Preliminary abstract: Using Abel Noser institutional trading data, I show that routing through affiliated brokers declines sharply after the SEC’s 2004 compliance reforms strengthened monitoring, documentation, and board oversight. The decline is concentrated among institutions with high pre-reform reliance on affiliated brokers and in large, high-commission orders, and it is matched by greater routing to unaffiliated brokers, primarily through pre-existing broker relationships. I then study trading outcomes in a difference-in-differences design that classifies institution–stock pairs by pre-reform exposure. Effects are heterogeneous: for money managers, moving away from affiliated brokers is followed by worse execution and lower next-day returns; for pension plan sponsors, the decline in affiliated routing is associated with lower commissions and improved net outcomes. Overall, the findings highlight a trade-off: tighter compliance and governance can curb conflict-prone routing, but may also reduce the value of broker relationships and raise trading frictions.
Prestented at: Manhattan University (2025), University of Manchester (2025), FBA Conference (2025), World Finance Conference (2024), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2023), University of Bristol (2022)