The cost-effectiveness of building energy codes: the role of equilibrium effects
With Stef Schildermans
Abstract
Governments assess the cost-effectiveness of building energy codes with per-dwelling calculations that take the housing stock as given. We study whether codes change the housing stock, and what this implies for residential energy use and for their cost. In a model with durable housing, a code changes energy use through three margins: the energy use per m² of new buildings, the amount of new construction, and the use of the existing stock. We estimate these margins by comparing Belgium's regions: Flanders, which introduced a code in 2006, with Wallonia, which did so in 2010. The code lowered predicted energy use per m² of new floor space by 8% but reduced new construction by twice as much, and additional sales of existing houses amount to three quarters of the dwellings that were not built. If it delays rather than prevents construction, it saves energy over the lifetime of the new stock only if the delay is shorter than 8 to 14 years, depending on how much of the predicted saving is realized. For a delay of five years, the cost per kWh saved is more than twice what a per-dwelling calculation implies, and for a delay of ten years more than five times.
Keeping investors at bay: the impact of uniform and preferential transaction tax reductions With Joren Vandenbergh
Expected vs. unexpected treatment effects: a comment on Borusyak and Hull (2023) With Jakob Vanschoonbeek
Split incentives, asymmetric information and energy efficiency subsidies With Sven Damen & Stef Schildermans
Identification with sharp difference-in-discontinuities and discontinuity-in-differences
Applied Economics Letters, 2026.
Housing market responses to the mortgage interest deduction. with Sven Damen
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2026, 116, Article 104165.
Reconstructing cities: stimulating redevelopment through the tax code.
Regional Science and Urban Economics, 2023, 99, Article 103880.
Do market rents reflect user costs? with Erik Buyst
Journal of Housing Economics, 2019, 44, 112-130.
Taxing vacant land (With Thomas Boogaerts & Stef Schildermans)
See how the land lies (With Sven Damen & Jacqueline Seufert)
Do taxpayers look beyond the statutory incidence? (With Thomas Boogaerts)
Reducing tax avoidance through information provision (With Thomas Boogaerts)
(Synthetic) difference-in-differences with a discontinuity (With Jacqueline Seufert)
Hold out in land assembly for residential development
With Thomas Boogaerts
Using the universe of construction permits, sales and land use in Flanders (Belgium), we present new evidence on frictions in the land market. First, developed parcels for assembly projects are bought at a premium of 17%. This premium is not the result of differences in land use restrictions, local prices, reservation prices nor the quality of the existing structure. Second, parcels in assembly projects are less likely to be (re)developed than similar parcels in single-plot projects. The results from three tests suggest that holdout by landowners might be one of the frictions: i) the last acquired plot is sold at an additional premium of 9%, ii) smaller parcels receive a higher premium and are less likely to be (re)developed and iii) assembly projects with more parcels face a higher average premium. Lastly, we document an important difference between developed and undeveloped parcels. While undeveloped parcels in assembly projects are also less likely to be (re)developed, they are bought without a premium.