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Françoise Forges, Emeritus professor at Université Paris-Dauphine, is internationally recognized for her groundbreaking contributions to game theory, particularly in the fields of strategic information transmission, mechanism design, semi-cooperative games, and repeated games with incomplete information.
She has been a fellow of the Econometric Society since 1997, received the C.N.R.S. silver medal in 2009, and was elected an international member of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences in 2020. She served as editor at Games and Economic Behavior from 2015 to 2020. She was also director of the doctoral program in economics, director of the doctoral school, and chair of the institutional review board at Université Paris-Dauphine.
This conference, organized to celebrate her retirement from the French university, brings together leading experts in game theory and economic theory, including some of her former and current co-authors and PhD students.
Conference venue: Université Paris Dauphine-PSL, Place du Maréchal de Lattre de Tassigny, 75016 Paris
Sessions: Room A709. Detailed instructions here
Slides of the talks: here
Lunches and coffee breaks: Espace 7
Mandatory registration here (closed)
Hotel recommendations: here
PROGRAM
PROGRAM
Monday, December 16
Monday, December 16
08:30-09:00. Registration and welcome coffee
09:00-09:15. Opening words: Bruno Bouchard (President of Université Paris Dauphine)
9:15 - 10:15. Session 1 (chair: Jörgen Weibull, Stockholm School of Economics).
Ehud Kalai (Northwestern University): Resilience in Strategic Analysis - Applications.
10:15-10:45. Coffee break
10:45 - 12:15. Session 2 (chair: Vincent Iehlé, University of Rouen)
10:45-11:15. Claude d’Aspremont (CORE, UCLouvain): Bayesian mechanism design: Old and new beliefs.
11:15-11:45. Indrajit Ray (Cardiff Business School): Any Outcome can be a Trading Equilibrium in a Market (with Manipushpak Mitra and Souvik Roy).
11:45-12:15. Gorkem Celik (ESSEC Business School): Informative Certification: Screening vs. Acquisition (with Roland Strausz).
12:30-14:00. Lunch
14:00 - 15:30. Session 3 (chair: Enrico Minelli, University of Brescia)
14:00-14:30. Marie Laclau (HEC Paris, CNRS): A belief-based approach to signaling (with Frederic Koessler and Tristan Tomala).
14:30-15:00. Heinrich Nax (University of Zurich): Evolutionary cooperative games: my PhD journey with Françoise (ex ante and ex post).
15:00-15:30. Roland Strausz (Humboldt University): Mediated Renegotiation (with Andrea Attar and Lorenzo Bozzoli).
15:30-15:45. Coffee break
15:45 - 17:15. Session 4 (chair: Chantal Marlats, LEMMA, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas)
15:45-16:15. Andrés Salamanca (Ca'Foscari University of Venice): Some advances in the theory of values for cooperative games with incomplete information.
16:15-16:45. Stephan Semirat (Université Grenoble Alpes): Optimal equilibrium in single-peaked, single-crossing cheap talk games: a dynamic programming approach.
16:45-17:15. Peter Vida (CY Cergy Paris University and Corvinus University of Budapest): Unmediated communication in games with (in)complete information: the 4-player case (with Helmuts Azacis and Marie Laclau).
17:15. Cocktail (Espace 7)
19:30. Dinner (by invitation only)
Tuesday, December 17
Tuesday, December 17
09:00-09:30. Welcome coffee
09:30 - 11:00. Session 5 (chair: Vincent Vannetelbosch, CORE, UCLouvain)
09:30-10:00. Sylvain Sorin (Sorbonne University): Recent advances in 2-person o-sum stochastic games.
10:00-10:30. Penélope Hernández (University of Valencia): Coordinating Through Platforms: Private Signals in Social Networks (with Julian Chitiva).
10:30-11:00. Jérôme Renault (Toulouse School of Economics): A Folk theorem for finitely repeated games with public monitoring (with Johannes Hörner).
11:00-11:30. Coffee break
11:30-13:00. Session 6 (chair: Ana Mauleon, CORE, UCLouvain)
11:30-12:00. Ron Holzman (Technion): The minimax property in infinite two-person win-lose games.
12:00-12:30. Anna Rubinchik (University of Porto): From Arbitrary Pairwise Comparisons to the Finest Ordered Partition of Alternatives (with Susana Furtado).
12:30-13:00. Andrea Attar (Toulouse School of Economics, CNRS): Keeping the Agents in the Dark: Private Disclosures in Competing Mechanisms (with E. Campioni, T. Mariotti and A. Pavan).
13:00-14:30. Lunch
14:30-16:00. Session 7 (chair: Olivier Gossner, CNRS - École Polytechnique and LSE)
14:30-15:00. Qianjun Lyu (University of Bonn): Complete Contracts under Incomplete Information (with Gregorio Curello and Yimeng Zhang).
15:00-15:30. Rajiv Vohra (Brown University): Nash Bargaining with Coalitional Threats (with Debraj Ray).
15:30-16:00. Bernhard von Stengel (London School of Economics): Extensive-Form Correlated Equilibrium.
16:00-16:30. Coffee break
16:30 - 17:30. Session 8 (chair: Pierre Dehez, CORE, UCLouvain)
Roger Myerson (University of Chicago): Dual reduction and elementary games with senders and receivers.
17:30. Closing words: Françoise Forges.
Organizers
Organizers
David Ettinger (LEDa, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL)
Sidartha Gordon (LEDa, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL)
Frédéric Koessler (GREGHEC-CNRS, HEC Paris)
Lucie Ménager (LEMMA, Université Paris Panthéon-Assas)
Marisa Ratto (LEDa, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL)
Yannick Viossat (CEREMADE, Université Paris Dauphine-PSL)
Logistics: Anne-Laure Chagnon, Eva Annane, and Cécile Billois-Fontalavie
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