関心分野 

組織の経済学（権限，インセンティブシステム），契約理論，ゲーム理論 

書籍

• 『活かすゲーム理論』有斐閣，2023年3月（浅古泰史 ，図斎大との共著）

論文

• "Preventing Bottlenecks in Organizations." (with Takuro Yamashita), AEA Papers and Proceedings, 112: 444-51, 2022.

• 「サプライヤーの品質改善投資と調達オークションのデザイン」(田中悟と共著）外国学研究94号，pp. 5-30, 2022.

• "Estimation of Job Ranks in the Japanese Judiciary" (with Kojima Kenta), The 1st Croatian-Japanese Conference “Contemporary problems in economics” Conference Proceeding, pp. 40-59, 2020.

  • （日本語版）「裁判所ポストの定量的評価： ランクとジョブバリューの観点から」Kobe City University of Foreign Studies Working Paper Series, No.58，pp. 1-31, 2019   (with Kenta Kojima). (興味がある方は直接ご連絡ください）

• "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure" (with Takuro Yamashita), Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, 29(1), 173 - 186, 2020.

  • Old version in  HIAS discussion papers, HIAS-E-18，pp. 1-31, Hitotsubashi University,  2015 . Download (Dec 14, 2015) 

  • Latest version in TSE Working Papers 18-941, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE) , 2018. Download(2018)

• 「会議の経済学（２）」神戸外大論叢, 第67巻2号（2017年11月）,pp.137-158

• 「会議の経済学（１）」神戸外大論叢，第62巻5号（2011年11月）,pp.11-30

• "中間管理職の経済理論---モニタリング機能 ，情報伝達機能とミドルのジレンマ---" 日本労働研究雑誌，2009年11月号（No.592）（伊藤秀史との共著）

  • " Economic Theories of Middle Management: Monitoring, Communication, and the Middle Manager’s Dilemma" Japan Labor Review，2010, vol. 7, No. 4 (with Hideshi Itoh）

• 「権限配分と組織設計」一橋大学日本企業研究センター編『日本企業研究のフロンティア④』有斐閣,2008年3月（伊藤秀史との共著）

ワーキングペーパー 

• "Empirical Implications of Sequential Innovation and Legal Action," HJBS Working Paper Series, No. 163，pp. 1-19, 2012 (with Yasuhiro Arai). Download (Feb 2, 2013) 

This article compares two hypotheses, sequential innovation and legal action, and theoretically obtains the testable implications to specify which hypothesis is crucial in empirical evidence. Our main results are that we distinguish between the two hypotheses based on i) whether the cross-term coe cient of the number of patents and the dummy of patent law are positive or negative and ii) whether the variance of the patent distribution is decreased. 

• "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect commitment," HJBS Working Paper Series, No. 61, pp. 1-25, 2007. Download (July 23, 2009) 

Should a principal delegates authority (decision right) to his or her agent if the agent has private information? This paper answers this question under the ``imperfect commitment'' assumption that compensation schemes are contractable but decisions are not verifiable. Our conclusions are that (i) the allocation of authority is determined by a trade-off between a self-commitment cost due to centralization and an incentive cost due to delegation and (ii) that the principal should adopt a performance-based compensation scheme under both delegation and centralization; however, the optimal compensation schemes are rather different. Furthermore, we find a new kind of advantage from delegation. 

• "The Optimality of Power in Organizations," HJBS Working Paper Series, No. 36, pp. 1-25, 2006. 

Download (June 9, 2007) 

This paper develops a moral hazard model whereby an agent exerts power to impute failure to other agents. The model is used to analyze the effect of power on organizational welfare. Our conclusion is that power is beneficial for organizations if the principal can control the power relationships between agents. These benefits disappear if strategic interaction between agents determines the power relationship. Other kinds of benefits are also shown by extending the model in two directions: (i) where there is competition for power between agents, and (ii) where the strategic interaction between agents generates a direct negative externality for the organization.

学会報告 

1. " 裁判所ポストの定量的評価：ランクとジョブバリューの観点から," (小嶋健太氏との共著)，法と経済学会，2024年12月1日，明治大学

2. “Preventing Bottlenecks in Organization,” (with Takuro Yamashita),  AEA 2022 Annual Meeting, Jan. 8, 2022, online  (presenter: Yamashita).

