Forthcoming
Special Issue: Conceptual Engineering and Socially Disruptive Technologies. In Ethics and Information Technology (editorial work together with J. Hopster, S. Köhler and H. Veluwenkamp)
Müller, V. & Löhr, G. (under contract). Artificial Minds. Cambridge University Press. (Elements)
Löhr, G. (forthcoming). What does it mean for a duty to be directed in a joint action?. Synthese.
Löhr, G. (forthcoming). Two Kinds of Failure in a Joint Action: On Disrespect and Directed Duties. Analysis.
Löhr, G. (forthcoming). Chatbots and Speech Act Responsibility Gaps. Volume on AI and Language, edited by Rachel Sterken. OUP.
Löhr, G. (forthcoming). What’s the relation between conceptual ethics and ethics? An instrumentalist defense of conceptual engineering. In P. Stalmaszczyk, P. (ed.). Conceptual Engineering: Methodological and Metaphilosophical Issues. Brill/Mentis.
2024
Michel, C. & Löhr, G. (2024). A cognitive psychological model of linguistic intuitions: Polysemy and order effects in copredication sentences. Lingua.
2023
Hopster, J.; Gerola, A.; Hofbauer, B.; Korenhof, P.; Löhr, G. ; Rijssenbeek, J. (2023). Who owns ‘Nature’? Conceptual Appropriation in Discourses on Climate- and Biotechnologies. Environmental Values.
Löhr, G., (2023). Robots can and will have interpersonal rights if they can refuse to cooperate with us. Robonomics (Special Issue on robot rights edited by David Gunkel).
Hopster, J. & Löhr, G. (2023). Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation? Philosophy & Technology.
Koch, S., Löhr, G., Pinder M. (2023). Recent Work in the Theory of Conceptual Engineering. Analysis. (Review)
Löhr, G., (2023). Does the mind care about whether a word is abstract or concrete? Why concreteness is probably not a natural kind. Mind and Language.
Löhr, G. (2023). Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework. Technology in Society.
Löhr, G. (2023). Are Concepts a Natural Kind? Against Concept Eliminativism. Philosophy and Mind Sciences.
Löhr G., & Michel, C. (2023). Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problem. Mind and Language.
Löhr, G. (2023). If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly? AI & Ethics.
Michel C. & Löhr, G. (2023). Copredication and complexity revisited: Reply to Murphy's reply. Cognitive Science.
Löhr, G. (2023). Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions? Technology in Society.
2022
Löhr, G. (2022). Robot rights in joint action. In: Müller, V. (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2021.
Marsili, N. & Löhr, G. (2022). Saying, commitment and the lying-misleading distinction. The Journal of Philosophy.
Löhr, G. (2022). Linguistic interventions and the ethics of conceptual disruption. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice.
Löhr, G. & Michel, C. (2022). Copredication in Context: A Predictive Processing Approach. Cognitive Science.
See reply to us by Elliot Murphy: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cogs.13207
Jorem S., & Löhr G., (2022). Inferentialist Conceptual Engineering. Special Issue: Pragmatism and Conceptual Engineering. Inquiry.
Löhr, G. & Michel, C. (2022). Predictive processing and the semiological principle. Invited (but peer-reviewed). Manuscrito.
Löhr, G., (2022). Recent experimental philosophy on joint action: Do we need a new normativism about collective action? Philosophical Quarterly,
See reply by Gomez–Lavin & Rachar: https://academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pq/pqad047/7128315?login=false
2021
Löhr, G. (2021). Commitment engineering: Conceptual engineering without representations. Synthese,
Löhr, G. (2021). What are abstract concepts? On lexical ambiguity and concreteness ratings. Review of Philosophy and Psychology.
Löhr, G. (2021). Does polysemy support radical contextualism? On the relation between minimalism, contextualism and polysemy. Inquiry.
Löhr, G. (2021). Social constructionism, concept acquisition and the mismatch problem. Synthese.
2017-2020
Löhr, G. (2020). Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things? Synthese.
Löhr, G. (2019). The experience machine and the expertise defense. Philosophical Psychology.
Löhr, G. (2019). Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave anything out? Philosophical Psychology.
Löhr, G. (2017). Abstract concepts, compositionality, and the contextualism-invariantism debate. Philosophical Psychology.