• (with M. Belhaj and M. Faure) Sharing opportunities under Externalities 

Abstract: We study strategic communication about the existence of an economic opportunity under sharing network context. In this environment, incentives to communicate increase with the amount of communication on the network, which entails Pareto-ranked equilibriums among initially informed agents. We also explore private investment into a screening technology, prior to communication. Nash equilibriums of the investment game may fail to exist, and we a give sufficient conditions to existence related to the domination number of the sharing network.

• (with M. Belhaj and R. Bourlès) Risk-taking in financial networks (NEW VERSION)

 Abstract: We analyze the risk-taking behaviors of financial institutions linked through shareholdings under prudential regulation, aiming at maximizing investments in risky assets under acceptable default probabilities in a context of an extreme adverse event hurting assets. We stress the strategic complementarities nature of risk-taking decisions, pin down risk-taking investments through the cross-shareholding network, and show how to implement regulation through capital requirements, and how to target banks with highest impact on aggregate investments in risky assets. Bringing the model to real-world data highlights the key role of network effects.