3. “Estimation of Job Ranks in the Japanese Judiciary,” (with Kenta Kojima) The 1st Croatian-Japanese Conference “Contemporary problems in economics,”  June 16, 2020, online (presenter: Kojima) .

4.  "Judical independence in Japanese courts ,"  (with Kenta Kojima) The 13th East Asian Contract Theory Conference(2019年12月7日), 関東学院大学

5. "Asymmetric information allocation to avoid coordination failure," East Asian Game Theory Conference 2015, (2015 年8月25日) , 早稲田大学

6. "Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision)" (with Takuro Yamashita) The 8th Japan-Taiwan-Hong Kong Contract Theory Conference, (2014年12月6日) , University of Hong Kong

7. "Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision)" (with Takuro Yamashita) The 20th Decentralization Conference in Japan, (2014年10月13日) , 福岡大学

8. "Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision)" (with Takuro Yamashita) 2014 European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, (2014年8月31日) , Universita Commerciale Luigi Bocconi

9. "Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision)," 2014 EEA-ESEM, (2014年8月25日) , University of Toulouse 1

10. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," 2008 European Association for Research in Industrial Economics, (2008 年9 月4 日) , University of Toulouse 1

11. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," 2008 EEA-ESEM , (2008 年8月28 日) , Universita Commerciale Luigi Bocconi

12. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," 2008 North American Summer Meeting of the Econometric Society, (2008 年6 月20 日) , Carnegie Mellon University 

13. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," 日本経済学会2007 年度春季大会, (2007 年6 月2 日) , 大阪学院大学

14. "Politics in Organiztion," 日本経済学会2004 年度秋季大会, (2004 年9 月25 日) , 岡山大学

研究会報告 

1. "裁判官人事と司法の独立性,"法社会学会関東研究支部研究会，(2025年2月22日)，東京大学

2. "裁判官の独立性のDID分析, " 人事経済学ワークショップ, (2025年1月11日)，早稲田大学

3. ”An Optimal Structure of Help," CTW, (2024年6月15日）, 大阪経済大学

4. "内部労働市場における選抜の理論と実証," 人材配置の経済学(2024年5月10日），大阪大学

5. "複線型キャリアの実証,” 関西大学ソシオネットワーク戦略機構ワークショップ「情報工学、理論経済学、実験社会科学の結節点を探る」フラッシュトーク (2024年4月16日）, 関西大学

6.  "An optimal Structure of Help,”Economics Workshop, (2023年8月29日）,釧路公立大学

7. "An optimal Structure of Help," CTW Summer Camp 2023: Kanazawa (2023 年8月19日) , 金沢星稜大学  

8.  "An optimal Structure of Help,”Economics Workshop, (2023年6月6日）,高知大学

9. "An optimal Structure of Help,” 経済研究会, (2022年12月9日）,小樽商科大学 

10. "An optimal Structure of Help,” Contract Theory Workshop on Zoom, (2022年4月16日）, Zoom

11. "Judicial Independence in Japanese Courts," Economics Workshop, (2019年3月20日) , 東北公益文科大学 

12. "An Empirical Analysis of Career path in Japanese courts," Economics Workshop, (2018 年9月14日) , 釧路公立大学 

13. "An Empirical Analysis of Career path in Japanese courts," CTW Summer Camp MMXVIII: Kushiro, (2018 年8月4日) , 釧路公立大学 

14. "Procurement auction and Collusion," CTW Summer Camp MMXVII: Nagasaki, (2017 年8月4日) , 長崎大学 

15. "Second Price Auction with Jump and Closing Bid Rule," Economics Workshop, (2017 年3月28日) , 釧路公立大学 

16. "Second Price Auction with Jump and Closing Bid Rule," (2017 年3月15日) , 名古屋大学 

17. "Second Price Auction with Jump and Closing Bid Rule," Contract Theory Workshop: Summer Camp in Aomori 2016(2016年8月8-10日），青森公立大学 

18. "Second Price Auction with Jump and Closing Bid Rule," (2016 年7月9日) , 高知大学 

19. "English Auction with Jump and Closing Bid Rule," Economics Workshop, (2015 年12月9日) , UNITY

20. "English Auction with Jump and Closing Bid Rule," Contract Theory Workshop, (2015 年11月21日) , 関西学院大学

21. "English Auction with Jump and Closing Bid Rule," Summer workshop on Economic Theory, (2015 年8月3日) , 小樽商科大学

