Co-authors: Sibilla di Guida (IMT School for Advanced Studies Lucca), Luca Polonio (University of Milan Bicocca) 

Title: When Game Theory Meets Psychometrics: Measuring Strategic Sophistication Across Games 

Abstract:

Decisions in economic games are increasingly used to measure individual characteristics, such as cooperativeness or theory-of-mind. These measures often analyze decisions using game theory notions, like level-k behavior or equilibrium concepts. However, it is unclear if measures obtained in different games and conditions consistently reflect the same individual characteristic. This paper introduces a theoretical framework and statistical methods to examine three key measurement properties: construct validity (whether different measures capture the same individual characteristic), measurement invariance (whether the same measure captures the same characteristic across conditions), and reliability (how accurately the measure captures the characteristic). We reanalyze data from seven past experiments on strategic sophistication, revealing pervasive issues with construct validity and measurement invariance that may alter the interpretation of results. I will then present an experimental design meant to illustrate how studies on strategic sophistication and learning can adapt their design to test and enhance these measurement properties. 

Title: Does regulating greenwashing improve trust in greener consumption choices?

Abstract:

Consumers' demand in pro-environmental goods has been growing with recent environmental concerns. Consequently, firms have increased their reliance on environmental communications and self-labelling schemes, many of them corresponding to “greenwashing” practices, only designed to capture demand without significantly improving the environmental impact of the firms' activities. The information asymmetry thus created could bring consumers to avoid self-promoting “green” products. Institutions are attempting to improve regulations on greenwashing, notably by punctually verifying environmental allegations from companies, and punishing unjustified allegations. This research aims to test whether or not 1) such punctual punishment of deceptive talk allows individuals to efficiently detect greenwashing 2) individuals’ mistrust is motivated by financial interests. Additionally, we explore mechanisms of “green (mis)trust” – subjective probability of and ambiguity attitudes towards greenwashing behaviour – across conditions.

Title : An experiment on strategic lying and deception

Abstract : 

One important finding in the lying experimental literature is that agents are at least somewhat averse to lying. However, little is known about how people lie in order to maximize their credibility. Hence, we study a simple cheap-talk game in which the sender, who can be either good or bad, tries to convince the receiver that she is good. The sender observes her type and the realization of a weighted 8-sided die. Good types are more likely to observe higher numbers, and bad types are more likely to receive lower numbers, with an increasing likelihood ratio. After observing the die’s outcome, the sender sends a message to the receiver–any whole number between 1 and 8. The sender (of any type) wishes to convince the receiver she is good, and the receiver wishes to guess the sender’s type as accurately as possible. 

Title: Beliefs in repeated dictator games: an experimental approach

Abstract:

This project proposes a laboratory experiment to explore the nexus between beliefs, actions, and reputation within finite and indefinitely repeated dictator games. Our primary aim is to shed light on subjects' elicited beliefs about their matched player's actions. Beyond actions, we want to extend our analysis to study the evolution of beliefs on a simple reputation, an information device that summarises previous actions of the game. 

 Title: Level 0 specification in 3x3 games

Abstract:

The Level-k model is one of the most important bounded rationality models. In this model, a level 0 player has a non-strategic behavior, a level 1 player best responds to the level 0 player, a level 2 best responds to the level 1 player, etc. One regular critic of this model is the level 0 specification, which is often chosen arbitrarily. In this experiment proposal, I present multiple 3x3 games to understand what is the most realistic level 0 specification. The most commonly used level 0 specification is the uniform one (i.e. the level 0 plays randomly) and it can be compared to a maxmax level 0 (i.e. the behavior with the highest potential) to a maxmin level 0 and a jointmax level 0 (i.e. the strategy maximizing the payoff for all players).