Embedded Files
Podcast Interview: Food Security, Hunger and Foreign Policy
27 March 2023
Originally in: Diálogos de Política Exterior
I was interviewed for the podcast "Diálogos de Política Exterior" (Foreign Policy Dialogues) part of the Foreign Policy Observatory of the International Security and Defense Study Group (GEDES) at the Federal University of Sergipe (UFS). The talk centered on Brazil's public policies on food security and hunger fighting, how they relate to the country's international inroads and what to expect from the new government.
Multilateralism and Brazilian Foreign Policy
12 January 2023
Originally in: UNESP
I gave a lecture on Multilateralism and the evolution of contemporary Brazilian foreign policy in multilateral debates. I started the presentation (in Portuguese) with brief introduction of the concept of multilateralism, presented the overall approaches of Brazil to the multilateral and delved into the recent inroads of the country's foreign policy, looking into the presidencies of Lula da Silva (2003-2010), Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016), Michel Temer (2016-2018) and Jair Bolsonaro (2019-2022). I finished the presentation pinpoint the expected multilateral foreign policy to be developed under the new government of Lula da Silva (2023-).
Migration management in times of COVID-19
31 August 2020
Originally in: IESP-UERJ
I gave a lecture on migrations in the European Union in times of the COVID-19 pandemic. In my presentation (in Portuguese), I touched upon topics like the role of the International Organization for Migration (IOM) - where I worked as a project assistant at the time -, the greatest challenges brought about by the pandemic, and the activities of IOM and the UN as a whole to overcome these hurdles and promote safe, regular, orderly and dignified migration.
President-Elect Jair Bolsonaro promises to bring grand changes to Brazil. (Image credit: Janine Moraes)
Bolsonaro leads Brazil into a turbulent future
13 November 2018
Originally in: Strife
Nearly two weeks after winning more than 55 percent of the vote, Jair Bolsonaro, the first extreme-right politician elected to the presidency in Brazil, vows to promote sweeping changes. Supported by around 57 million voters, the histrionic former Army captain showcased himself as an outsider while combining virulent and nationalistic discourses. Even before taking office, he manoeuvred with the current Michel Temer’s administration (2016-2018) to advance economic reforms and to promote conservative views in the name of ‘family values.’ His path will necessarily be turbulent.
Driving factors
How did an ultra-conservative, unnoticed congressman who defended the dictatorship come to be president of South America’s largest country? His election is a by-product of five main factors.
First, Brazil’s economy is painfully recovering from its worst recession, which is directly related to the economic errors made during the presidency of Dilma Rousseff (2011-2016) and her centre-left Worker’s Party (PT). Brazil’s GDP fell 3.5 percent in 2015 and 3.6 percent in 2016, creating social unrest and damaging PT’s image, later ending in Rousseff’s impeachment. The next year saw a sluggish economic recovery of one percent, which was not able to compensate for the 12.5 million unemployed, many of them now falling back under the poverty line.
Second, violence is endemic. The daily death toll tops Syria, with nearly 64 thousand murders and 60 thousand cases of rape recorded in 2017. In the same period, Brazil’s police killed around 14 people every day, and 385 policemen died. As far as Brazil promotes itself as a “cordial” country, it is plagued by rampant violence, especially against poor, young, black men and minorities, not to mention gender-motivated violence.
Third, the country is engulfed in spiralling corruption, which led to the imprisonment of former president Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva (2003-2010), government officials, leaders of political parties and businessmen alike. Temer and congressmen in power might come next.
Fourth, progressive agendas related to LBGT+ rights, reproductive rights and affirmative action in higher education were associated with left and centre-left parties. These advancements encountered fierce opposition, namely amongst religious groups. In 2010, around 64 percent of the country’s population was declared Catholic and 27 percent evangelical. Currently, being elected in Brazil is impossible without the support of the highly engaged evangelical communities, which now control parliamentarian seats and media outlets. In the recent election, two other candidates besides Bolsonaro declared support for evangelical beliefs.
Fifth, traditional political parties such as the PT and the centre-right Social Democratic Party (PSDB), which disputed Brazil’s presidency since 1994, could not reinvent campaigning strategies, compose competitive campaigns and properly make use of social media. The PT did not reckon past mistakes and was over reliant on Lula’s ability to transfer votes to Fernando Haddad, Bolsonaro’s main adversary. Plagued by internal rivalries and boycotting a possible centre-left coalition, the party ended up second, but still maintained prevalence over Brazil’s Northeast region and elected the largest number of seats in the lower house of the National Congress. The PSDB was also tainted by corruption scandals and disputes between older and younger party members, not being able to cultivate its position as the ‘anti-PT’ and achieving only 4.7 percent of the votes.
