Christiana Olfert (Tufts University)
The Pyrrhonian Skeptics say that the aim of their philosophical practice is ataraxia (tranquility, peace of mind) (PH I.25-29). But what is ataraxia? The Skeptics’ main philosophical interlocutors give different answers. For Epicureans, ataraxia is freedom from the unpleasant feelings of physical pain and mental anxiety (DL X.81-2). For later Stoics like Epictetus, ataraxia is closely related to apatheia, which means, roughly, freedom from passion or emotion (Discourses I.4). But what do the Pyrrhonian Skeptics mean by “ataraxia”? Answering this question is complicated by the fact that Skeptical ataraxia is said to be achievable by three different groups of people, who experience apparently different kinds of distress (tarachê): the so-called “men of talent” who are distressed by anomalies and puzzles; the so-called “ordinary people” who are distressed by their everyday value-beliefs; and the Skeptics themselves, who still aim at ataraxia after inquiring into these matters and suspending judgment. In my paper, I tentatively propose that interpreting Skeptical ataraxia as an epistemic accomplishment might offer a novel, unifying account of this central Skeptical concept.
Jari Kaukua (University of Jyväskylä)
The Arabic philosophers inherited an epistemologically optimistic theory of science from Greek Aristotelianism. Committing to the essentialism of Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics, they held that through the systematic co-operation of sense perception, intellection, and reasoning, we have reliable access to the axiomatic first principles of understanding as well as to the real definitions of extramental substances, which provide us the grounds for understanding phenomena that can be explained by means of them. Yet fractures to the framework are clearly visible already in the work of the most influential philosopher of the classical period, Avicenna (Abū ʿAlī ibn Sīnā, d. 1037 CE), and they become wider in the critical reception of his works towards the end of the twelfth century CE. My paper investigates Avicenna’s pessimistic concerns about the Aristotelian theory of science and their amplification in twelfth-century thinkers such as Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d. 1210 CE) and Shihāb al-Dīn al-Suhrawardī (d. 1191 CE).
Clinton Tolley (University of California, San Diego)
While there has been considerable interest throughout the history of European philosophy in the interaction of epistemology and ethics, the Romanticist and Idealist movements of the early 19th century brought about a renewed interest in the relation between aesthetics and the theory of knowledge. In this talk, I will show how a parallel 'aestheticist' position on truth and knowledge forms a deep thread in the history of Mexican philosophy, focusing on two central contributions as exemplary of this thread. I begin with the Nahuatl philosophy of the 1400s-1500s (as documented by Miguel León-Portilla), and their commitment to 'singing and offering flowers' as 'the only truth on earth', and the highest form of communion with the truth. I then turn to a more recent systematic expression of similar thoughts in the aesthetic value-suprematism put forward by José Vasconcelos in the early 20th century, which subordinates the resolution of classical epistemological (and ethical) concerns to the higher task of establishing the 'aesthetic stage' of human existence.
Maria Heim (Amherst College)
My paper explores the intellectual program of the 5th century Indian Buddhist scholar, Buddhaghosa, and the Abhidhamma tradition that he interpreted and systematized. Buddhaghosa conceived of wisdom – which he defined as practices of phenomenological analysis – to be ethically, existentially, and soteriologically transformative at the deepest levels. Wisdom is a verb, involving structured modes of analzying and reanalyzing human experience to destablize fixed notions of selfhood and essence. Analysis dismantles essences and replaces them with causes and conditions, which in turn are subject to further analysis. My paper works particularly with Buddhaghosa’s metaphors and practices of vision to bring out the distinctive contributions of his epistemic program.
Tamer Nawar (University of Barcelona)
One distinctive contribution of medieval philosophers in the Latin West was the attention they gave to various philosophical questions concerning the nature of divine foreknowledge and how an omniscient God can know everything, including how the future will unfold, while many future events are contingent and God Himself is (according to many medievals) 'outside' of time. While these medieval discussions have received significant attention from those interested in future contingents and free will, I will focus on how such debates contributed to several sophisticated discussions of the nature of knowledge and the relation between epistemic agents and the objects of which they have cognisance and how, from Augustine and Boethius onwards, medieval philosophers in the Latin west theorised about the epistemic implications of divine omniscience and foreknowledge, thereby giving rise to novel accounts of acquaintance, cognisance, comprehension, and knowledge.
