Charlie Kurth
Email: charles.kurth [at] wmich [dot] edu
This is a fully synchronous online course
Class meetings: Wednesdays, 4:00-6:30pm
Virtual Office Hours: Mondays, 2:00-3:00 pm, and by appointment
Office Hours Location: This Zoom link
In this course we will explore recent work on metaethical expressivism. Expressivists—philosophers like Allan Gibbard, Simon Blackburn, and Mark Timmons—offer a novel and exiting way of making sense of our moral and normative discourse. The expressivists’ distinctive—and controversial—claim is that moral judgments don’t aim to describe states of affairs (call this standard view ‘descriptivism’), but rather express motivationally laden mental states or attitudes. So, in judging that torture is wrong, one does not make an assertion about the way the world is; rather, one’s speech-act is more like a cry of pain or a command to close the door.
Expressivism is exciting, in part, because it seems well positioned to capture the distinctive action-guidingness of morality—after all, it holds that moral judgments are motivationally laden. Moreover, it appears to get this from a metaphysically and epistemologically modest foundation. But expressivism is also highly controversial. Part of the difficulty lies is getting clear about what exactly the expressivist proposal is: what does it mean to say that moral judgments express motivationally laden mental states? But, as we will see, the expressivist account of what moral judgments do (i.e., express attitudes, rather than describe the world) seems to require us to accept significant revisions to our commonsense conceptions of moral thought and moral objectivity. Are these costs worth accepting?
As part of our investigation, we will also explore sentimentalist proposals. Sentimentalism is a thesis that, while independent from expressivism, typically accompanies expressivism (as it does in the influential accounts of Gibbard and Blackburn). As commonly understood, sentimentalism is a thesis about normaitve/evaluative concepts and properties: we can understand what, say 'wrong' is only by way of the associated sentiment: disapprobation.
The aim of the course is to get a better understanding of the details, motivations, and prospects of expressivism and sentimentalism. To this extent, we will look at Allan Gibbard’s highly influential expressivist/sentimentalist proposal as well as recent critical commentary on his work and the work of other expressivists and sentimentalists.
Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (available at the bookstore and via Amazon and the like)
Noted as WCAF below
Tristram McPherson & David Plunkett, Routledge Handbook of Metaethics
Noted as RHM below
Selected readings available on the course web site
This course will have three graded components.
1) Class participation (20%). This course is structured as a seminar. So you will be expected to contribute to our weekly class discussions. To give you some guidance, I will provide weekly reading questions. While you are not required to write up answers to these questions, you should come to class prepared to talk about them.
Assessment: Just showing up to the Zoom sessions will earn you an 80% (a CB grade); to do better, you must contribute regularly to our discussions.
2) Reading responses (40%). Throughout the course, you will write four brief critical response essays. More specifically, you need to write one response for each of Parts 1-4 of the course (the readings for Jan 13 are not eligible for reading responses). These constraints aside, you are free to choose which reading you write about, and you can use the reading questions as guide for your response papers. These essays should be approximately 500-600 words long (standard formatting).
In your response paper, you should focus on just one of that week's assigned readings. Having picked a reading, you should then do two things. First, you should summarize one argument from the reading you selected (not the entire paper) by putting it into standard form. That is, explicitly lay out your understanding of the argument's premises and conclusions. Second, you should raise an objection to the argument you've presented. As a rough guide, presenting the standard form version of the argument should 30-40% of your discussion with the balance left for your objection.
The essays are to be emailed to me by noon on the Tuesday before the relevant Wednesday class meeting.
3) Long paper (40%). The longer paper assignment invites you to explore one of the topics that we will be discussing in the course. For graduate students taking the course for 3 credits: your paper should be approximately 15 pages long (double spaced, standard formatting). For undergraduates: your paper should be approximately 12 pages long (double spaced, standard formatting).
Though you are free to choose the topic for your long paper, you must get it approved by me before you start working on your draft. I strongly recommend that you begin thinking about you paper topic early and you must have a proposal signed off on by April 5 (this is the Monday after Spring Break).
You will need to turn in a draft of your paper by noon on Sunday, April 25. I will provide you with feedback by Wednesday, April 28 (hopefully earlier). The final version of the paper will be due at noon on Saturday, May 1. You should email both your draft and your final papers to me.
