Public Communication in Regime Change Games (with A. Makhmudova), International Journal of Game Theory (2026) 55:8
The welfare effects of policy signalling in a regime change game, Economic Theory Bulletin (2025) 13:291–303
Belief Diversity and Cooperation (with David Li), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization (2025) 229:106815
Collateral and Reputation in a Model of Strategic Defaults, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control (2023) 156:104755
Reputation for Competence in a Cheap-Talk Setting, Research in Economics (2023) 77(3):285–294
Public Communication with Externalities (with K. Shamruk, T. Su and A. Wakrim), Games and Economic Behavior (2022) 136:177–196
Self-Employment as a Signal: Career Concerns with Hidden Firm Performance (with S. Lashkery and K. Popov), revise & resubmit at the Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Dynamic Delegation with Reputation Feedback (with A. Vlasova)
Risky Advice and Reputational Bias (with A. Vlasova and M. Ziskelevich), submitted
Peace Talk and Conflict Traps (with A. Gyarmathy)
False Cascades and the Cost of Truth (with D. Cheredina)
Contrarian Motives in Social Learning: Information Cascades with Nonconformist Preferences (with V. Ivanik)
Learning to Unlearn: Education as a Remedy for Misspecified Beliefs (with D. Fedyaeva and H. Tollié)
Herding Prices: Social Learning and Dynamic Competition in Duopoly (with A. Azova)
Mutual Reputation and Trust in a Repeated Sender—Receiver Game
Public Persuasion with Endogenous Fact-Checking (with S. Safaryan)
Banks, Bonds, and Collateral: A Microfounded Comparison under Adverse Selection
Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice (with A. Vlasova)
Entry Deterrence with Partial Reputation Spillovers (with R. Khachatryan)
Endogenous Quality in Social Learning (with K. Shamruk and E. Logina)
Advising with Threshold Tests: Complexity, Signaling, and Effort (with M. Izgarshev)
Government Reputation in Ramsey Taxation (with E. Ablyatifov)
Optimal Taxation under Imperfect Trust (with E. Ablyatifov)
Honesty, Stigma, and Cooperation in an Overlapping-Generations Game (with D. Li)
A Tight Sufficient Condition for Recursive Formulation of Dynamic Implementation Problems (with E. Mengus)
Labour Force Composition and Credit Constraints (with M. Gebauer)
Asset Prices, Banking Panics, and Fire Sales (with C. Hellwig and K. Shamruk)