Accepted Papers

Accepted papers

1 Rupert Freeman, David Pennock, Dominik Peters and Jennifer Wortman Vaughan

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals

2 Rica Gonen and Anat Lerner

Towards Characterizing the Deterministic Combinatorial Constrained Efficient Space

3 Haris Aziz, Bo Li and Xiaowei Wu

Strategyproof and Approximately Maxmin Fair Share Allocation of Chores

4 Haris Aziz, Serge Gaspers and Zhaohong Sun

Mechanism Design for School Choice with Soft Diversity Constraints

5 Chaya Levinger, Noam Hazon and Amos Azaria

Cost Allocation for Prioritized Ride-Sharing

6 Eric Bahel, Justin Leroux and Christian Trudeau

Choosing between non-mutually exclusive social groups

7 Nawal Benabbou, Mithun Chakraborty, Edith Elkind and Yair Zick Fairness Towards Groups of Agents in the Allocation of Indivisible Items

8 Vittorio Bilò, Ioannis Caragiannis, Michele Flammini, Ayumi Igarashi, Gianpiero Monaco, Dominik Peters, Cosimo Vinci and William S. Zwicker

Almost Envy-Free Allocations with Connected Bundles

9 Parham Shams, Aurélie Beynier, Sylvain Bouveret and Nicolas Maudet

Minimizing and balancing envy among agents using Ordered Weighted Average

10 Itay Shtechman, Rica Gonen and Erel Segal-Halevi

Fair Cake-Cutting Algorithms with Real Land-Value Data

11 Alan Tsang, Bryan Wilder, Eric Rice, Milind Tambe and Yair Zick

Group-Fairness in Influence Maximization

12 Szilvia Papai and Pooya Ghasvareh

Fairness Comparisons of Strategyproof and Efficient Matching Rules