Hacking Connected Cars Tactics Techniques And Procedures Pdf Download

Hacking Connected Cars deconstructs the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs) used to hack into connected cars and autonomous vehicles to help you identify and mitigate vulnerabilities affecting cyber-physical vehicles. Written by a veteran of risk management and penetration testing of IoT devices and connected cars, this book provides a detailed account of how to perform penetration testing, threat modeling, and risk assessments of telematics control units and infotainment systems. This book demonstrates how vulnerabilities in wireless networking, Bluetooth, and GSM can be exploited to affect confidentiality, integrity, and availability of connected cars.

Areas the book covers include: penetration testing of infotainment systems and telematics control units, analysing risk levels surrounding various vulnerabilities (affecting confidentiality, integrity, and availability) and a look at the tactics, techniques, and procedures used by hackers.

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Alissa Knight has worked in cybersecurity for more than 20 years, says Wiley. For the past ten years, she has focused her vulnerability research into hacking connected cars, embedded systems, and IoT devices for clients in the United States, Middle East, Europe, and Asia.

Connected cars are now on the way to becoming a regular part of everyday traffic all over the world. How should stakeholders make these vehicles more secure? The regulatory framework created by WP.29, UN Regulation No. 155 (UN R155), provides a guide, giving directions towards a safer path for connected cars moving forward.

The report mentions that while tracking threat actors offering access to OT systems connected to the internet since 2012, there has been a significant increase in the frequency of incidents against OT within the last couple of years. The most common observed threat activity has been actors trying to make money off internet-connected OT and leveraging well-known TTPs, tactics, techniques and procedures in conjunction with commodity tools. This gives threat actors the ability to access, interact with, and harvest information from internet exposed OT, which was observed hardly ever in the past (mainly due to the standard practice of air-gapping OT systems into segregated networks).

Rick Howard: An adversary playbook collates all known intelligence on a hacker group's attack sequence across the intrusion kill chain - tactics, techniques, indicators of compromise, attack time frame and context about motivation, as well as attribution. Ryan Olson and I published this paper back in 2020 called "Implementing Intrusion Kill Chain Strategies by Creating Defensive Campaign Adversary Playbooks." Ryan is a longtime colleague and friend of mine and currently the intelligence vice president at Palo Alto Networks. He's in charge of Unit 42. And he's way smarter than I am. But together we noticed that although we both believe that the intrusion kill chain prevention strategy is something that all of us should be pursuing, there wasn't a lot of success stories proving that we should. The industry was bogged down. Implementing a robust program was still too hard.

Rick Howard: MITRE released the first version of the ATT&CK framework in 2013, three years after the original Lockheed Martin paper. The acronym stands for adversarial tactics, techniques and common knowledge. At first glance, the casual reader would just assume that the framework is a slight improvement on the original Lockheed Martin model. The framework extends the original phases and corrects some of the limitations. It eliminates the recon phase and clarifies and expands the actions on the objective stage, with more clarity and detail. That's all true. But the framework's significant innovation is an extension of the list of information requirements intelligence analysts collect for adversary playbooks. They added tactics, techniques and procedures.

Rick Howard: Before the framework, we would all collect indicators of compromise without any relation to known adversary behavior. They're not bad per se, but they are ephemeral, and hackers can easily change them at the drop of a hat and did and still do. By the time infosec teams deployed countermeasures, the bad guys had likely already changed their behavior. MITRE's extension to the kill chain model includes the grouping of tactics, the why, the techniques used, the how, and the specific implementation procedures the adversary group used to deploy the tactic. That intelligence is not as ephemeral, is tied to known adversary group behavior and is conducive to designing impactful countermeasures.

Rick Howard: That said, there's still a lot of work that needs to be done. Users of the wiki still need to automate the process of collecting the attack intelligence and using it to upgrade their internal defenses. Further, the intelligence collected by MITRE is not in real time. They only update the Wiki every few months. But since adversary groups don't wholesale change their attack playbooks that often, that's not a major concern at the moment. Still, it would be better if they updated the wiki in a continuous manner. Lastly, it would be better if MITRE covered all hacking groups like crime and hacktivism, not just the groups that operate at the nation-state level. They cover roughly 150 nation-state adversary playbooks today, but that leaves about a hundred other groups uncovered, and that's a big gap. Still, we've come a long way since 2010. The Lockheed Martin research team gave us the new strategy, and the MITRE team helped us to operationalize it. The remaining task is how to collect the adversary playbook intelligence with some rigor. In other words, can we formalize the process so that all cyberthreat intelligence teams can use the same basic procedures and can easily share and compare their nodes with peers and colleagues? That's where the diamond model comes in.

Rick Howard: In practice, your own intel team might be analyzing multiple incidents that may or may not be related to each other. For each, using the Lockheed Martin strategy, you are monitoring adversary activity across all kill chain phases. You collect that intelligence by filling in the blanks of the four feature pairs from the diamond model, and you standardize the language by using the MITRE Framework's vocabulary of tactics, techniques and procedures. As the story develops, the kill chain becomes more complete with data for all the incidents. At a certain point, you might note that the diamond model event for the delivery phase and the command-and-control phase in Incident 1 is remarkably similar to the events captured Incident 2. These activity threads connect the two incidents together, may indicate that the attacks have originated from the same adversary and implies a much broader campaign against your network. According to the paper, quote, "the diamond model's events can then be correlated across activity threads to identify adversary campaigns and coalesced into activity groups to identify similar events and threats which share common features," end quote.

Rick Howard: And it's taken the network defender community over a decade to figure out how to do it in terms of strategy, operations and cyberthreat intelligence best practices. Big thinkers from Lockheed Martin, the kill chain, the Department of Defense, the diamond model, and MITRE, the ATT&CK Framework, gave us the blueprints on how to be good at this over a decade ago. It's taken that long for the rest of us mere cybersecurity mortals to get our heads around the key concepts. The bottom line is that we build adversary playbooks so that we can automatically collect threat intelligence on what adversaries are actually doing across all the Lockheed Martin kill chain phases. We operationalize that process by standardizing on the MITRE ATT&CK Framework's established vocabulary for adversary tactics, techniques and procedures. We instruct our cyberthreat intelligence analyst teams to fill in the blanks of event pairs, identify activity threats across multiple incidents and establish activity groups for common behavior in the diamond model. Finally, we automate the deployment of our mitigation plan across the entire security stack. We do all of that with the adversary intelligence trifecta - kill chain, attack and diamond. e24fc04721