Online platforms that implement reputation mechanisms typically prevent the transfer of ratings to other platforms, leading to lock‐in effects and high switching costs for users. Platforms are able to capitalize on this arrangement, for example, by charging their users higher fees. In this paper, we theoretically and experimentally investigate the effects of platform pricing on workers' switching behavior in online labor markets and analyze whether a policy regime with reputation portability could mitigate lock-in effects and reduce the likelihood of worker capitalization by the platform. We examine switching motives in depth, differentiating between monetary motives and fairness preferences. We provide theoretical evidence for the existence of switching costs if reputation mechanisms are platform‐specific. Our model predicts that reputation portability lowers switching costs, eliminating the possibility for platforms to capitalize on lock‐in effects. We test our predictions using an online lab‐in‐the‐field experiment. The results are in line with our theoretical model and show that platforms can capitalize on lock‐in effects more effectively in a policy regime without reputation portability. We also find that reputation portability has a positive impact on worker mobility and the wages of highly rated workers. The data further show that the switching of workers is primarily driven by monetary motives, but perceiving the platform fee as unfair also plays a significant role for workers.

This paper investigates the intermediary's ability to manipulate consumers' perception of product differentiation between two firms. The intermediary has the ability to decrease transportation costs for the favored firm while increasing them for its competitor. Our findings indicate that an increase in relative differentiation is advantageous for both total industry profits and consumers, albeit at the expense of the disadvantaged firm. However, the degree to which consumers benefit from this relative differentiation depends on the intermediary's chosen monetization strategy: in some instances, the intermediary may capture all the benefits, reducing consumers' surplus.