Research

This study examines how formative experiences of democratic backsliding shape both diffuse and specific democratic support later in life. Drawing on political socialization theory, we argue that the consequences of autocratization depend not only on whether individuals come of age during democratic decline, but also on the democratic context in which that decline is experienced. Using cross-sectional survey data collected between 1980 and 2024 across 28 autocratization episodes, we compare individuals socialized during backsliding between ages 15–20 to those who reached adulthood under more stable democratic conditions within the same countries. The results reveal that individuals exposed to backsliding during their formative years exhibit significantly higher support for democracy as a regime ideal, but the effect is conditional on the political environment in which citizens are socialized. At the same time, they report lower levels of democratic satisfaction and institutional trust. These findings suggest that citizens become more attached to democracy as an ideal after witnessing its deterioration in practice, reinforcing normative support even as evaluations of democratic institutions become more critical. More broadly, the study highlights how political experiences during adolescence leave enduring imprints on democratic attitudes and demonstrates the importance of distinguishing between normative support for democracy and evaluations of democratic performance during backsliding.

When radical right parties moralize policy issues, mainstream parties face a strategic dilemma: accommodate their framing and risk appearing unprincipled to opponents, or oppose it and cede control of the narrative. This paper examines how voters respond to mainstream party reactions to the radical right's moral framing of immigration through a novel vignette survey experiment in Spain. Respondents were then primed with mainstream elites responding through either accommodation or opposition using moral or pragmatic framing. The findings show that mainstream party responses to moral framing trigger partisan-motivated reasoning rather than principled evaluation. When parties accommodate Vox's moral framing, in-party supporters see this as defending principles, while out-party supporters interpret it as capitulation. Pragmatic framing reduces—but does not eliminate—this polarization. Importantly, moralization effects are strongest on identity-defining judgments (policy alignment, party competency) and weakest on abstract values (negotiation openness, morality perception), suggesting voters evaluate mainstream responses through a tribal lens focused on "what does this mean for my party's identity?" rather than principled debate. These findings reveal a fundamental mechanism of democratic polarization: radical right moralization succeeds not by persuading voters that the issue is moral, but by forcing mainstream parties into positions that voters evaluate through partisan identity rather than principle. The result is that accommodation and opposition alike strengthen in-party supporters while alienating opponents—destabilizing the cross-party consensus needed for democratic compromise on polarizing issues.

Keywords: moralization, framing effects, radical right, political polarization, partisan motivated reasoning, mainstream parties, immigration

Do parents transmit far-right political support to their children, and does context matter? Political socialization research emphasizes intergenerational transmission in explaining how young people develop far-right support, but little attention has been paid to the role of parenting conditions during upbringing. Using linked parent-child data from the German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP), this study identifies two distinct pathways of intergenerational far-right transmission. First, parental support for the Alternative for Germany (AfD) strongly predicts children's AfD support. Second, warm parenting can protect children from becoming far-right supporters, independent of parental ideology, but this effect is conditional on broader structural conditions. While parental warmth does not reduce far-right support on average, warm and supportive parent-child relationships substantially reduce children's likelihood of supporting the AfD in regions that experienced low levels of German reunification-related dislocation. In contrast, this protective effect weakens and disappears in regions that experienced severe population loss during the 1990–1993 reunification period. These findings show that intergenerational far-right support is shaped not only by what parents transmit directly, but also by the structural context in which children are raised.

Keywords: political socialization, intergenerational transmission, civic education, political

extremism, parenting