Together, economic recession, corruption scandals, mounting violence, the so-called ‘threats’ to family values, and the crisis of traditional parties formed the conditions explaining the Bolsonaro phenomenon. Adding to that, he was critically injured after being stabbed, which led him to avoid televised debates, thereby preventing other candidates from challenging his views directly. Rightly interpreting and fuelling popular dissatisfaction against the PT, and what he and his supporters classified as an array of ‘communists’ ranging from musician Roger Waters to political scientist Francis Fukuyama and the Pope, Bolsonaro capitalised upon the feelings of an impatient and angry population. Portraying himself as an anti-establishment candidate, he upheld patriotic slogans tempered with violent discourses, promising to jail or exile rivals.
‘Strongman diplomacy’
Bolsonaro’s election comes in a moment when strongmen are concentrating power. Together with that, multilateralism and the landmarks of the ‘liberal’ global order are treated as a scapegoat, much for their distributional costs, rising inequality and ‘decaying’ values. It is not by accident that his government pledges to emphasise bilateral relations, to move away from the Paris Agreement and to by-pass the rules and norms stemming from the United Nations, which he called a gathering of communists.
Much of that reasoning has to do with reverting PT’s foreign policy, which, Bolsonaro argues, gave undesired attention to South-South cooperation and used public funds to finance countries like Venezuela and Cuba. Indeed, in the first speech after being elected he promised to ‘liberate’ the ministry of External Affairs from an ‘ideological’ orientation. Achieving so, in his views, involves prioritising relations with countries such as the United States, Italy, and Israel, to which he promised relocating Brazil’s embassy from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem and to review the status of a Palestinian diplomatic legacy in Brasília. His Trump-like move is short-sighted and has already caused the suspension, by the Egyptian government, of an official visit of Brazil’s current minister of external relations. It is also expected to spark criticism from poultry importing Arab markets with which Brazil has trade surpluses.
Regarding Brazil’s immediate region, Paulo Guedes affirmed that Mercosur and Argentina ‘will not be a priority.’ In his view, the economic bloc is too restrictive, harming Brazil’s chances of expanding extra-regional trade ties. Moreover, moribund Unasur is seen as a forum under the influence of Venezuela, with whom relations are already unstable. In contrary, Bolsonaro expects to promote relations with Chile.
Dialogue with China, Brazil’s biggest trading partner, is messy. In March, Bolsonaro visited Taiwan. During the campaign, he declared that the Chinese are “buying Brazil”, which led two Chinese newspapers, China Daily and Global Times, to harshly question Bolsonaro’s intentions and to affirm that his actions can cost Brazil a ‘great deal.’ Later on, he met with Chinese representatives to say that bilateral trade should increase during his government.
Not even in power, president-elect Bolsonaro is already harming Brazil’s democracy and the country’s image abroad. The question now is how much change he will be able to imprint.
Can he govern?
Bolsonaro is expected to face a paralysing fiscal scenario, a divided but vocal opposition, and one of the most fragmented lower houses in the world. Of a total of 35 political parties, 30 have at least one chair at the lower house and 21 at the senate, greatly complicating governability. His until then insignificant Social Liberal Party (PSL), however, grew from eight seats to 52, ranking second. It is expected to surpass the PT, as a ‘performance clause’ to control fragmentation was established, allowing shifts in party membership without punishment. Furthermore, Brazil’s political compass moved towards the right, which made moderate political parties – namely the PSDB and Temer’s Brazilian Democratic Movement (MDB) – lose influence. Bolsonaro is expected to receive support from the BBB (bullets, beef, bible) caucus. That configuration can grant him enough backing even to approve constitutional amendments.
Up to now, his administration will be based on four axes, embodied by key appointees: (i) the military, represented by Vice-President General Hamilton Mourão and minister of Defence General Augusto Heleno; (ii) the Congress, guided by his future chief of staff, Congressman Onyx Lorenzoni, who is expected to accommodate demands from the BBB caucus; (iii) free market enthusiasts directed by his “super minister” and top financial advisor Paulo Guedes; and (iv) the judiciary and his second minister with unbridled powers, Judge Sergio Moro who helped to jail Lula and who is expected to tackle any wrongdoings in Bolsonaro’s political base.