While your draft needn't be a highly polished piece, the more developed it is, the better the comments I will be able to give you. Turning in a cursory draft may result in a grade penalty.
Grading: Final grades will be calculated based on the percentages noted above (using the average for the four reading responses). Here is a tentative guide for the grading scale: A=100-92, BA=91-88, B=87-83....
In order to help ensure a successful class, please heed the following rules and policies:
Due Dates. Baring unusual circumstances, the due dates on the syllabus are non-negotiable. If you think you have reason to miss an assignment, it is best to inform me well in advance.
Technology & 'Classroom' Environment. This is a fully online course. The expectation is that you will arrive on time and have access to reliable internet service for our weekly sessions. During our sessions, the expectation is that you will have your cameras on for the duration of our sessions. Abuse of these guidelines may lead to penalties.
Academic Honesty. As a student at WMU, you are responsible for making yourself aware of the University policies and procedures that pertain to Academic Honesty. These policies include cheating, fabrication, falsification and forgery, multiple submission, plagiarism, complicity, and computer misuse. In this class, you will be expected to abide by these obligations. This means that all work presented as original must, in fact, be original; the ideas and contributions of others (be they quotes, summaries, or paraphrases) must be appropriately acknowledged. More information about the WMU Academic Honesty rules as well as the rights of accused students can be found here.
Accommodations for Disabilities. I am happy to make accommodations to assist students with documented disabilities (e.g., physical, learning, psychiatric, vision, hearing, etc.). Those wishing to arrange reasonable accommodations must contact Disability Services for Students. A disability determination must be made by this office before any accommodations are provided by the instructor. More information can be found here.
Mental Health. WMU’s Mental Health Services’ professional staff members work with students to resolve personal and interpersonal difficulties, many of which can affect the academic experience. These include conflicts with or worry about friends or family, concerns about eating or drinking patterns, and feelings of anxiety and depression.
Jan 13.
Read syllabus
GE Moore , “The Subject Matter of Ethics”
Stephen Darwall, Allan Gibbard, & Peter Railton, “Toward a Fin de siècle Ethics” (pp 115-21 only)
Elizabeth Camp, "Metaethical Expressivism" [in RHM, esp. 87-93]
Amia Srinivasan, "Feminism and Metaethics" [in RHM, recommended]
Qs: Moore considers a variety of ways one might understand the project of providing a definition of ‘good’. What does he take himself to be doing? What is Moore’s proposed definition for ‘good’? What does this definition amount to? Commentators on Moore, have struggled to understand what, exactly, the fallacy of the naturalistic fallacy is supposed to be. What is your take? Similarly, the argument of sec 13—the (in)famous “Open Question Argument”—has puzzled many. How do you think it works? What conclusion do you think it establishes? Turning to the Camp, in your own words, what does the expressivist think we do when we make moral judgments? According to Camp, what are some of the motivations underlying expressivist proposals? How does she characterize the 'express' relation?
Jan 20.
Allan Gibbard, WCAF, Ch 1-2
Nick Smyth, "The Function of Morality"
AJ Ayer, "Critique of Ethics and Theology” (up to p. 114) [Recommended: old-school emotivism--where it all began...]
Qs: What is the point of conversation and why is Gibbard focused on giving a account of 'rational'? What is his initial take on an answer (p. 6ff)? What does he see as the problem with Hume-Ramsey and full information accounts of 'rational'? What is his alternative? In what sense is Gibbard's account naturalistic? Why does he think this is plausible? What etiological claim is Smyth targeting? Do you find his argument compelling? If sound, what implications might the Smyth paper have for Gibbard's account?
Jan 27.
Allan Gibbard, WCAF, Ch 3 & 7
Alex Miller, "Chap 3.6: The Moral Attitude Problem and the OQA Revisited" [start on p. 43]
Antti Kauppinen, "A Sentimentalist Solution to the Moral Attitude Problem" [recommended: replies to Miller, among others]
Qs: Explain the notion of ‘rational’ that’s Gibbard’s focus: how does it contrast with, e.g., prudence? What are we assessing when we call and act or an emotion (ir)rational in Gibbard’s sense? What is the Millian account of morality that Gibbard endorses and how does it fit into his expressivist account? What is Gibbard’s account of ‘wrong’? Do you find it plausible? What do we do when we judge something wrong? In order to judge your action wrong, must I feel anger? Explain. Does Gibbard’s account require him to endorse a specific theory of emotion? Explain. What, more generally, does Gibbard need from a theory of emotion? Why?
