(with M. Belhaj and M. Faure) Sharing Opportunities under Externalities
Abstract: A subset of economic agents in a society is aware of the existence of an economic opportunity, and compete for exploiting the opportunity. We study incentives to communicate about the existence of this economic opportunity when the exploitation of the opportunity by the winner generates externalities to other agents. We characterize the equilibria of the communication game and identify conditions under which more externalities generates more communication.
(with P. Escudié) Addiction in networks
Abstract: Addiction rarely develops in isolation: social influence is a powerful driver of consumption, yet network effects remain largely unexplored in the economics of addiction. This paper develops a dynamic model of addiction on networks, where individuals’ consumption evolves under peer influence. We characterize steady-state consumption as a function of both network position and forward-looking attitudes, comparing myopic, time-consistent, and present-biased consumers. We then evaluate the effectiveness of public policies aimed at curbing demand for addictive goods. In particular, we study a key-player policy—modeled as a targeted rehabilitation program—that strategically exploits network spillovers to maximize aggregate impact.
Abstract: This paper incorporates demotivation into a model of social comparison on networks, where status is determined by relative performance. Demotivated agents experience both a reduced marginal return to effort and lower overall effort. In the absence of demotivating status concerns, social comparison increases effort but diminishes welfare. However, introducing demotivation generates a game of strategic substitutes. While demotivation lowers the well-being of affected individuals, it can generate welfare benefits by alleviating social pressure to perform and generating positive status spillovers.
In progress:
(with M. Belhaj and A. Seror) A model of social identity
(with M. Belhaj and J. Zheng) An experiment on risk-sharing networks