In the best but unlikely scenario, Bolsonaro would be able to adjust the preferences of these different groupings, combining market reforms and anti-corruption rhetoric with a conservative, religious-like, family agenda. The crusade against some media outlets would continue and criticisms would be labelled fake news. Adding to that, he would relax gun laws, lower age of criminal responsibility and approve measures against indigenous territories and the environmental sector. He would proceed with reforms in the educational sector, favouring distance learning, and push changes in the pension system. In this situation, Bolsonaro would face street protests from the opposition. If deadlock exists and measures are postponed, he would infuriate some of his own voters and instability would mount.
A second and more likely scenario occurs with Bolsonaro not being able to handle his support base. His coalition is fragile and composed by groups with clashing interests. Two consequences can derive from that. First, congressmen counter Bolsonaro, impeding his ability to govern, as happened with Rousseff. Second, Bolsonaro attempts to circumvent Congress by heavily relying on his presidential decree authority and focusing on a minimalistic agenda that might appease his supporters.
In either case, he is likely to continue upholding radical, authoritarian-like discourses, calling voters to show public support and pressuring the media, the judiciary, and the political system. In a highly polarised political landscape with continued fears surrounding a sluggish economy, these discourses could spur increased violence, perhaps so much so that the military would be required to act.
Trade and food standards: another step towards the promotion of food security?
01 August 2017
Originally in: Socialprotection.org
A pressing issue in international relations today is the need to implement standardized measures of food production and consumption, which can ensure harmonization and make food trade less costly and more inclusive. Having been relatively less studied in the academic landscape, discussed in national bureaucracies, or present in the media, the topic of food standards gained renewed importance with the recent document entitled “Trade and Food Standards”, published by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) and the World Trade Organization (WTO). Together, the two bodies under the United Nations constellation brought attention to different aspects of international food standards, stressing that harmonization can ensure safe, nutritious, and sufficient food for a growing world population, especially in developing countries (FAO & WTO, 2017). The argument is straightforward: social protection - and food security in particular - can benefit with higher food standards.
Food standards are not new. Since 1955, a joint expert committee on nutrition involving the FAO and the World Health Organization (WHO) has stressed that multiple domestic food regulations can be contradictory, which can harm the distribution of “nutritionally valuable food” to all populations.[1] Years later, the work of the two agencies received backing from the Codex Alimentarius Commission or simply the “food code”, which was set to be the standard for consumers, producers and processors of food as well as for national food control agencies and the players operating international food trade chains. By advocating a set of parameters for food regulations, the code contributes to ensure the protection of public health and good practices in food trade.
The topic is of utmost importance in current times, as global leaders slowly implement protectionist measures and implement trade barriers. National food regulations are increasingly being made more complex in response to the demands of specific domestic groups and to exclude external actors. Disputes at the WTO on its agreements on technical barriers to trade (TBT) and on the application of sanitary and phytosanitary measures (SPS) are routine, but can also respond to other imperatives, going beyond the original controversy and further affecting access to appropriate and nutritious food. Furthermore, by complicating the already intricate collection of rules and procedures related to food trade, states can negatively impact the role of trade in promoting sustainable development. Fair trade can help in the global effort to achieve the sustainable development goals, namely SDGs 2, 3, 8 and 17 (FAO & WTO, 2017).[2]
One of the direct benefits of enhancing food criterions and of following a scientific framework is that domestic producers would not need to comply with a plethora of different rules and standards when engaging in food value chains. In light of this, national governments could better allocate their resources in the development of food safety requirements, assuring more sustainable programs that include purchases from smallholders and pay respect to the particularities of local communities. Furthermore, such measures can lower the costs of exporting food-related products. As agriculture and livestock form the basis of the economies of many developing countries, the existence of fewer technical and sanitary trade barriers could ease market access and diminish existing imbalances in interstate relations.
One possible critique is that the rules governing fairer and facilitated food standards work to the advantage of more powerful states. Justifiably, since rich states have more technical and scientific expertise in the global debate on food standards and are able to exert considerable influence within the mentioned organizations, as well as at the Codex Alimentarius Commission. Acknowledging the problem, the FAO together with the WTO, the WHO, the World Bank, and the World Organization for Animal Health, promote training and capacity building activities in order to allow developing countries to effectively and actively use the food standards system. The effort is crucial, since any standardized convention needs to take into consideration the realities of different countries, regions and local communities.[3] Otherwise, there is the risk that such a code could be used to simply perpetuate asymmetrical relations without acknowledging the most vulnerable.