Feb 3.
Allan Gibbard, WCAF, Ch 4
Dan Kelly, "Two Ways to Accept a Norm" [Recommended: insightful discussion and elaboration of the internalizing/avowing distinction]
Jonathan Birch, "Toolmaking and the Evolution of Normative Cognition" [Recommended: As with Smyth from 1/20, offers and alternative to Gibbard's evolutionary picture]
Nick Sturgeon, "Critical Study: Wise Choices, Apt Feelings" [Recommended: extended critical look at the Gibbard]
Qs: (1) What is the psychological state of accepting a norm? How does accepting contrast with other states like internalizing, avowing, and animalistic drives? How is accepting illuminated by phenomena like weakness of will? (2) What is Gibbard’s argument for there being a state of norm acceptance? Why role do things like language, the Milgram experiments, and evolutionary speculation play in substantiating his proposal? Do you find it plausible? (3) What is normative governance and normative discussion? Why are these notions important for Gibbard?
Feb 10.
Dorit Bar-On & Matt Chrisman, "Ethical Neo-Expressivism"
Jamie Dreier, "Internalism and Speaker Relativism"
David Copp, "Realist-Expressivism" [Recommended: semantics of moral terms modeled on semantics of slurs. Pairs with the Bar-On & Chrisman]
Sigrun Svavarsdottir, "Moral Cognitivism and Motivation" [Recommended: Extended defense of externalism. Pairs with the Dreier]
Qs: How do Bar-On & Chrisman see the logical space for understanding the “express” relation? That is, what options do they consider (traditional non-cognitivism, neo-expressivism, etc.) and what do these views take “express” to mean? Explain the difference between “action expression” and “semantic expression”. How do Bar-On & Chrisman think that avowals offer a good model for understanding moral judgments? Explain the distinction between the act of making a (moral) claim, and the product of that act. Why is this distinction important? Does the view Bar-On & Chrisman develop commit them to the existence of moral properties or facts? Explain. What is internalism and why does Dreier think we need to acknowledge that moral terms have a “two-level” semantics? What is the difference between content and character? Illustrate this with an indexical term. What’s the content/character distinction as Dreier applies it to moral terms? Why does Dreier’s proposal not count as a form of expressivism? Why is Dreier’s view a type of relativism?
Feb 17.
David Wiggins, "A Sensible Subjectivism"
Justin D'Arms & Dan Jacobson, "Sentiment and Value" [section III can be skimmed and appendix can be skipped]
Justin D'Arms, "Two Arguments for Sentimentalism" [Recommended: elaboration on insights from Wiggins]
Jesse Prinz, "Sentimentalism and the Moral Brain" [Recommended: empirically-oriented defense of an alternative, more classical sentimentalism]
Justin D'Arms & Dan Jacobson, "Sensibility Theory and Projectivism" [Recommended: background piece that give detail/context to the broadly sentimentalist accounts of Wiggins, Gibbard, and others]
Qs: What is the “disagreement in valuation” that Wiggins is keen to explain? Explain Wiggins’ response to the circularity charge (in Sec 4, 5, 9). Do you find it convincing? Explain. What is the Humean proposal in Sec 6—what does Wiggins think it gets right, where does it falter? In Sec 8, we get the core of Wiggins’ positive view for how we’re to understand the connection between values like the amusing and the associated responses (amusement). Explain the proposal. Drawing on Sec 9 and longer note 19, explain Wiggins’ account of disagreement. On Wiggins’ account, in what sense are evaluative claims (eg, that joke was amusing) objectively true (Sec 10; long note 26)? Do you find this plausible?
According to D&J, in what way are the views of Wiggins and Gibbard similar; in what ways do the differ? What is the “response-dependency thesis”? What is the “conflation problem”—give your own examples? Why do D&J think that Gibbard and Wiggins fail to solve the conflation problem? What is their “rational sentimentalist” alternative?
