Drifting Away, 2013, photograph, by Erik Johansson

Reasoning, Rules, and the Normativity of Logic

May 25^th and 26^th, 2020

Venue: Dalarnas Hus, Vasagatan 46, 11120 Stockholm, Sweden

Conference Announcement and Call for Papers

It is natural to think that logic is normative for reasoning, that logic comprises rules that guide reasoning, and that reasoning consists in following logical and other epistemic rules. However, these hypotheses give rise to a host of issues. One issue concerns what rule following and hence reasoning consists in. In his influential discussion of Wittgenstein’s rule following considerations, Saul Kripke presented a dilemma for the rule following conception of reasoning: on the one hand, being disposed to act in accordance with a rule is neither necessary nor sufficient for following it. On the other hand, any account of rule following that requires acceptance of a rule gives rise to an infinite regress, since acting on the basis of one’s acceptance of a rule necessarily involves rule following. Another issue concerns whether it is possible to know a general rule of reasoning such as Modus Ponens (MP). One lesson that is frequently drawn from Lewis Carroll’s parable of Achilles and the Tortoise is that it is difficult to see how one might justify MP without making circular reference to it in one’s justification. Yet, if MP cannot be non-circularly justified, it seems it cannot be known. A third issue is the ‘adoption problem’, originally articulated by Kripke in an unpublished lecture, which concerns whether it is possible to adopt a general rule such as Universal Instantiation (UI), since one cannot so much as understand what it is to adopt such a rule without already having adopted it. These issues call into question the status of the hypotheses with which we began: is logic normative for reasoning after all? Or is the relation of logic to the norms of reasoning less direct, inherited from broader epistemic norms, goals, or values? Is reasoning essentially a matter of rule following or is it to be understood in some other way? And should knowledge of logic be understood as knowledge of rules?

Invited Speakers:

• Corine Besson, University of Sussex

• Daniel Cohnitz, Utrecht University

• Kathrin Glüer, Stockholm University

• Anandi Hattiangadi, Stockholm University

• Saul Kripke, CUNY Graduate Center

• Anna-Sara Malmgren, Stanford University

• Romina Padro, CUNY Graduate Center

• Dag Westerståhl, Stockholm University

• Crispin Wright, NYU/Stirling

Registration:

Registration is free, but spaces are limited. Please register by emailing Anna Petronella Foultier (anna.petronella.foultier@philosophy.su.se) by the 22^nd of May. Please indicate if you will attend on the 25^th, 26^th or both days. There will be a social event for all registered participants on the evening of the 26^th of May (details TBC).

Call for Papers for a Flash Workshop on Reasoning, Rules, and the Normativity of Logic

In conjunction with the main conference, there will be a flash workshop on the theme of the main conference from 4pm to 6pm on May 25^th at Dalarnas Hus. The rules of the flash workshop are as follows:

1. Theme of the talks: anything related to the theme of Reasoning, Rules, and the Normativity of Logic (broadly construed)

2. Talks will be circa 5 minutes in length

3. Be prepared to tailor your talk to different lengths of time

4. There will be just five minutes for questions—depending on how many people express an interest in giving a talk

5. We work out the schedule, chairs, etc. on the spot, depending on how many people attend

6. No powerpoint is allowed; you may bring with you a handout of no more than one page

7. Work in progress is especially welcome—just come along with a hunch or a scruffy idea

8. Graduate students and junior scholars are especially welcome

There are limited funds available to contribute to the costs of travel/accommodation for a small number of participants in the flash workshop. If you would like to be considered for travel funding, please send the following in an email with the heading ‘Flash Workshop’ to Anna Petronella Foultier (anna.petronella.foultier@philosophy.su.se) by April 1^st, 2020:

• The title of your paper and a short abstract (max. 100 words)

• Your name, position (graduate student, professor, etc.), institutional affiliation, and the approximate cost for you to travel to and from Stockholm

Conference dinner:

There is a limited number of places available at the conference dinner on the 25^th of May, 2020 at 7:30pm for speakers at the flash workshop. If you will definitely present at the flash workshop, and would like to come to dinner, please email Anna Petronella Foultier (anna.petronella.foultier@philosophy.su.se) with the heading ‘Conference Dinner’ by April 20^th 2020.

This event is hosted by the Foundations of Epistemic Normativity Research Group:

(https://sites.google.com/view/found-ep-norm/home).

We are grateful to Riksbankens Jubileumsfond for its generous support.