Sometimes perceived to be detached from social protection practices or judged as an unavoidably “negative” force, trade has distributives costs and benefits that cannot be minimized. It affects a range of issues that go from the micro management of diets in a specific community or population to the overall flow of international agricultural trade. As stated in the document “Trade and Food Standards”, transparent trade is inextricably connected to the assurance of food security, nutrition and food safety.[4] Considering the fast-paced transformations in the manifold intersections of food production and trade, the institutional framework provided by the FAO and the WTO can contribute to ensure that food standards are responsible and inclusive enough to take into account the lived realities of people in developed and developing countries. The debate, however, still needs to continue, increasing the number of stakeholders and enforcing accountability.
References
FAO & WTO. 2017. Trade and Food Standards. The Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations & the World Trade Organization.
Cover Image: WTO, available here.
This blog post is published as part of the Ambassador Series, which presents insights into social protection around the world from the viewpoint of our Ambassadors, a group of international online United Nations Volunteers who support the online knowledge exchange activities, networking and promotion of socialprotection.org.
[1] See: http://www.fao.org/fao-who-codexalimentarius/en/, access in July 2017.
[2] More specifically: hunger, food security, nutrition and sustainable agriculture (SDG 2); healthy lives and wellbeing (SDG 3); economic growth, employment and work (SDG 8); and strengthening global partnerships for sustainable development (SDG 17). See: http://www.un.org/sustainabledevelopment/sustainable-development-goals/, access in July 2017.
[3] Moreover, the WTO and the FAO created the Standards and Trade Development Facility (STDF), a partnership to disseminate best practices and support developing countries. See: http://www.standardsfacility.org/, access in July 2017.
[4] As said FAO’s director-general José Graziano da Silva, “food safety and food standards are crucial to unlock the potential of an important tool to fight hunger, which is trade”. See: http://www.fao.org/news/story/en/item/996295/icode/, access in July 2017.
FAO's 43rd session of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS): food security, 2030 Agenda and climate change (part 2/2)
04 July 2017
Originally in: Socialprotection.org
During an opening statement at the 43rd Session of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) held last October in Rome, the former United Nations Secretary-General, Ban Ki-moon, emphasized the interrelation between food security, sustainable development, and climate change. His words set the tone for the meeting, which was named “making a difference in food security and nutrition” and also figures as the subject of a previous blog post. In the speech, he remembered the collective effort to end hunger and invited parties to fulfill their roles in implementing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development and the Paris Agreement, topics that comprise the center points of this piece.[1]
The CFS focuses on assuring food security and nutrition to all, especially those most vulnerable, food insecure, and malnourished. Its mission is, therefore, closely intertwined with the 17 Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and 169 associated targets of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development, adopted by 193 countries in September 2015 as a beacon for advancing social protection. By and large, the commitment to ending poverty and hunger is tied to a development path integrating economic, social, and environmental dimensions, composing a holistic picture (FAO, 2016a). In the same vein, the CFS is reckoned as an important stakeholder in, for example, contributing to the UN Decade of Action on Nutrition 2016-2025 and the Addis Ababa Action Agenda on financing for development.[2]
SDG 2 – end hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition, and promote sustainable agriculture – is directly related to the FAO’s institutional purpose and to the work of the CFS in supporting country-led efforts to eradicate hunger and malnutrition. One of the key points here, but still in need to be further developed, is how the CFS could add to enhancing the means of implementation, follow-up, and review measures of the mentioned SDG. Considering the challenge, parties at the 43rd session recommended a more robust engagement with the High Level Political Forum (HLPF), a UN knowledge platform that aims to provide political guidance and to facilitate the sharing of experiences.[3] The exchange of good practices and lessons, as happens with South-South and triangular cooperation, can too represent one way for the CFS to promote a better understanding of the linkages between SDG 2 and the overall content of the 2030 Agenda. Additionally, for its multistakeholder character, the CFS is to support the promotion of SGD 17 – revitalize the global partnership for sustainable development.
Climate change and food security
Climate change, another topic that animated the 43rd section of the CFS, represents one of the greatest challenges of the current century. Building on the reaching of the much-awaited Paris Agreement in late 2015, the global collaboration to tackle harmful effects of anthropogenic actions is currently facing setbacks, such as the recent defection of the federal government of the United States from the accord. Amidst such turbulences, it is fair to say climate change is a serious threat to the successful implementation of the SDGs and to the eradication of hunger by 2030.[4] In 2013, over 90% of natural disasters were climate related, as state the assistant executive director of the World Food Programme (WFP), Elisabeth Rasmusson. Adding to such dire circumstances is the fact that more than 80% of the world’s hungry people live in disaster-prone and environmentally degraded countries (FAO, 2016c).