Feb 24.
Francois Schroeter, "The Limits of Sentimentalism"
Justin D'Arms & Dan Jacobson, "Whither Sentimentalism?"
Qs: What are the two aspects of meaning that Schroeter is concerned with? According to Schroeter, what is the meaning of ‘is dangerous’ and ‘is fearsome’? What implications does he think this has for the prospects of sentimentalism (e.g., consider the shock experiment example)? Schroeter maintains that, in focusing us on the appropriateness of emotions, sentimentalism focuses us on the wrong thing. Explain and assess this claim. How is ‘is shameful’ different than ‘is wrong’ according to Schroeter? What does it mean to say that sentimentalism is a claim about semantic competence? Why does Schroeter reject this possibility? Do you agree?
What is shadow skepticism and why is it a threat to sentimentalism? What would need to be the case in order for shadow skepticism to be true? Why is fear/danger an alluring test case for the truth of sentimentalism? What is D&J’s general response to Schroeter’s argument? What is D&J’s specific response to the “expected badness” version of Schroeter’s worry (260f)? How does D&J’s objection to shadow skepticism also bring trouble for cognitive theories of emotion? What is D&J’s non-cognitivist account of when an emotion is fitting? How does their view differ from Wiggins?
Mar 3.
Christine Tappolet, "Chap 3: Emotion and Values" (3.7-3.8 can be skimmed)
Gideon Rosen, "The Alethic Conception of Moral Responsibility"
Chris Howard, "The Fundamentality of Fit" [Recommended: piece on general questions of fittingness, defends a 'fittingness-first' account]
Daniel Wodak, "Who's on First?" [Recommended: paper critical of the Howard view, among others]
Howard Nye, "The Wrong Kind of Reason" [Recommended, in RHM]
Qs: What is the difference between normative and representational neo-sentimentalism? Why does Tappolet think that we should reject normative sentimentalism? Do you agree? Why does Tappolet think representationalist neo-sentimentalism captures both the intuition that comes out of the OQA (3.3) and the action-guidingness of value judgments (3.4)? Do you agree? How does representationalist neo-sentimentalism avoid the WKR problem? Do you find it convincing? Tappolet’s discussion of the circularity worry is rich and complex. What do you see as the main concerns she takes up? How does she address them? What is sentimental realism? Why might the proposal be (un)appealing?
Briefly, what is Rosen’s account of moral responsibility? Is it a sentimentalist account (and in what sense)? How does Rosen understand “appropriateness” as it figures in his account? How does Rosen understand the nature of emotion? How plausible to you find Rosen’s account of the thoughts that are (partly) constitutive of resentment? What might D&J or Tappolet say in response to Rosen’s proposal?
Mar 10.
Allan Gibbard, Thinking How to Live, Ch 3 and Ch 4 (p 79ff can be skipped)
Mark Schroeder, "How Expressivists Can and Should Solve their Problem with Negation” [through section 2.1]
Jack Woods, "The Frege-Geach Problem" [in RHM, recommended]
Qs: Gibbard introduces a lot of technical vocabulary in this discussion. Be sure you’re comfortable with terms like rejecting/ruling out, allowing, permitting, hyperplan. Gibbard wants to use plans/planning and rejecting to show how an expressivist can mimic a descriptivist’s account of both the content of a judgment (sentence) and the inferential relations that a given judgment (sentence) has to other judgments (sentences) within an argument. Do you understand how this is supposed to work? Do you find it plausible—that is, do you think he has the makings of a solution to the Frege-Geach problem? How does Gibbard explain the difference between choosing out of indifference and choosing in a more active way? Why is this significant for his proposal?
Mar 17.
Mark Schroeder, "How Expressivists..." [finish paper]
Nate Charlow, "The Problem with the Frege-Geach Problem"
Matt Bedke, "Non-Descriptive Relativism: Adding on to the Expressivist Marketplace" [Recommended: A non-expressivistic account with parallels to the Dreier proposal]
Qs: What is the difficulty that Unwin reveals about expressivistis accounts of negation? What does an adequate solution to this problem demand? Explain the difference between A-type and B-type inconsistency. What type of inconsistency does Gibbard’s account provide us with? What is an inconsistency transmitting attitude? Why does Schroeder think B-type inconsistency is problematic? Relatedly, why does Schroeder think Gibbard’s account is inadequate? What is Schroeder’s proposal for how expressivists can secure an account of A-type inconsistency? What’s the cost of doing this?
