Knowing is a House of Cards

One of the most profound insights I gained in college was this: 

‘Learning is fundamentally about understanding language.’ 

To resolve confusion about a concept, one must precisely understand the language of that domain of knowledge. It does not matter if the topic is physics, chemistry, or medieval history; if one can grasp the precise conceptual representation evoked by a set of symbols and operate within the logical limits of that domain—voila! Aced it. But just as a picture can be worth a thousand words, a word can evoke a thousand different pictures. If someone associates a word with the ‘wrong picture’—a flawed conceptual representation—and continues to build upon it, the entire structure of understanding may eventually collapse.

When making scientific discoveries, we are, in essence, creating new language. We experiment and theorize to carefully place new conceptual building blocks upon the platform of current progress. However, sometimes the house of cards collapses, crushed by the weight of new incisive evidence. Though the structure falls, this event sparks a new method of card stacking, resulting in a more robust framework. These upending events represent the paradigm shifts essential for scientific progress. This phenomenon is evident in how scientific and societal understandings of heritability have evolved over time.

Heritability, as a fundamental concept, has existed since antiquity, persisting through the rise and fall of empires. The essential observation that physical traits pass from parent to offspring could always be captured in some explanatory language. Such understanding, grounded in the explanatory framework of the time, could be used to justify societal decisions. For example, in monarchies, the heir to the throne was often determined by lineage, with the assumption that the king’s son carried the divine blood of his predecessor. But this explanatory framework lacked logical rigor—how does blood relate to intelligence, decision-making, or benevolence? Should heritability even justify rulership in the first place? The logic of the times said yes.

In a more modern example, are Caucasians genetically superior? Are Aryans the embodiment of the superhuman? Without the proper scientific language to refute pseudoscientific claims, harmful ideas like these can take hold and spread. The language used to describe heritability has shaped not only scientific discourse but also societal norms and policies.

As the linguistic landscape surrounding heritability developed, so did our logical framework. When Mendel systematically demonstrated that the characteristics of pea plants could be reasonably predicted through the inheritance of discrete units, he laid the foundation for what we now call genetics. Yet, geneticists at the time were constrained by a limited conceptual vocabulary; they lacked the scientific tools to determine what that ‘discrete unit’ of heritability actually was. Only when chemistry and biology advanced could the gene be identified as DNA. Each refinement in scientific language has allowed us to build a more accurate and resilient house of knowledge—one that, while still subject to collapse, grows ever stronger with each paradigm shift. From this evolving structure emerges the language that subtly shapes the dominant socio-cultural philosophies of the times.