There exists plenty of evidence on the deleterious consequences of climate change to food systems. Droughts, depletion of water reserves, storms, ocean acidification, and the spread of pests are just some examples.[5] IPCC’s Fifth Assessment Report goes further to affirm that “all aspects of food security are potentially affected by climate change, including food access, utilization, and price stability”, which is to cause greater damage to low-latitude countries in South America, Africa, and Asia.[6] Related to this, food prices are to spike and to remain volatile, a trend that is especially pernicious to smallholders in developing countries. Wheeler and Braun (2013) add to the grim scenario, arguing that food utilization and commercialization can be impaired by loss of access to drinking water and by health damages associated to climate change.
Ensuring more resilient food systems that can properly mitigate risks is something that needs to go beyond governmental rhetoric and be practically implemented. More integration between the three Rome-based agencies, the Climate Secretariat, and the WHO is crucial for effective progress. Also, more attention should be given to the issue of food security in climate talks, which remains on the top of the international agenda. Related to this, parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) should abide to the voluntary commitments expressed in the submissions of their intended nationally determined contributions (INDCs) and fulfill the mandate of Paris not only on mitigating emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG), but also implementing strategies to ensure adaptation to climate change and to minimize damage associated to extreme events. Technical interchanges and financial aid prove much needed in states most suffering the present and future effects of climate change.
In a nutshell, one should reckon that, taking into consideration present turbulent times for multilateralism and concerted action, the message from the UN Secretary-General echoes the importance of enhancing global cooperation for advancing common goals and promoting social protection. Following the director-general of the FAO, José Graziano da Silva, eradicating hunger, promoting sustainable agriculture, and addressing climate change are different facets of the same challenge (FAO, 2016d).
References
FAO. 2016a. CFS Engagement in Advancing the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. CFS 2016/43/6. Rome: Committee on World Food Security.
______. 2016b. Guidance Note for CFS Contribution to the 2017 United Nations High Level Political Forum. CFS 2016/43/Inf.16. Rome: Committee on World Food Security.
______. 2016c. Statement by the Assistant Executive Director of World Food Programme. CFS 2016/43/Inf.10. Rome: Committee on World Food Security.
______. 2016d. Statement by the Director-General of FAO. CFS 2016/43/Inf.8. Rome: Committee on World Food Security.
Wheeler, Tim; Braun, Joachim von. 2013. Climate change impacts on global food security. Science, vol. 341, issue 6145, pp. 508-513.
Cover Image: FAO, available here.
This blog post is published as part of the Ambassador Series, which presents insights into social protection around the world from the viewpoint of our Ambassadors, a group of international online United Nations Volunteers who support the online knowledge exchange activities, networking and promotion of socialprotection.org.
[1] See: http://www.fao.org/3/a-ms028e.pdf, access in June 2017.
[2] The UN Decade of Action on Nutrition 2016-2025 is an UN-wide initiative headed by the FAO and the WHO. See: http://www.fao.org/3/a-i6129e.pdf. For the Addis Ababa Action Agenda, see: http://www.un.org/esa/ffd/wp-content/uploads/2015/08/AAAA_Outcome.pdf, access in June 2017.
[3] On the HLPF, see: https://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/hlpf, access in June 2017. Also see: FAO (2016b).
[4] The interdependence between climate change and sustainability of food security systems also features in the Paris Agreement. See: https://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2015/cop21/eng/l09r01.pdf, access in June 2017.
[5] See: https://www.earthhour.org/content/5-ways-climate-change-challenging-our-food-security, access in June 2017.
[6] See IPCC’s AR-5 Chapter 7: http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/assessment-report/ar5/wg2/WGIIAR5-Chap7_FINAL.pdf, p. 488. Access in June 2017.
FAO's 43rd session of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS): "making a difference in food security and world nutrition" (par 1/2)
01 June 2017
Originally in: Socialprotection.org
Throughout the years, and especially after its 2009 reform, the Committee on World Food Security (CFS) of the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the United Nations has become a pivotal locus for discussing the state of global food security and nutrition. During its 43rd session held last October in Rome, amongst a myriad of topics discussed, stakeholders focused their attention on smallholders’ access to markets; the role of livestock in sustainable agricultural development; the interconnections between food security and climate change; as well as the Agenda 2030 and its Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). Named “making a difference in food security and nutrition”, the outcomes of the 43rd session will be tackled along these lines and in a future blog post.