22. "Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision)," Interdisciplinary Workshop of Economics and Institutions, (2015 年2月23日) , 武蔵大学

23. "Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision)," , (2015 年2月20日) , 名古屋大学

24. "Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision)," Contract Theory Workshop: Summer Camp in Sendai 2013(2014年8月5-7日），高知大学 

25. "Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision)," Economics Workshop, (2013 年9月25日) , UNITY

26. "Optimal Contract to Avoid Disastrous Outcomes (and Information Precision)," Contract Theory Workshop: Summer Camp in Sendai 2013(2013年8月5-7日），東北大学 

27. "A Benefit of Distorted Performance Evaluation,"Contract Theory Workshop, (2013 年1月26日) , 関西大学

28. "A Benefit of Favoritism in Organizations,"Contract Theory Workshop East, (2012年12月7日) , 一橋大学

29. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment,"Contract Theory Workshop East, (2012年7月27日) , 一橋大学

30. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment,"Contract Theory Workshop East, (2012年4月27日) , 一橋大学

31. "コッミティーの理論,"関西ゲーム理論研究会,甲南大学 (2011年7月7日) , 一橋大学

32. "Does Protection for Intellectual Property Rights Strengthen Incentives?," Second Asia-Pacific Innovation Conference, (2011年5月3,4日) , National University of Singapore（共著者報告）

33. "Does Protection for Intellectual Property Rights Strengthen Incentives?," Contract Theory Workshop, (2011 年3月19日) , 関西大学

34. "Strategic Communication and Plan," Cheap talk mini-conference, (2010年12月06日) , 一橋大学

35. "Does Protection for Intellectual Property Rights Strengthen Incentives?," Contract Theory Workshop East, (2010年11月26日) , 一橋大学

36. "Does Protection for Intellectual Property Rights Strengthen Incentives?," 「ゲーム理論とその応用」, (2010年10月22日) , 名古屋大学

37. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," 関西ゲーム理論研究会, (2010 年5月22日) , 富山国際会議場

38. "Coordination and an Allocation of Authority," Network Economics Workshop, (2010年4月2日) , 中央研究院（台湾）

39. "Coordination and an Allocation of Authority," Contract Theory Workshop, (2010 年1月23日) , 関西大学

40. "Coordination and an Allocation of Authority," The Osaka Workshop on Economics of Institutions and Organizations (OEIO), (2009年11月20日) , 大阪大学

41. "Job Structure and Delegation," Contract Theory Workshop East, (2009 年7月30日) , 一橋大学 

42. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," 六甲台セオリーセミナー, (2009 年7月10日) , 神戸大学 

43. "The positive side of favoritism in organizations", Contract Theory Workshop, (2008年11月15日) , 関西大学 

44. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," Japan-Taiwan Conference on Contract Theory and Applications, (2007年12 月8 日) , Academia Sinica

45. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," 公共経済セミナー, (2007年11月9 日) , 慶応大学 

46. "The Optimality of Power in Organizations: Power Acquisition Process and Evaluation " , 経済政策セミナーシリーズ, (2007 年10 月25 日) , 大阪大学 

47. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," ビジネス＆エコノミクス国際 ワークショップ, (2007 年7 月27 日) , 青山学院大学 

48. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," 一橋ゲーム理論ワークショップ2007, (2007年3月5日) , 一橋大学 

49. "The Optimality of Delegation under Imperfect Commitment," 2006 年CTW Summer Conference, (2006 年9月18 日) , 一橋大学・京都大学共催 

50. "不完全コミットメントと権限委譲," 2005年CTW Summer Conference on Behavioral Finance and Contract Theory , (2005年9 月15 日) , 京都大学・大阪大学共催 

討論者 

1. 雨宮 祐樹, "Convertible Debt with Costly Communication," 日本応用経済学会, (2014 年6月22日) , 新潟大学

2. 濱田 弘潤, "Incentive for Innovation and the Optimal Allocation of Power," 日本経済学会, (2011 年5月22日) , 新潟大学

その他 

1. "情報システム産業における理論モデルによるインセンティブの適用可能性," 日本価値創造学会（2010年1月15日）,(共著，共著者報告) 

2. "ソフトウェア産業における契約について," 2009年12月, SEC journal, vol. 19, pp.362-367 (共著, 技術解説論文)