Research

Published and accepted papers

Uncertainty in Organizations: Strategic Pay, Financial Risk, and Industry Competition (with Roland Pongou),  Economic Theory (2025): 1-34.

Abstract. What pay can a worker reasonably expect when facing uncertainty about their own productivity and that of their co-workers? We address this question through three complementary approaches. First, we propose an axiomatic framework that extends the neoclassical model of the firm to account for imperfect information. A new set of axioms, generalizing classical fairness principles, uniquely determines a fair expected payoff—though this allocation need not be stable. Second, we introduce the probabilistic core, a new solution concept that identifies stable allocations under uncertainty, even when they deviate from fairness. We reconcile fairness and stability by identifying a new class of technologies—quasimodular technologies—for which the fair allocation lies in the core, making it both fair and stable. Third, we study a strategic environment where uncertainty arises endogenously from costly effort. When pay follows the fair scheme, we derive conditions for the existence, uniqueness, and Pareto efficiency of a Nash equilibrium, with each equilibrium determining an expected pay. Although motivated by labor markets, the framework has broader applicability. We extend it to asset valuation under volatility and interdependence, and to Cournot oligopoly, where it reproduces the classical equilibrium—showing that fairness-based pay expectations can align with profit-maximizing behavior.

Cross-policy Effects: Lockdown Stringency, Race, and COVID-19 Vaccine in U.S. Nursing Homes (with Roland Pongou, Guy Tchuente, and Jean-Baptiste Tondji), AEA Papers and Proceedings, 115: 457-461, 2025  

Abstract.  In a health crisis, how do early mitigation policies affect the effectiveness of later interventions? Using the lens of the COVID-19 pandemic in the United States, we show that the stringency of early public health and safety interventions increased vaccine uptake among nursing homes’ residents and employees; however, the effect was negative in states with low lockdown compliance. This negative effect was exacerbated in nursing homes with a larger proportion of Black residents. The analysis highlights the present-day relevance of the historical mistrust between Black populations and health authorities and how this manifests in long-term care institutions.

Working papers

Acting under Incomplete Information: Mechanism Design, Justice, and Efficiency, Under submission

Abstract.  This paper develops a theoretical framework to examine how distributive justice shapes strategic behavior in production economies with privately informed agents. When output is distributed according to principles of distributive justice, a pure-strategy Bayesian Nash equilibrium exists. In contrast, deviations from these principles distort incentives and may preclude the existence of such an equilibrium. The findings remain robust across various technological and fairness environments. An application to mechanism design demonstrates that, under \textit{technological monotonicity}, fairness ensures truthful revelation of private productivity and yields efficient and optimal production outcomes. The analysis sheds light on how aligning incentives with fairness can sustain stability, truthful reporting, and optimal production in incomplete information environments.

Voting When Rankings Matter: Truthful Equilibria, Efficiency, and Abstention (with Roland Pongou), Reject and Resubmit at American Political Science Review

Abstract. Ranked voting is an election format in which each voter ranks candidates on a ballot, and individual rankings are aggregated using a general rule to produce a social ranking. This paper proposes a non-cooperative model of this electoral system. The setting allows for unequal voting rights, abstention, and social incomparability of candidates, and each voter’s utility is measured by how close his or her true preferences are to the social ranking. The analysis uncovers three main findings. First, it proves the existence of a pure strategy Nash equilibrium. Second, it shows that truthtelling is always a Nash equilibrium regardless of the voting rule and the structure of individual preferences. Third, under mild conditions, truthtelling is Pareto-efficient when voters have strict preferences. Extending the analysis to majoritarian elections with costly voluntary participation (Börgers, 2004) shows that truthtelling is an equilibrium if and only if the costs of participation are not too high and the election is tight. The findings have implications for the design of ranked voting systems that are compatible with truthtelling and efficiency while allowing unrestricted freedom in the choice of the voting rule.

A reinterpretation of the model in the context of intrapersonal bargaining, where the decision-maker has multiple rational selves, has implications for the occurrence of cyclic individual choices that reflect stable and efficient behavioral patterns.

A Formal Representation of Rights and the Measure of Illiberalism (with Nicolas Côté), under review

Abstract. Can we meaningfully compare the extent to which different policy alternatives show respect for individual rights? It is intuitively obvious that some rights violations are worse than others (e.g. extra-judicial executions vs. denying someone bail), just as it is obvious that some states perform better than others on human rights issues. But intuitions often differ in particular cases over which violations or states are worse than which and we lack in either economics or philosophy any rigorous method for settling the question. Our paper aims to close this theoretical gap.  We start by axiomatically characterizing what it is to show more-or-less respect for rights. We then present a variety of aggregation rules which we refer to as ``measures of illiberalism'' because they represent how well-respected all individuals' rights are in various social states. One of these rules provides what is, to our knowledge, the first axiomatic characterisation of Rawls's first principle of justice.

Bayesian Fairness: Reward Rule and Disappointment under Information Asymmetry (with Roland Pongou), Under review

Abstract. We develop an axiomatic foundation for the classical problem of paying workers in settings where their actions are not observed by the employer. The latter observes the distribution of workers’ abilities, has precise or imprecise information on the level of output, and demands fairness. We first characterize workers’ pay thanks to a set of axioms developed under conditions of uncertainty and information asymmetry, and assuming that the employer is Bayesian. This characterization leads to a closed-form reward rule called the informational Bayesian value (IBV). Then, we analyze worker disappointment under the IBV and find that average disappointment is equal to zero for each worker. This latter result is robust to considering all forms of disappointment, including ex-post, interim, and ex-ante disappointment. The analysis implies that a worker is never disappointed in the long run when the pay rule utilized in an organization under information asymmetry is fair.

Systemic Exposures vs. Facility Vulnerabilities: Policy Efficiency, Ownership, and Mortality in U.S. Nursing Homes (with Roland Pongou, Guy Tchuente, and Jean-Baptiste Tondji), under review

Abstract.  How does market structure influence the efficiency and distributional impacts of government interventions during health crises? We study this question in the U.S. long-term care sector, where ownership and organizational heterogeneity interact strongly with policy environments. Using data on over 11,000 nursing homes in 40 states during the COVID-19 pandemic, we examine how public health and safety interventions affected mortality gaps between for-profit (FP) and not-for-profit (NFP) facilities. Our analysis reveals that for-profit facilities recorded a 19 percent higher mortality rate relative to the mean compared to not-for-profits, and this gap increased by 39 percent relative to the mean under more efficient interventions. Our structural estimates enable us to interpret policy efficiency causally, distinguishing between the effects of interventions and reactive responses. Oaxaca–Blinder decomposition analyses reveal that external exposures—namely, network centrality, county socioeconomic status, and policy environments—account for the majority of for-profit disadvantage, while internal factors—quality and occupancy—have a lesser impact. Mechanism evidence suggests that staffing resilience, compliance, and network position are key channels through which these effects are mediated. Crisis policies should target systemic vulnerabilities (such as network centrality, county disadvantage, and staffing fragility) rather than relying solely on institutional ownership. 

Work in Progress

Boosting Productivity Through Interdisciplinary Collaboration (with Jean-Baptiste Tondji)

Connecting the Marketplace:  Digital Technologies and  Efficiency in Ethiopia's Agricultural Markets (with Woubet Kassa,  Roland Pongou, and Andinet Woldemichael)

Valuing Matching Opportunities: Imperfect Information, Roth’s Risk Neutrality, and Preferences (with  Roland Pongou)