PhD Thesis:
Cartel Recidivism, Market Structure and Green Antitrust
Advisor: Chloé Le Coq (CRED & SSE)
Working papers and ongoing projects:
Abstract
Firms may belong to many cartels, resulting in interconnected corporate cartels’ networks that share practices, strategies, and information. Consequently, each firm can be viewed as a node, and each cartel as the links between those nodes within a larger cartels’ network. Using Graph Theory, we formulate a model of collusive behavior in the presence of a cartels’ network to examine the impact of the cartels’ network’s organization on cartel stability. Firms face a “centrality trade-off”: the more cartels they belong to, the higher their profits, but the less stable each cartel is. We characterize one general network shape that maximizes cartel stability: in a connected cartels’ network, the denser the network, the more stable the cartels. In other words, cartels are more resilient when firms participate in multiple overlapping cartels.
Topology of Collusion: Empirical Analysis of Network Shapes in Corporate Cartels
Abstract
Upcoming soon
Other Projects: