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This has been a widespread problem at my University for some time now. Sometimes everything works fine with simulations. Other times (apparently at random) Spectre simulations will not work when started through the Analog Environment. When it starts to fail, it generally will continue to do so for a long period and restarting Cadence does not help. If I try again the next day sometimes it will work, other times it won't. When it fails to run, the spectre.out window displays a message similar to "Simulation failed. See output.log file for more information." However, this file is not created.

When this happens we use a workaround to run simulations: Using the console, we browse to the simulation/Design_Name/spectre/schematic directory and run the Spectre command from the command line, using the command that has been set up in ADE. This always works, and the results can be loaded into ADE and analyzed as usual. The problem with this workaround, other than being a hassle, is that there is no way to run parametric simulations (as far as I can figure out).

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The first thing that caught my eye was the version of spectre that you are using....MMSIM 6.2.1 has been End of Life for some time now. I strongly recommend upgrading to MMSIM 7.1.1 if at all possible.

I see this problem sometimes but it seems to be specific to certain machines (Netlist & Run, no output log and spectre stalls, after a minute icfb reports problem). We have a UNIX lab running Solaris 10 and sometimes the error is resolved by simply going to another workstation and running the simulation.

Update 4 April 2018 With Visual Studio 2017 version 15.7 Preview 3 we have two new features to announce with regards to our Spectre mitigations. First, the /Qspectre switch is now supported regardless of the selected optimization level. Second, we have provided Spectre-mitigated implementations of the Microsoft Visual C++ libraries. See below for details.

If you are a developer whose code operates on data that crosses a trust boundary then you should consider downloading an updated version of the MSVC compiler, recompiling your code with the /Qspectre switch enabled, and redeploying your code to your customers as soon as possible. Examples of code that operates on data that crosses a trust boundary include code that loads untrusted input that can affect execution such as remote procedure calls, parsing untrusted input for files, and other local inter-process communication (IPC) interfaces. Standard sandboxing techniques may not be sufficient: you should investigate your sandboxing carefully before deciding that your code does not cross a trust boundary.

The C5045 diagnostic, added in Visual Studio 2017 version 15.7 Preview 4, shows where the compiler would insert a mitigation if the /Qspectre switch were enabled. Please see this post for more details.

In current versions of the MSVC compiler, the /Qspectre switch only works on optimized code. You should make sure to compile your code with any of the optimization switches (e.g., /O2 or /O1 but NOT /Od) to have the mitigation applied. Similarly, inspect any code that uses #pragma optimize([stg], off). Work is ongoing now to make the /Qspectre mitigation work on unoptimized code.

All versions of Visual Studio 2017 version 15.5 and all Previews of Visual Studio version 15.6 already include an undocumented switch, /d2guardspecload, that is currently equivalent to /Qspectre. You can use /d2guardspecload to apply the same mitigations to your code. Please update to using /Qspectre as soon as you get a compiler that supports the switch as the /Qspectre switch will be maintained with new mitigations going forward.

The /Qspectre switch will be available in MSVC toolsets included in all future releases of Visual Studio (including Previews). We will also release updates to some existing versions of Visual Studio to include support for /Qspectre. Releases of Visual Studio and Previews are announced on the Visual Studio Blog; update notifications are included in the Notification Hub. Visual Studio updates that include support for /Qspectre will be announced on the Visual C++ Team Blog and the @visualc Twitter feed.

Our tests show the performance impact of /Qspectre to be negligible. We have built all of Windows with /Qspectre enabled and did not notice any performance regressions of concern. Performance gains from speculative execution are lost where the mitigation is applied but the mitigation was needed in a relatively small number of instances across the large codebases that we recompiled. Codebases vary greatly so we advise all developers to evaluate the impact of /Qspectre in the context of their applications and workloads.

If you know that a particular block of your code is performance-critical (say, in a tight loop) and does not need the mitigation applied, you can selectively disable the mitigation with __declspec(spectre(nomitigation)). Note that the __declspec is not available in compilers that only support the /d2guardspecload switch.

In order to help developers mitigate this new issue, the MSVC compiler has been updated with support for the /Qspectre switch which will automatically insert one of these speculation barriers when the compiler detects instances of variant 1. In this case the compiler detects that a range-checked integer is used as an index to load a value that is used to compute the address of a subsequent load. If you compile the example above with and without /Qspectre, you will see the following code generation difference on x86:

As the above shows, the compiled code under /Qspectre now contains the explicit speculation barrier instruction on line 6 which will prevent speculation from going down the unsafe path, thus mitigating the issue. (For clarity, the left hand side includes a comment, introduced with a ; in assembly.)

It is important to note that there are limits to the analysis that MSVC and compilers in general can perform when attempting to identify instances of variant 1. As such, there is no guarantee that all possible instances of variant 1 will be instrumented under /Qspectre.

We on the MSVC team are committed to the continuous improvement and security of your Windows software which is why we have taken steps to enable developers to help mitigate variant 1 under the new /Qspectre flag.

The /Qspectre compiler option causes the compiler to insert speculative execution barrier instructions. They're inserted where analysis indicates that a Spectre variant 1 security vulnerability exists. The specific instructions emitted depend on the processor. While these instructions should have a minimal impact on code size or performance, there may be cases where your code is not affected by the vulnerability, and requires maximum performance.

Expert analysis might determine that a function is safe from a Spectre variant 1 bounds check bypass defect. In that case, you can suppress the generation of mitigation code within a function by applying __declspec(spectre(nomitigation)) to the function declaration.

The /Qspectre speculative execution barrier instructions provide important security protection and have a negligible affect on performance. Therefore, we recommend that you do not suppress them, except in the rare case where the performance of a function is a critical concern and the function is known to be safe. be457b7860