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Location: WS Room 1, University of Bremen
9:00 – 9:15 · Gather, Settle, and Opening Remarks
9:15 – 10:30 · Session 1: Restricted Instances and Fairness Notions (10 min + QA each)
The Landscape of Almost Equitable Allocations
Maximin share allocation for two types of items
Resolving Envy by Adding Goods with Bounded Supply: Two-Agent Hardness and Single-Type Tractability
Subexponential Algorithm for High Multiplicity Fair Division of Mixed Instances via Stereometry
10:30 – 11:00 · Coffee break (with Posters)
11:00 – 11:45 · Keynote #1 — Jérôme Lang: Computational fair division: inputs!
11:45 – 12:30 · Session 2: Beyond Goods and Agents (10 min + QA each)
Proportionality in Participatory Budgeting with Type Constraints
Approximating Fair Repetitive Scheduling on Heterogeneous Machines
Dividing Indivisible Items for the Benefit of All: It is Hard to Be Fair Without Social Awareness
Scarcity and Life Uncertainty: Implications for Societal Resource Allocation
12:30 – 14:00 · Lunch break
14:00 – 14:45 · Keynote #2 — Michal Feldman: Epistemic Pairwise Maximin Share
14:45 – 15:30 · Session 3: Structured Preferences and Valuation Classes (10 min + QA each)
Cost Utilities: A Practical Domain Restriction Enabling Strategy-Proofness and Other Normative Guarantees
Efficient and Fair Allocation on Graphs: From Orientation to Position-Aware Valuations
Multilevel Fair Allocation under Additive Preferences
Multilevel Fair Allocation with Matroid-Rank Preferences
15:30 – 16:00 · Coffee Break (with Posters)
16:00 – 16:25 · Demo Session
16:25 – 17:00 · Poster Session and Networking
Keynote Address:
Computational fair division: inputs!
Dr. Jérôme Lang
Abstract: While a substantial body of work has focused on identifying desirable outputs in fair division problems, this talk will instead explore the role of the input. The presentation will be mostly non-technical, and I encourage audience participation throughout.
Keynote Address:
Epistemic Pairwise Maximin Share
Dr. Michal Feldman
Abstract: We introduce epistemic pairwise maximin share (EPMMS), a new fairness notion for fair division of indivisible goods. Two fundamental notions in this setting are envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) and pairwise maximin share (PMMS), with PMMS being stronger than EFX. While EFX has been extensively studied, far less is known about PMMS. Recent work shows that relaxing EFX via an epistemic perspective leads to substantial progress on the EFX problem, raising the question of whether a similar approach can advance our understanding of PMMS. Motivated by this, we initiate the study of EPMMS, the epistemic relaxation of PMMS. EPMMS is more challenging than EEFX: the key approaches underlying recent progress on epistemic EFX inherently fail to extend to EPMMS.
We establish the following results. (1) For additive valuations, 4/5-EPMMS allocations exist and can be efficiently computed. (2) For bivalued valuations, EPMMS allocations exist and can be efficiently computed; in fact, we obtain the stronger guarantee of epistemic groupwise maximin share (EGMMS), which also strengthens the existence of MMS allocations for this setting. (3) We prove that EPMMS allocations exist in two settings where MMS allocations need not exist: instances with three additive agents or two types of additive agents.
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