Polysemy and philosophy of language

Michel, C. & Löhr, G. (2024). A cognitive psychological model of linguistic intuitions: Polysemy and order effects in copredication sentences. Lingua.

Michel C. & Löhr, G. (2023). Copredication and complexity revisited: Reply to Murphy's reply. Cognitive Science. 

Marsili, N. & Löhr, G. (2022). Saying, commitment and the lying-misleading distinction. The Journal of Philosophy.

Löhr, G. & Michel, C. (2022). Copredication in Context: A Predictive Processing Approach. Cognitive Science.

See reply to us by Elliot Murphy: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cogs.13207 

Löhr, G. & Michel, C. (2022). Predictive processing and the semiological principle. Invited (but peer-reviewed). Manuscrito. 

Löhr, G. (2021). Does polysemy support radical contextualism? On the relation between minimalism, contextualism and polysemy. Inquiry. 

Conceptual engineering/metaphilosophy

Hopster, J. & Löhr, G. (2023). Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation? Philosophy & Technology.

Koch, S., Löhr, G., Pinder M. (2023). Recent Work in the Theory of Conceptual Engineering. Analysis. (Review) 

Löhr G., & Michel, C. (2023). Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem. Mind and Language. 

Jorem S., & Löhr G., (2022). Inferentialist Conceptual Engineering. Special Issue: Pragmatism and Conceptual Engineering. Inquiry. 

Löhr, G. (2021). Commitment engineering: Conceptual engineering without representations. Synthese, 

Löhr, G. (forthcoming). What’s the relation between conceptual ethics and ethics? An instrumentalist defense of conceptual engineering. In P. Stalmaszczyk, P. (ed.). Conceptual Engineering: Methodological and Metaphilosophical Issues. Brill/Mentis.

Löhr, G. (2019). The experience machine and the expertise defense. Philosophical Psychology.

Conceptual disruption and technology

Special Issue: Conceptual Engineering and Socially Disruptive Technologies. In Ethics and Information Technology (editorial work together with J. Hopster, S. Köhler and H. Veluwenkamp)

Hopster, J.; Gerola, A.; Hofbauer, B.; Korenhof, P.; Löhr, G. ; Rijssenbeek, J. (2023). Who owns ‘Nature’? Conceptual Appropriation in Discourses on Climate- and Biotechnologies. Environmental Values.

Löhr, G. (2023). Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework. Technology in Society. 

Löhr, G. (2023). Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions? Technology in Society. 

Löhr, G. (2022). Linguistic interventions and the ethics of conceptual disruption. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 

Marchiori, S., et al. Conceptual Disruption and the Ethics of Technology. In: van de Poel, Ibo, et al. (eds.). Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Open Book Publishers. 

The psychology of abstract concepts

Löhr, G., (2023). Does the mind care about whether a word is abstract or concrete? Why concreteness is probably not a natural kind. Mind and Language.

Löhr, G. (2021). What are abstract concepts? On lexical ambiguity and concreteness ratings. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.

Löhr, G. (2019). Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave anything out? Philosophical Psychology.

Löhr, G. (2017). Abstract concepts, compositionality, and the contextualism-invariantism debate. Philosophical Psychology.

Löhr, G. (2023). Are Concepts a Natural Kind? Against Concept Eliminativism. Philosophy and Mind Sciences. 

Löhr, G. (2020). Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things? Synthese.

Löhr, G. (2021). Social constructionism, concept acquisition and the mismatch problem. Synthese.

AI and robots

Müller, V. & Löhr, G. (under contract). Artificial Minds. Cambridge University Press. (Elements)

Löhr, G., (2023). Robots can and will have interpersonal rights if they can refuse to cooperate with us. Robonomics (Special Issue on robot rights edited by David Gunkel). 

Löhr, G. (2023). If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly? AI & Ethics.

Löhr, G. (forthcoming). Chatbots and Speech Act Responsibility Gaps. Volume on AI and Language, edited by Rachel Sterken. OUP.

Löhr, G. (2022). Robot rights in joint action. In: Müller, V. (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2021.

Dale, M. et al. (2023). Social Robots and Society. In: van de Poel, Ibo, et al. (eds.). Ethics of Socially Disruptive Technologies: An Introduction. Open Book Publishers.

Joint Action and directed duties 

Löhr, G. (forthcoming). Two Kinds of Failure in a Joint Action: On Disrespect and Directed Duties. Analysis. 

Löhr, G., (2022). Recent experimental philosophy on joint action: Do we need a new normativism about collective action? Philosophical Quarterly, 

See reply by Gomez–Lavin & Rachar: https://academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pq/pqad047/7128315?login=false