In tandem with the three Rome-based agencies (FAO, IFAD and WFP), and relying on scientific support provided by the High Level Panel of Experts (HLPE), the CFS is the foremost inclusive intergovernmental platform of the UN constellation. Its contributions prove much needed in a scenario in which more than half of the world’s population suffers from one or more forms of malnutrition.[1] This dire statistic shows that efficient convergence of policies is still lacking, which proves even more problematic in times of soaring flows of refugees and internally displaced people; deleterious impact of climate change in food production systems; derangement of production chains in reason of persistent conflicts; and ongoing challenges posed by urbanization and changing dietary requirements in developing countries.[2] One of the main tasks of the CFS is to supplement these gaps, matching the content of its recommendations with actual practices and engaging both civil society and governments within a functioning process.
Connecting smallholders to markets, one of the key issues in the realm of social protection, received special consideration at the 43rd CFS session. Although responsible for 70% of the overall food production – a number that can go considerable higher in some developing countries – and employing the majority of the population in rural areas, family farmers still face persisting restraints (FAO, 2015).[3] Food insecurity, gender imbalances, and difficulties to access markets and acquire technical expertise are just some hurdles affecting this crucial yet vulnerable group.[4]Reckoning that small producers are recurrently the weakest link in agricultural value chains, parties at the CFS reunion asked how they could better collaborate to integrate smallholders within the four dimensions of food security: availability, access, utilization, and stability.[5]
Some recommendations regarding the issue were proposed at the meeting, for instance: fostering more enabling markets that adequately remunerate smallholders’ work and investments, which can help them to diversify productions and to cope with times of crisis, conflicts, and natural disasters; providing access to productive resources to women and youth, as more inclusiveness can increase yields in farm productions and diminish undernourishment; developing smallholder-targeted infrastructures; and linking family farming outputs with public procurement programs for school feeding and other public institutions (FAO, 2016). Still mostly visible in the discursive realm, such policies, if properly implemented and shared amongst developed and developing partners, can meet up with the Voluntary Guidelines for the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food, a beacon for the CFS’ debates.[6]
The role of livestock in sustainable agricultural development motivates lively disputes within the CFS and was subject to recommendations from the FAO’s committee. The debate largely relied on a report published in July 2016 by the HLPE. The document recognizes the importance of livestock to many countries and stresses the need to enhance the sector’s contributions to sustainable development, as well as strategies to minimize the multiple impacts associated with the activity.[7]While reckoning the importance of the sector for poverty reduction and the achievement of food security and nutrition, the report assumes that sustainable management of livestock should involve organic and agro-ecological approaches, which can minimize environmental degradation and reduce the carbon footprint associated with livestock systems. The non-binding recommendations can be useful for many countries in South America such as Brazil and Argentina, which depend on intensive productions aiming at both domestic and international markets.
Meeting future demand for food, which is to dramatically increase as population reaches 9.5 billion by 2050, requires novel approaches in both the livestock sector and in connecting smallholders to markets to assume a truly inclusive, multi-stakeholder character. The second part of this series looks into how the CFS adds up to the Agenda 2030, and deals with the interconnections between food security and climate change.
References
FAO. 2016. Connecting Smallholders to Markets – recommendations. CFS 2016/43/5. Rome: Committee on World Food Security.
______. 2015. CFS High-Level Forum on Connecting Smallholders to Markets – background document. Rome: CFS.
HLPE. 2013. Investing in Smallholder Agriculture for Food Security. Rome: High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security.
______. 2016. Sustainable Agricultural Development for Food Security and Nutrition: what roles for livestock? Rome: High Level Panel of Experts on Food Security and Nutrition of the Committee on World Food Security.
IFAD. 2016. Rural Development Report 2016: fostering inclusive rural transformation. Rome: International Fund for Agricultural Development.
Cover Image: FAO, available here.
This blog post is published as part of the Ambassador Series, which presents insights into social protection around the world from the viewpoint of our Ambassadors, a group of international online United Nations Volunteers who support the online knowledge exchange activities, networking and promotion of socialprotection.org.
[1] Around 800 million people are chronically undernourished; another 2 billion suffer some form of micronutrient deficiency; and 1.9 billion are overweight, of which 600 million are obese See: http://www.fao.org/3/a-mr980e.pdf, access in April 2017.
[2] In developing countries, consumption of meat has been growing at a pace of 5-6% per year and that of milk and dairy products at 3.4-3.8% per year in the last decades. See: http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y4252e/y4252e05b.htm, access in April 2017. Also see: IFAD (2016).
[3] According to the FAO, there is no universally accepted definition for smallholders. The International Year of Family Farming (IYFF) policy dialogue, which initiated in 2014, shed light into the centrality of family farming.
[4] Indeed, of the 1.4 billion extremely poor, 70% live in rural areas (HLPE, 2013).
[5] The issue has been part of CFS debates since 2011, but only now gained momentum.
