Having enough and not having too much: a characterization of sufficientarianism-limitarianism (with J. Ferreira), Economics Letters (2025).
The difference between the weak and the strong core from the design point of view (with M. Lombardi and V. Korpela), Economic Theory (2024).
Implementation in strong core by codes of rights (with M. Lombardi and N. Zivanas), Social Choice and Welfare (2022).
Motives and implementation with rights structures, Economics Letters, 204 (2021), p.109913.
Strong implementation with partially honest individuals, Journal of Mathematical Economics. 78 (2018), pp. 27-34.
Preferences for income and wealth limits: Evidence from a survey experiment (with J. Ferreira, S. Ramoglou and M. Vlassopoulos). Older version: Link
Implementation with evidence: a full characterization, (with R. Jain and M. Lombardi), draft coming soon.
Conditional rights and implementation, Revised version: Link
Decentralization and conditional rights structures.
Fairness in environments with public goods.
Limitarian principles of distributive justice.
Mechanism design with evidence.