Kristin Primus (University of California, Berkeley)
Spinoza argues that the “human mind has an adequate cognition of God’s eternal and infinite essence” (E2p47); indeed, every human mind has an adequate grasp of two of God's attributes—extension and thought. My focus will be on our knowledge of the attribute of thought. What exactly does one know just in virtue of having an adequate cognition of God, conceived under the attribute of thought? What might the "common notions" (E2p38) regarding thought be? I’ll also discuss the various senses in which thought, for Spinoza, is “multifaceted,” and whether we can coherently identify one “facet” as fundamental. One of my central aims is to explain the extent to which the best sort of cognition, scientia intuitiva, does not involve learning something new; its distinctive power does not lie in the discovery of novel information about the nature of reality, but rather in a kind of reappraisal of what one already, in some sense, knew.
Zeyad El Nabolsy (York University)
This paper traces the history of the idea of participation as an epistemic achievement in African philosophy. Lucien Lévy-Bruhl held that the main distinguishing feature between what he called "primitive thought" and modern thought was that the former is in communion with the world in a way that the latter is not. In particular, he held that "primitive thought" did not attempt to distinguish between the subject of experience and the objects of experience in a systematic manner and it personalized the world of experience. In Levy-Bruhl's thinking this feature of "primitive thought" was considered an obvious defect and African thought was subsumed under the category of "primitive thought". However, with later African philosophers, such as Léopold Sédar Senghor, participation came to be seen as an epistemic achievement. Indeed, participation with its non-instrumental orientation towards the world came to be seen as a necessary corrective to the dominance of what some have described as instrumental rationality.
Yitzhak Melamed (Johns Hopkins University)
Nachman of Bretzlaw (1772-1810) was a highly controversial Hassidic master. A religious and hermaneutical anarchist he would always strive to turn upside-down whatever topic he addressed. In one of his most daring teachings he addresses a certain kind of heresy that is irrefutable. This is the Heresey of the Void. Relying and developing the Lurianic Doctrine of Zimzum (Divine Self-Limitation), Reb Nachman argues that this doctrine must be true and must be false (in manner that is akin to a genuine antinomy). God must have limited himself in order to create a space free from God's presence as a precondition for creation, but it is also impossible that any part of space would be free from God's presence for a single moment. No intellectual discourse is capable of resolving this antinomy, but it can be overcome by a specific melody which reflects --- at the same time --- the highest heresy and the supreme faith.
Jorge H. Sanchez-Perez (University of Alberta)
In this paper I would introduce the audience to the connection between Metaphysics and Epistemology in Andean thought. In what I call classic Andean thought, a relational-ontological account of reality is endorsed. This account, in turn, commits the knowers to certain epistemological goals that are then transformed into moral precepts. By establishing this connection, the social role of epistemology as a tool for "living-well" becomes clear in Andean thought. My goal is to highlight how in Andean thought, moral obligations are derived from knowledge of the material world, based on important assumptions metaphysical assumptions.
Jing Iris Hu (Concordia University)
In this presentation, I explore how the exemplary actions of others can trigger shame and reveal new insights into one’s moral development. This phenomenon—exemplar-induced shame, widely recognized in the Confucian tradition—challenges dominant views that see shame either as failing one’s own standards or as tied to social stigma. I argue that exemplar-induced shame is inherently social: it reveals not what values individuals already hold, but what values they find newly desirable, admirable, and achievable. By inviting individuals into a moral community they initially feel unworthy of, this kind of shame heightens their awareness of both higher standards and the gap between those standards and their own conduct. In response, individuals may come to reject former behaviors, values, and even aspects of their identity.