Publications

Published/Accepted

De Martin Polo, F. (Forthcoming). "Beyond semantic pollution: Towards a practice-based philosophical analysis of labelled calculi". Erkenntnis. [Preprint]

De Martin Polo, F. (Forthcoming). "Fusion, fission, and Ackermann’s truth constant in relevant logics: A proof-theoretic investigation." In: New Directions in Relevant Logic. Ed. by I. Sedlár, S. Standefer and A. Tedder, Trends in Logic Series, Springer. [Preprint]


De Martin Polo, F. (2023) "Modular labelled calculi for relevant logics." The Australasian Journal of Logic. Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 47-87. DOI: 10.26686/ajl.v20i1.7990


De Martin Polo, F. (2023) "Discussive Logic. A Short History of the First Paraconsistent Logic." In: Historia Logicae. Ed. by M. Ingolf and J. Lemanski, vol. 1, College Publications, London. [Preprint]


De Martin Polo, F. (2021) "A Cut-free Hypersequent Calculus for Intuitionistic Modal Logic IS5." In: Proceedings of the 18th International Workshop of Logic and Engineering of Natural Language Semantics 18 (LENLS18), JSAI-isAI202. Ed. by A. Butler, pp. 217-230.


PhD Thesis

De Martin Polo, F. (2023) Topics in the Proof Theory of Non-classical Logics. Philosophy and Applications. Ruhr University Bochum, University Library. 

DOI: 10.13154/294-10679


Under review/In preparation


Unpublished manuscripts

William of Sherwood, Introductiones in logicam, Latin-to-Italian translation, with comments and introduction, 2019 (∼155 pp.)

Abstract. William of Sherwood’s 13th century logic manual, Introductiones in Logicam, was crafted as a concise volume for use during the author’s own university logic lectures. Its importance extends beyond its practical use in teaching; the text provides a clear analysis of the predominant logical questions of that era, meticulously selected and discussed in comparison to other major authors, particularly Aristotle and Boethius. Within this yet-to-be-published manuscript, I present the first Latin-to-Italian translation of Sherwood’s logic manual, Introductiones in Logicam, accompanied by comprehensive comments and a detailed historical and philosophical introduction.

Numbers, Objects and Abstraction. Notes on a Philosophical Interpretation of Mathematics, Master’s thesis, University Ca’ Foscari, Venice, 2019.

Abstract. The focus of this research lies in the philosophy of mathematics, exploring both its metaphysical and epistemological dimensions. The thesis aims to address a specific aspect of the contemporary philosophical-mathematical discourse: the possibility of admitting the existence of abstract objects in the ontology of mathematics. The inquiry centers around the mathematical Platonism articulated by K. Gödel, whose positions assert the existence of mathematical objects independently of our thoughts and propose a form of intellectual perception for knowing them. While Gödel’s stance is sophisticated, challenges have arisen, notably through the critiques of the French philosopher P. Benacerraf. Benacerraf’s theses, presented in 1965 and 1973, serve as a catalyst for scrutinizing and refining the Gödelian perspective, engaging logical, set-theoretical, and model-theoretical tools. Additionally, the work draws inspiration from the philosophical contributions of G. Frege and subsequent developments in his thought.

From Logic to Philosophy. Kurt Gödel’s Ontological Argument (in Italian), Bachelor’s thesis, University Ca’ Foscari, Venice, 2017.

Abstract. The thesis investigates Kurt Gödel’s philosophy, focusing on his ontological argument. Part I delves into foundational debates in mathematics, covering logicism, formalism, and concluding with Gödel’s incompleteness theorems. The research explores the connection between incompleteness and the philosophy of mathematics, emphasizing Gödel’s Platonism. In Part II, the study analyzes the ontological argument, exploring its philosophical significance and contrasting Gödel’s ideas with Leibniz, Kant, and contemporary discussions on existence. The analysis sheds light on the roles of logic, metaphysics, rationalism, and phenomenology in Gödel’s philosophical observations.