"Risk, Equity-Market Integration, and Export Entry."
Is selection of firms into export status affected by the possibility of international portfolio diversification? Firms’ export entry decisions entail a risk trade-off. On the one hand, entering foreign markets is an inherently risky venture, which involves investment expenses and can expose the firm to new sources of risk. On the other hand, exporting can serve as an operational hedge that limits the firm’s exposure to domestic shocks and is reflected in its profit stream. Investors, who own firms, can take advantage of the diversification opportunities offered by exports, but can also pursue a financial hedge. By purchasing foreign equity, they can diversify their portfolios directly, which lowers the market price of risk used to value the firm’s profits. I use a transparent model of firm selection into export to show that the export entry condition admits a clean exposure–price decomposition: a firm’s operations determine its risk exposure, while financial integration shifts the state prices used to value that exposure. This creates a risk-based channel for the extensive margin of trade. I examine the effects of an increase in international financial integration in this setting and show it sets two opposing forces in motion. First, by providing a cheaper financial hedge, better integration lowers the need to hedge via exports, thus discouraging entry (hedge-substitution effect, exporting becomes less valuable). Second, by lowering the market price of risk, it reduces the valuation penalty for being exposed, thus encouraging entry (risk-price effect). This emphasizes firms’ risk characteristics as a key determinant in the composition of exporting firms. The framework predicts that after equity-market liberalizations, we should observe (i) higher relative entry by high-exposure firms−those whose valuations are significantly penalized by risk−, (ii) lower entry to less correlated markets−those that provide hedge to local shocks−, and (iii) higher entry to positively correlated markets−those that imply an increase in risky exposure for the firms. Using a panel combining Compustat and CRSP data from 1976 to 2019, I measure export activity with segment-level data and risk exposure with rolling firm-market betas. I find a negative association between risk exposure and both export participation and intensity.
How do firms perceive and respond to trade-related uncertainty? This paper uses firm-level earnings-call text measures to study trade-related risk and sentiment during two major episodes: the 2018–2019 trade-war period and the 2025 surge in trade risk. I document four main facts. First, the 2025 episode is substantially larger, more broadly diffused across sectors, and more U.S.-centered than the 2018–2019 episode, although non-U.S. firms also experience higher trade risk. Second, within the United States, trade risk is geographically uneven, persistent across episodes, and only weakly predicted by normal-period trade language. Furthermore, U.S. state-level heterogeneity reflects both sectoral composition and within-sector differences. Lastly, I also show that trade risk and trade sentiment capture distinct margins: high-risk discussions are not always accompanied by negative tone. I then link the text measures to firm-level outcomes for U.S. publicly listed firms. Firms with higher trade-risk language experience lower stock returns, weaker revenue growth, and lower investment. Dynamic specifications show that increases in trade risk are followed by persistent declines in investment and weaker revenue dynamics. The findings suggest that earnings-call text captures economically meaningful variation in firms’ perceived exposure to trade-related uncertainty.
Entrepreneurs in many small open economies accumulate substantial positions in dollar-denominated safe assets, even when domestic investment capital is scarce. This paper studies how uninsurable idiosyncratic capital income risk can generate a precautionary demand for foreign assets and how this demand feeds back into aggregate investment. I build a tractable continuous-time incomplete-markets model in which a subset of agents (“entrepreneurs”) chooses a portfolio between risky domestic capital and a riskless bond. A key institutional difference across economies is the depth of the domestic safe-asset market: in a closed-economy benchmark (a proxy for the U.S.), the bond return clears domestically, whereas in a small open economy, the bond return is pinned by the world rate, capturing limited reliance on the local bond market. In qualitative calibrations, standard parameter values can reproduce sizeable steady-state holdings of foreign safe assets by entrepreneurs (on the order of 10–40% of GDP), consistent with patterns observed in several emerging economies. Furthermore, because the small open economy lacks the interest-rate adjustment that accommodates flight-to-safety, aggregate investment is highly responsive to idiosyncratic risk. Extending the framework to include a government highlights how the supply of public debt and fiscal policy interact with private precautionary saving by strengthening or weakening the general-equilibrium return-adjustment channel.
"Cyclic episode and structural change. The Stabilization and Development Plan of 1958-1962." (Joint with Raul Garcia Heras and Daniel Heymann.) in Medio siglo entre tormentas, EUDEBA, 2022, (book chapter). [Book], [Working Paper].
"Expectations, Coordination Failures and Macro Crises." (Joint with Heymann, Daniel, Brichetti, Juan Pablo, and Juarros, Pedro.) Journal of Globalization and Development, vol. 11, no. 1, 2020. [Paper].