Research
Publications
Managing Seller Conduct in Online Marketplaces and Platform Most-Favored Nation Clauses (Job Market Paper)
Journal of Industrial Economics, forthcoming
Abstract: This article investigates the incentive and ability of a platform to limit the extent of competition between the sellers it hosts. Absent contractual restrictions, a platform has an incentive to ensure competition between the sellers. This incentive can change with the introduction of so-called platform most-favored nation clauses (PMFN) that require the online sellers not to offer better conditions on other distribution channels. Such clauses can align the interests between sellers and platforms to restrict competition. I illustrate that a platform can stabilize seller collusion to its own benefit. These results offer a novel rationale to treat PMFNs with scrutiny.
Supply Contracts under Partial Forward Ownership (with Matthias Hunold)
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, forthcoming
Abstract: With forward ownership, an upstream supplier internalizes the effect of its supply contracts on the downstream firms, which is so far understood to decrease prices. We show that instead downstream prices generally increase if firms use two-part tariffs. The price-increasing effect of forward ownership occurs with both observable and secret two-part tariffs, albeit for different economic reasons. The results arise under both quantity and price competition as well as for different belief refinements. Partial forward ownership can be more profitable and more harmful for consumers than a full vertical merger between an upstream and a downstream firm.
This article supersedes Vertical Financial Interest and Corporate Influence. It builds on and extends Sections 4 and 6.
Evaluation of Best Price Clauses in Online Hotel Bookings (with Matthias Hunold, Reinhold Kesler, and Ulrich Laitenberger)
International Journal of Industrial Organization, 61, 2018, 542-571.
Abstract: We analyze the best price clauses (BPCs) of online travel agents (OTAs) using meta-search price data of nearly 30,000 hotels in different countries. We find that BPCs influence the pricing and availability of hotel rooms across online sales channels. In particular, hotels publish their offers more often at Booking.com when the OTA does not use the narrow BPC, and also tend to promote the direct online channel more actively. Moreover, the abolition of Booking.com’s narrow BPC is associated with the direct channel of chain hotels having the strictly lowest price more often.
Working Papers
No-Challenge Clauses in Patent Licensing - Blessing or Curse? (with Benno Buehler and Matthias Hunold)
Revise and Resubmit at the International Journal of Industrial Organization
Abstract: We analyze the effects of no-challenge clauses that prevent licensees from challenging the validity of patents. Contrary to popular arguments, we show that banning these clauses does not necessarily improve the frequency of successful patent challenges. Depending on the patent strength, patent holders may profitably offer license contracts that incentivize licensees to not challenge the patent. Even worse, such a strategy can lead to higher running royalties and lower consumer surplus compared to contracts with no-challenge clauses. We demonstrate that measures that aim at improving the prospects of patent challenges, such as prohibiting termination-upon-challenge clauses, can cause additional detrimental effects.
Work in Progress
Endogenous Market Power in Vertical Industries (with Markus Reisinger)
Corporate Influence and Financial Interest in Vertical Relations (with Matthias Hunold)
Other Publications
Less Competition for more Sustainability? (with Felix Rhiel, also available in German)
D'Kart Spotlight Series on the Competition Policy Agenda 2025 of the Federal Ministry of Economic Affairs and Climate Action (BMWK).
Die Wirkungen der Bestpreisklauseln von Hotelbuchungsportalen (in German)