Working papers
"A President of One's Own? Regional Favoritism in Latin America’s Federations" (with Adrián Lucardi)
To what extent do presidents favor –and are favored by– their home state while in office? There is evidence that at least some presidents disproportionately favor their home states while in office, but the mechanisms are not clear. First, presidents may deliberately favor their home state due to personal attachment or for sentimental reasons. Second, presidents may disproportionately recruit their collaborators from their home state, and these collaborators may be more vulnerable to lobbying efforts from the people that replaced them. Lastly, parties may nominate candidates from, and distribute more resources to, states they expect to be pivotal. We examine these possibilities with data from Latin America's three largest federations: Argentina (1983-2023), Brazil (1989-2023) and Mexico (1988-2023). We find that (a) both winning and losing candidates tend to overperform electorally in their home state, and (b) the president's home state is overrepresented in the cabinet, especially when (c) the president is a former governor. However, with some specific exceptions (d) the president's home state does not receive more (discretionary) transfers per capita from the central government, nor do (e) the home state's unemployment rate decrease during the president's tenure in office.
Work in progress
"Property Rights, Institutional Capacity and Political Participation in Peru and Colombia" (with Jorge Mangonnet and Jacob Kopas)
[Data analysis]
"Indigenous Plunder Raids and Local State Capacity in Argentina" (with Jorge Mangonnet, Christopher Carter and Paola Galano Toro)
[Data collection]
"The Judicialization of Fiscal Transfers"
[Research design]
"The Political Economy of Touristic Development"
[Research design]
"Subnational Election Timing and Electoral Accountability"
[Data collection]
"Political Careers and Socialization in the U.S House of Representatives" (with Zach Broeren and Hangsung Lim)
[Data collection]