Handbuch Metaphysik, ed. Markus Schrenk, Stuttgart/Weimar: Metzler, S. 141–145. ▷ (ms)

2015, ‘A Puzzle About Disputes and Disagreements’, Erkenntnis 80, Issue 1 Supplement, 167–189.  ▷ (ms)

2013, ‘Interpreting Enthymematic Arguments Using Belief Revision’ (with Georg Brun), Synthese 190, 4041–4063. ▷ (ms)

2008, ‘Meinungsverschiedenheiten und Missverständnisse’, in Ignoranz: Nichtwissen, Vergessen und Missverstehen in Prozessen kultureller Transformationen, eds. Achim Geisenhanslüke and Hans Rott, Bielefeld: Transcript-Verlag, pp. 61–96. ►

2007, ‘Disagreement and Misunderstanding Across Cultures’, in Cultures: Conflict, Analysis, Dialogue. Proceedings of the 29th International Wittgenstein Symposium, eds. Christian Kanzian and Edmund Runggaldier, Frankfurt: Ontos-Verlag, pp. 261–275. ►

2005, ‘Rationalitätsunterstellungen im Dienst der Interpretation von Texten’, in Rationalität im Prozess kultureller Evolution, ed. Hansjörg Siegenthaler, Schriftenreihe 'Die Einheit der Gesellschaftswissenschaften', Bd. 132, Tübingen: Mohr-Siebeck, pp. 331–354. ▷ (ms)

2004, ‘Wittgensteins “Meinung” ’, in Selected Papers Contributed to the Sections of GAP.5, 5th International Congress of the Society for Analytic Philosophy, September 2003 , eds. Roland Bluhm and Christian Nimtz, e-Book, Paderborn: Mentis, pp. 356–369. ►

2004, ‘Unstimmigkeiten: Pragmatistische Gedanken über Bedeutungs- und Meinungsverschiedenheiten’, in Pragmatisch denken, eds. André Fuhrmann and Erik Olsson, Frankfurt/Lancaster: Ontos-Verlag, pp. 295–321. ▷ (ms)

2004, ‘Vom Fließen theoretischer Begriffe: Begriffliches Wissen und theoretischer Wandel’, Kant-Studien 95, 29–52. ▷ (ms)

2003, ‘Variably Restricted Necessity: Truth and Fiction in the Interpretation of Indicative and Subjunctive Conditionals’, in Possibility and Reality – Metaphysics and Logic, eds. Hans Rott and Vítězslav Horák, Frankfurt/London: Ontos-Verlag, pp. 269–296. ▷ (ms)

2000, ‘Words in Contexts: Fregean Elucidations’, Linguistics and Philosophy 23, 621–641. ▷ (ms)

2000, ‘Billigkeit und Nachsicht’, Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung 54, 23–46. ▷ (ms)

1997, ‘Comment on Gärdenfors’ “Meanings as Conceptual Structures” ’, in Mindscapes: Philosophy, Science and the Mind, eds. Martin Carrier and Peter K. Machamer, Konstanz and Pittsburgh: Universitätsverlag Konstanz and University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 87–97. ▷ (ms)

2022, ‘Was ist Zufall? Kontingenz – Unvorhersagbarkeit – Koinzidenz’, in Zufall – rechtliche, philosophische und theologische Aspekte, ed. Konstantina Papathanasiou, Berlin: Duncker & Humblodt, pp. 34–51. ▷ (ms)

2011, ‘Idealizations, Intertheory Explanations and Conditionals’, in Belief Revision Meets Philosophy of Science, eds. Erik Olsson and Sebastian Enqvist, Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 59–75. ▷ (ms)

2004, ‘Supplying Planks for Neurath’s Boat: Can Economists Meet the Demands of the Dynamics of Scientific Theories?’, in Induction and Deduction in the Sciences. Vienna Circle Institute Yearbook 11 (2003), ed. Friedrich Stadler, Dordrecht: Kluwer, pp. 225–245. ▷ (ms)

1994, ‘Chaos: The Reason for Structural Causation’, in Logic and Causal Reasoning, eds. Jan Faye, Uwe Scheffler and Max Urchs, Berlin: Akademie-Verlag, pp. 191–215. ►

1994, ‘Zur Wissenschaftsphilosophie von Imre Lakatos’, Philosophia Naturalis 31, 25–62. ►

1990, ‘Approximation versus Idealization: The Kepler-Newton Case’, in Idealization II: Forms and Applications, eds. Jerzy Brzeziński, Francesco Coniglione, Theo A.F. Kuipers and Leszek Nowak, Poznań Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 17 (1989), Amsterdam and Atlanta GA: Rodopi, pp. 101–124. ►

1989, ‘Approximation versus Idealisierung: Das Verhältnis zwischen idealem und van der Waalsschem Gasgesetz’, in Philosophy of the Natural Sciences. Proceedings of the 13th International Wittgenstein Symposium 1988. Selected Papers, eds. Paul Weingartner and Gerhard Schurz, Vienna: Hölder-Pichler-Tempsky, pp. 224–228. ►

1987, ‘Reduction: Some Criteria and Criticisms of the Structuralist Concept’, Erkenntnis 27, 231–256. ►

2013, ‘Mehr als tausend Worte – Was sagt uns ein Bild?’, in Bilder sehen: Perspektiven der Bildwissenschaft, eds. Mark Greenlee, Rainer Hammwöhner, Bernd Körber, Christoph Wagner and Christian Wolf, Regensburg: Schnell und Steiner, pp. 205–230. (ms)

2009, ‘Die Freiheit in den Zeiten neurowissenschaftlichen Fortschritts’, in Gezwungene Freiheit? Personale Freiheit im pluralistischen Europa, ed. Markus Mühling, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, pp. 117–134. (ms)

2008, ‘Aufklärung und Gotteshypothese’, in Glaube und Vernunft – Spannungsreiche Grundlage europäischer Geistesgeschichte, eds. Erwin Dirscherl and Christoph Dohmen, Freiburg: Herder, pp. 192–209. (ms)

2007, ‘Wahrheit und Wahrscheinlichkeit in Schikaneders Zauberflöte’, in Modell Zauberflöte: Der Kredit des Möglichen, ed. Mathias Mayer, Hildesheim: Olms Verlag, pp. 33–53. (ms)

2007, ‘Bedarf die moderne Philosophie einer Ausweitung des wissenschaftlichen Vernunftbegriffes?’ (with Ralf Busse), in Die Regensburger Vorlesung Papst Benedikts XVI. im Dialog der Wissenschaften, ed. Christoph Dohmen, Regensburg: Pustet, pp. 86–99. (ms)

2006, ‘ “Alle andere Dinge müssen; der Mensch ist das Wesen, welches will” – Anmerkungen zu Schillers Philosophie des Geistes’, in Schiller neu denken: Beiträge zur Literatur-, Kultur- und Kunstgeschichte, ed. Peter Philipp Riedl, Regensburg: Schnell und Steiner, pp. 69–89. (ms)