[6] For a good debate on the topic, see the Food Governance website, namely Thomas Patriota’s blog post: https://foodgovernance.com/2017/02/21/the-cfs-policy-recommendations-on-connecting-smallholders-to-markets/, access in April 2017.
[7] Livestock accounts for around a third of global agricultural GDP and is the largest user of land resources, permanent meadows and pastures (HLPE, 2016).
MERCOSUR's REAF: providing a framework for social protection on family farming
23 May 2017
Originally in: Socialprotection.org
Created in 2004, MERCOSUR’s Specialized Meeting on Family Farming (REAF) is a regional mechanism that aims to tackle asymmetries by means of promoting and sharing successful public policies, most of them directly related to social protection.[1] Its inception is closely intertwined with the ascension of left/center-left wing governments in most South American states, a phenomenon some pundits define as the “pink tide”. Through the internationalization of domestic public policies, such countries established a platform that eases regional cooperation and endeavors to create a common framework for family farming. Its initiatives revolve around the assurance of social participation and the interchange of good practices.
MERCOSUR (Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, Uruguay, and Venezuela) is an agricultural and livestock powerhouse and home to one of the world’s most relevant biodiversity and natural resources. The region’s dynamism and international reckoning in the agricultural domain involves a delicate equilibrium between its leading technology-intensive agribusiness and the significance of family farming, the latter being the purpose for the creation of the REAF.[2] Being a “bread basket” and net exporter of food supplies, the region’s achievements in the family farming sector can be taken as successful examples of how to include and embolden smallholders. International organizations like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) as well as research centers such as the International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI), just to mention two, commend REAF’s practices.
The specialized meeting works on six thematic groupings: registration of family farmers; access to land; youth; climate change; trade; and gender. The goals of diminishing regional and individual vulnerabilities through the assurance of social inclusion and the development of skills and capabilities for family farmers is what unites these dimensions. In order to achieve these, REAF’s members drafted a series of social protection standards that bring together operational provisions, as the case of harmonized policies on rural credit and insurance, and guidelines on how to foment dialogue between governments and civil societies. Moreover, REAF articulates its actions with other specialized organs within MERCOSUR such as the Meeting of Ministers and High Authorities for Women.
In 2008, MERCOSUR established a family farming fund (Fondo de la Agricultura Familiar - FAF), which receives annual contributions. Whereas Brazil contributes with 70% of the total, Argentina responds to 27%, Uruguay 2%, and Paraguay 1%.[3] For the initiative to thrive, therefore, the compromise of the major partners is crucial. Beyond their goodwill, international organizations, funds like the International Fund for Agricultural Development (FIDA), and associated members of the regional bloc can also add up to the effort. In 2013, FAO and MERCOSUR engaged in a joint initiative to beef up REAF’s operation.[4]
Now in its second decade of functioning, the REAF needs to overcome persisting challenges. A framework that harmonizes national programs for purchases from smallholders and domestic legal landmarks is still to be seen.[5] Such advancement could routinize the exchange of experiences related to, for example, conditional cash transfer programs and financing social protection in rural communities. Also, the REAF could gain more dynamism with the enhancement of South-South cooperation initiatives with other groupings beyond the scope of Latin America and the Caribbean.[6] Lastly, recent hurdles in the economies of its members have hampered the ability of the REAF to operate, especially through its family farming fund, which denotes the need for more and continuous incentives.
Apart from such challenges, the REAF is internationally reckoned as a locus for the development of public policies on social protection. Throughout the years, its institutionalization has deepened, which helped placing family farming as one of the most representative topics of the regional integration in South America.[7] Since its inception, more than 100 governmental officials working with the topics under the umbrella of the REAF received training and interchanged national experiences on a wide array of themes, as the case with public procurement for school feeding and hunger fighting programs, rural credit for family farmers, not to mention politics of social inclusion.[8]
This blog post is published as part of the Ambassador Series, which presents insights into social protection around the world from the viewpoint of our Ambassadors, a group of international online United Nations Volunteers who support the online knowledge exchange activities, networking and promotion of socialprotection.org.
References
FAO. 2017. América Latina y Caribe: Panorama de la seguridad alimentaria y nutricional. Sistemas alimentarios sostenibles para poner fin al hambre y la malnutrición. Food and Agriculture Organization. Roma.
Márquez, S. and A. Ramos. 2009. “Differential policies for family farming in MERCOSUR: contribution of political dialogue in the design of public policies and institutionalization”. International Fund for Agriculture Development – IFAD. Discussion Paper, pp. 1-24.
