Abstract:" We analyze the macroeconomic effects of within-sector common ownership in the presence of bankruptcy costs due to costly state verification. Greater within-sector common ownership softens competition, which raises firms’ profitability, lowers their default risk and reduces the cost of business credit, but it also contracts total hours worked. We find that where bankruptcy costs are low, so that liquidation recovers most of the value of a defaulting firm, the contraction of hours dominates and common ownership lowers aggregate output. Where bankruptcy costs are high, the lower default risk saves the resources lost in costly liquidation, and weaker competition associated with increased ownership concentration can be beneficial in terms of aggregate output. Under these circumstances, there exists an interior level of within-sector common ownership that maximizes aggregate output. The model therefore suggests that common ownership is more tolerable where bankruptcy is more costly, as in low- and middle-income economies, where recovery rates are lowest.
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