Publications

• The welfare effects of policy signalling in a regime change game, Economic Theory Bulletin (2025)

  • working paper

• Belief Diversity and Cooperation (with David Li), Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 229 (2025) 106815

  • working paper

• Collateral and Reputation in a Model of Strategic Defaults, Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control 156 (2023) 104755

  • working paper

• Reputation for Competence in a Cheap-Talk Setting, Research in Economics 77(3):285–294, 2023

• Public Communication with Externalities (with K. Shamruk, T. Su and A. Wakrim), Games and Economic Behavior 136:177–196, 2022

  • working paper

Working papers

• Public Communication in Regime Change Games (with A. Makhmudova), revise & resubmit at the International Journal of Game Theory

• Dynamic Delegation with Reputation Feedback (with A. Vlasova), submitted

• Risky Advice and Reputational Bias (with A. Vlasova and M.Ziskelevich), submitted

• False Cascades and the Cost of Truth (with D. Cheredina), submitted

  • slides

• Contrarian Motives in Social Learning: Information Cascades with Nonconformist Preferences (with V. Ivanik)

  • slides

• Herding Prices: Social Learning and Dynamic Competition in Duopoly (with A. Azova)

  • slides

• Social Learning from Experts with Uncertain Precision, submitted

  • slides

• Mutual Reputation and Trust in a Repeated Sender—Receiver Game

• Public Persuasion with Endogenous Fact-Checking (with S. Safaryan)

• Self-Employment as a Signal: Career Concerns with Hidden Firm Performance (with S. Lashkery and K. Popov)

  • slides

• Banks, Bonds, and Collateral: A Microfounded Comparison under Adverse Selection

• Reputational Conservatism in Expert Advice (with A. Vlasova)

• Reputation, Risk, and Visibility

• Endogenous Quality in Social Learning (with K. Shamruk and E. Logina)

  • slides

• Advising with Threshold Tests: Complexity, Signaling, and Effort (with M. Izgarshev)

  • slides

• Government Reputation in Ramsey Taxation (with E. Ablyatifov)

• Optimal Taxation under Imperfect Trust (with E. Ablyatifov)

• Intergroup cooperation and reputation for honesty in an OLG framework (with D. Li)

Work in progress

• A Tight Sufficient Condition for Recursive Formulation of Dynamic Implementation Problems (with E. Mengus)

• Labour Force Composition and Credit Constraints (with M. Gebauer)

• Asset Prices, Banking Panics, and Fire Sales (with C. Hellwig and K. Shamruk)