Essence, Modality, and Intrinsicality
Essence, Modality, and Intrinsicality
[Open Access, DOI: 10.1007/s11229-020-02545-y]
In his Essence and Modality (1994), Kit Fine objected to the idea that essence can be successfully analyzed in terms of de re necessity. In response, I want to explore a novel, interesting, but controversial modal account of essence in terms of intrinsicality and grounding. In the first section, I will single out two theoretical requirements that any essentialist theory should meet – the essentialist desideratum and the essentialist challenge – in order to clarify Fine’s objections. In the second section, I will assess Denby’s improved modal account, which appeals to the notion of intrinsicality, and argue that it is untenable. In the third section, I will explain how, when combined with a modal-existential criterion, a hyperintensional account of intrinsicality – in the same vein as Ralf Bader (2013) and Gideon Rosen (2010) – can help successfully address Fine’s counterexamples. In the fourth section, I will evaluate how this novel analysis of essence stands with respect to sortal, origin, and natural kinds essentialism and discuss potential objections and difficulties.
[Open Access, DOI: 10.1007/s11098-021-01758-2]
In the present inquiry, I defend the claim that the thesis that essence is the source of all (metaphysical) necessity is compromised. I argue that, on pain of circularity, essentialists cannot successfully account for the necessity of essences. In response to the difficulties I raise, I discuss potential solutions on behalf of essentialists and explain why I find none of them compelling. My conclusion on the matter is that the best essentialists can hope for is a view where the necessity of essences is left unexplained (by essences).
[Open Access, DOI: 10.1007/s11016-021-00699-0]
Review of 'Metaphysics, Modality, and Meaning: Themes from Kit Fine' (Ed. M. Dumitru, OUP) for Metascience. (Invited)
For previous talks, check my CV here.