Preliminary abstract: Using institutional trading data, I find that investment managers significantly reduce the trading volume directed to their affiliated brokers after a regulatory change strengthens the monitoring of such transactions in the U.S. This reduction is driven by large orders with higher commission fees, which are more likely to be scrutinized, and is associated with a shift in trading volume toward unaffiliated brokers. In a difference-in-differences setting, I show that the execution quality and information content of affiliated investment managers' trades decline after the regulatory change, partly due to the splitting of orders into smaller trades. Additionally, affected stocks experience temporary increases in volatility around the reform. These results indicate that affiliated investment managers make disadvantageous trading choices to mitigate regulatory and compliance risks, highlighting the unintended consequences of financial regulation and tight governance.
Prestented at: Manhattan University (2025), University of Manchester (2025), FBA Conference (2025), World Finance Conference (2024), U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (2023), University of Bristol (2022)