Abstract: Using U.S. institutional equity trading data, I show that routing through affiliated brokers declines sharply following the SEC's 2004 compliance reforms, which strengthened monitoring, documentation, and board oversight. The decline is concentrated among investment managers with high pre-reform reliance on affiliated brokers and in large, high-commission orders, and it is matched by greater routing to unaffiliated brokers, primarily through pre-existing broker relationships. I then study trading outcomes in a difference-in-differences design that classifies fund--stock pairs by pre-reform exposure. Effects are heterogeneous: for money-manager funds, moving away from affiliated brokers is followed by worse execution and lower one-day realized returns; for pension-plan funds, the decline in affiliated routing is associated with lower commissions and improved net outcomes. Overall, the findings highlight a trade-off: tighter compliance and governance can reduce reliance on conflict-sensitive routing, but may also reduce the value of broker relationships and raise trading frictions.
Prestented at: Waseda University (2026), Manhattan University (2025), University of Manchester (2025), FBA Conference (2025), World Finance Conference (2024), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2023), University of Bristol (2022)