Forthcoming
Artificial Minds Cambridge University Press (Element)with Vincent Müller 
Why Proxy Accounts of AI Speech Acts FailAmerican Philosophical Quarterly
Chatbots and Speech Act Responsibility GapsCommunicating with AI: Philosophical PerspectivesOxford University PressEdited by Rachel Sterken and Herman Cappelen 
Rethinking Disruptive Technologies: The Benefits, Harms, and Injustices of Human Niche ConstructionPhilosophy & TechnologyWith Sabrina Coninx
2026
Two Concepts of Commitment Philosophia
2025
Do New Technologies Change Our Moral Norms? ThinkWith Robin Hillenbrink
What is Pragmatist Conceptual Engineering? Inquiry
Rethinking Philosophical Methodology: Conceptual Engineering Meets Value Sensitive DesignMetaphilosophy. Special Issue on Conceptual Engineering, With Herman Veluwenkamp
Une vision minimaliste de la polysémie: Le minimalisme comme contrainte dans les négociations MétalinguistiquesKlesis, Special Issue on Francois Recanati
Prudential reasons for designing entitled chatbots: How robot "rights" can improve human well-beingAI and Ethics. With Matthew Dennis
2024
Two Kinds of Failure in a Joint Action: On Disrespect and Directed DutiesAnalysis. 
What’s the relation between conceptual ethics and ethics? An instrumentalist defense of conceptual engineeringIn P. Stalmaszczyk, P. (ed.). Conceptual Engineering: Methodological and Metaphilosophical Issues. Brill/Mentis.
Socially Disruptive Technologies and Conceptual EngineeringEthics and InformationTechnologywith Veluwenkamp, H., Hopster, J., Köhler, S.,
What does it mean for a duty to be directed in a joint action?Synthese
A cognitive psychological model of linguistic intuitions: Polysemy and order effects in copredication sentencesLinguaWith Christian Michel
Inferentialist Conceptual Engineering. Special Issue: Pragmatism and Conceptual EngineeringInquiry (online first, 2021)With Sigurd Jorem
2023
Who owns ‘Nature’? Conceptual Appropriation in Discourses on Climate- and BiotechnologiesEnvironmental ValuesWith Hopster, J.; Gerola, A.; Hofbauer, B.; Korenhof, P.; Löhr, G. ; Rijssenbeek, J.
Robots can and will have interpersonal rights if they can refuse to cooperate with usRobonomics (Special Issue on robot rights edited by David Gunkel)
Conceptual Engineering and Philosophy of Technology: Amelioration or Adaptation? Philosophy & TechnologyWith Jeroen Hopster
Recent Work in the Theory of Conceptual Engineering AnalysisWith Koch and Pinder
Does the mind care about whether a word is abstract or concrete? Why concreteness is probably not a natural kind Mind and Language
Conceptual disruption and 21st century technologies: A framework Technology in Society
Are Concepts a Natural Kind? Against Concept EliminativismPhilosophy and Mind Sciences
Conceptual engineering, predictive processing, and a new implementation problemMind and LanguageWith Christian Michel
If conceptual engineering is a new method in the ethics of AI, what method is it exactly? AI & Ethics
Copredication and complexity revisited: Reply to Murphy's reply Cognitive ScienceWith Christian Michel
Do socially disruptive technologies really change our concepts or just our conceptions? Technology in Society. 
2022
Robot rights in joint actionMüller, V. (ed.), Philosophy and theory of artificial intelligence 2021.
Saying, commitment and the lying-misleading distinctionThe Journal of PhilosophyWith Neri Marsili
Linguistic interventions and the ethics of conceptual disruption. Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
Copredication in Context: A Predictive Processing Approach. Cognitive ScienceWith Christian MichelSee reply to us by Elliot Murphy: https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/cogs.13207 
Predictive processing and the semiological principle. Invited (but peer-reviewed). Manuscrito. With Christian Michel
Recent experimental philosophy on joint action: Do we need a new normativism about collective action? Philosophical Quarterly, See reply by Gomez–Lavin & Rachar: https://academic.oup.com/pq/advance-article/doi/10.1093/pq/pqad047/7128315?login=false 
2021 
Commitment engineering: Conceptual engineering without representationsSynthese What are abstract concepts? On lexical ambiguity and concreteness ratingsReview of Philosophy and Psychology
Does polysemy support radical contextualism? On the relation between minimalism, contextualism and polysemyInquiry
Social constructionism, concept acquisition and the mismatch problemSynthese
2017-2020
Concepts and categorization: do philosophers and psychologists theorize about different things? Synthese
The experience machine and the expertise defensePhilosophical Psychology
Embodied cognition and abstract concepts: Do concept empiricists leave anything out? Philosophical Psychology
Abstract concepts, compositionality, and the contextualism-invariantism debate Philosophical Psychology