Summarize the principle features of expressivistic semantics as Charlow lays them out. What is strong logicality and why do folks like Schroeder think it reveals trouble for expressivists? What is Charlow’s assessment of all this (e.g., what lesson do we learn from looking at imperatives)? Related: what central question does Charlow think that Portner’s account of imperatives needs to explain? Why? What is a “psychological semantics”? What does it mean to accept a psychological theory as one’s account of meaning, but not one’s semantics?
Mar 24.
Allan Gibbard, WCAF Ch 8-10
David Faraci, "On Leaving Room for Doubt" [Recommended: uses concerns about expressivists' ability to solve FG problem in order to motivate worries about expressivistic accounts of objectivity]
Qs: What are the three forms of objectivity that Gibbard thinks his account must be able to make sense of? Explain the Quine/Davidson radical interpretation method and why Gibbard rejects it. What are higher-order norms? Give some examples. How does Gibbard explain the difference between norms of rationality, existential commitments (personal ideals), and standpoint dependent commitments. Give examples of each.
What are conversational demands? Why are they important—eg, how do they tie in with Gibbard’s account of normative discussion? What is contextual authority and how does it differ from fundamental authority? According to Gibbard, why must we grant fundamental authority to ourselves? Why must we grant it to others? Do you find this argument convincing? What is an “epistemic story”? How does it fit in with Gibbard’s account of fundamental authority and how does it fit in with his account of objectivity? Why does Gibbard think there will be pressure to see certain norms as being objective? In what ways is this pressure limited?
On Gibbard’s account, what is it to think something objective? How is this related to browbeating and conversational demands? What is an epistemological story? What kinds of epistemological stories are needed for one to count as taking something to be objective? Why does Gibbard think that we won’t be happy with epistemological stories that appeal to only content-neutral characteristics? What does this imply about the objectivity of, say, morality? What’s the difference between grandiose and modest objectivity? Is it plausible?
Mar 31. Spring break
Apr 5. Deadline to have term paper topic approved
Apr 7.
Andy Egan, "Quasi-Realism and Fundamental Moral Error"
Simon Blackburn, "Truth and A Priori Possibilty"
Sabastian Kolher, "What is the Problem with Fundamental Moral Error?" [Recommended: in line with Egan, raise issues with expressivist accounts of error]
Qs:What problems is the expressivist’s move to “quasi-realism” supposed to solve? How is deflationism supposed to help them do this? More specifically, explain the quasi-realist’s deflationary account of truth and belief. What is the expressivist/quasi-realist account of third-person moral error? Do you find it plausible? According to Egan, why is first-person present error hard to explain—specifically: what’s the issue, what’s Blackburn’s response, why is it inadequate (at least according to Egan)? Do you think Gibbard’s 1990 account faces a similar problems that Egan takes Blackburn’s to face? Why does Egan think quasi-realism is committed to a non-deflationary account of truth-conditions? Do you agree?
What does Blackburn see as the crux of Egan’s critique (Sec 2)? What is his response to it (and why the foray into questions about probability)? Do you think this reply is sufficient—explain? Do you think Blackburn’s response allows him to continue claiming to be a “quasi-realist? Explain.
Apr 14.
Bob Beddor, "Fallibility for Expressivists"
Garrett Lam, "Making Quasi-Realists Admit of Fundamental Moral Error"
Qs: The Beddor and Lam papers present two very different assessments of the quasi-realist’s ability to answer the Egan (and Kohler) objections. What do you see as the primary differences between the two approaches? Which do you see as more promising—and why? All told, should we be satisfied with the expressivist account of error?
Apr 21.
Caroline Arruda, "Why Moral Status Matters for Metaethics"
Qs: Step back and think about what we've learned about expressivism? What are the proposals strengths? What has you concerned? Overall, is it a view you find attractive?
Sunday, April 25: Drafts Due at Noon
Saturday, May 1: Final Papers Due at Noon