(with M. Belhaj) The Dark Side of Peers: Demotivation through Social Comparison in Networks (Revised & Resubmitted at the American Economic Journal: Microeconomics)
Abstract: This paper incorporates demotivation into a model of social comparison on networks, where status is determined by relative performance. Demotivated agents experience both a reduced marginal return to effort and lower overall effort. In the absence of demotivating status concerns, social comparison increases effort but diminishes welfare. However, introducing demotivation generates a game of strategic substitutes. While demotivation lowers the well-being of affected individuals, it can generate welfare benefits by alleviating social pressure to perform and generating positive status spillovers.
(with P. Escudié) Addiction in networks
Abstract: Addiction rarely develops in isolation: social influence is a powerful driver of consumption, yet network effects remain largely unexplored in the economics of addiction. This paper develops a dynamic model of addiction on networks, where individuals’ consumption evolves under peer influence. We characterize steady-state consumption as a function of both network position and forward-looking attitudes, comparing myopic, time-consistent, and present-biased consumers. We then evaluate the effectiveness of public policies aimed at curbing demand for addictive goods. In particular, we study a key-player policy—modeled as a targeted rehabilitation program—that strategically exploits network spillovers to maximize aggregate impact.
A few works in progress:
(with M. Belhaj and A. Seror) A model of social identity
(with M. Belhaj and J. Zheng) An experiment on risk-sharing networks