Schneider, Sergio. 2016. “Family farming in Latin America and the Caribbean: looking for new paths of rural development and food security”. International Policy Centre for Inclusive Growth of the United Nations Development Programme (IPC-IG). Working paper n. 137, pp. 1-46.
Cover image: http://www.foodprocessing-technology.com/features/featurepulse-productio...
[1] See: http://www.reafmercosul.org/, access in March 2017.
[2] According to Rocha (2010), 83% of the farms in MERCOSUR belong to family farmers, which accounts for more than 13 million people and employs around 75% of the workforce. Furthermore, family farmers provide the majority of the food supplies consumed in the region. See: http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs/Docs0910/CFS36Docs/CFS36_Sess..., access in March 2017.
[3] See: http://www.cartillaciudadania.mercosur.int/uploads/DEC_006-2009_ES_Regla..., access in March 2017.
[4] See: http://www.fao.org/americas/noticias/ver/es/c/229960/, access in March 2017.
[5] For national programs and legal frameworks, see: http://www.reafmercosul.org/index.php/acerca-de/biblioteca/marco-legar, access in March 2017.
[6] In 2015, Latin America and the Caribbean became the first region to reach both international hunger goals, as defined by the Millennium Development Goals (MDG) of the United Nations. These successful outcomes partially derive from national experiences and from regional advancements promoted by the REAF. See: (FAO, 2017).
[7] For the institutional evolution of the REAF, see: http://www.reafmercosul.org/index.php/acerca-de/biblioteca/publicaciones..., access in March 2017.
[8] See: http://www.reafmercosul.org/index.php/acerca-de/biblioteca/publicaciones..., access in March 2017. For a good evaluation of REAF’s policies, see: Márquez and Ramos (2009). For an overview on Latin America and the Caribbean, see: Schneider (2016).
Brazil's year ahead (2017)
31 January 2017
Originally in: PRIMO blog
The outlook for the year ahead looks bitter. After the impeachment process of 2016, ousting Dilma Rousseff alongside a 13-year-in-power Workers’ Party (PT),
Brazil’s political landscape remains unpredictable. The economy shows ambivalent signals of recovery. Whilst inflation and two-digit interest rates are gradually declining, high unemployment persists. Michel Temer’s government was able to reunite a majority of center and right-wing parliamentarians to approve a harsh austerity bill that limits increases in government expenditures. Whereas the government argues a spending cap is much needed to balance the public budget, the opposition maintains it curtails funding for health and education. A pension reform may also be on the way. Aside from such hurdles, Temer strives to sell Brazil as a reliable country to investors.
In addition, Temer was not able to gather public legitimacy, for his government is continuously engulfed in corruption scandals. Up to now, six ministers have resigned amidst the perpetuation of “Operation Car Wash”. This month, the Supreme Court judge in charge of the operation died in a plane crash. The grim scenario is also marked by a series of riots that left a death toll of more than 120 prison killings and raised fears of a sprawling war between drug cartels. In 2015 alone, Brazil saw more violent deaths than war-torn Syria. Additionally, last year saw an escalation in deforestation levels, which is contradictory with the country’s leadership in climate change. Moreover, a sense of paralysis in the political arena persists, an impression that is fuelled by ongoing uncertainty over the 2018 presidential elections. Beyond old names and new adventurers, the situation remains uncertain. All things considered, a lack of proper domestic foundations can tarnish Brazil’s image.
Brazil’s external overtures under Temer started with a thorough revision of the work of his predecessors. Needleless to say, the current foreign minister, José Serra, nurtures presidential aspirations. Under his supervision, Brasília opted for a harsh tone with crisis-laden Venezuela, suspending Caracas from Mercosur, and pressed the country for paying its debts to Brazilian multinationals. While regional integration is sidelined, Brazil’s presence in Africa received less attention. This reverse trend spared the BRICS grouping, which Brazil sees as a pragmatic way to access China. It may also bring back IBSA from the dead, having received lackluster care from Dilma. By and large, the diagnosis is that Brazil punched above its weight during the PT years, damaging the country’s position in the world.
José Serra’s Itamaraty hopes to attract investors, re-negotiate trade agreements, revise Brazil’s South-South policies, and calibrate its relations with Washington and a post-Brexit European Union. Regarding Trump’s administration, Brazil is waiting to see how things unfold. Coming to the EU, Brasília seeks possible opportunities with London, as the awaited Mercosur-EU trade agreement is still in a quagmire. When it comes to China, Brazil’s leading trading partner, Brasília needs to develop proper strategies to deal with Beijing. Asia should be privileged, as recent visits of Temer to Japan and India demonstrate. The result of these options, though, remains to be seem.
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