The paper/presentation addresses atomless economies with commodity differentiation, where monopolistic competition situations may arise. We define an associated coalitional game and establish the existence of the value. Furthermore, we analyze the relationship between competitive and value allocations. We provide examples to illustrate the critical role of continuity and differentiability properties of utility functions in our results.
When more than one Nash equilibrium exists for a game, the problem of choice arises and on this depends the outcome of the game. This problem will be addressed in two forms: (i) in coordination games, often the question is that of deciding between a payoff-dominant and a risk-dominant equilibrium. Assuming that one of the players learns to use a third action, the 2x2 game can be seen as embedded in a 2x3 game for which the payoff-dominant equilibrium of the original game is the outcome; (ii) the size of the basin of attraction of each Nash equilibria determines the set of initial actions from which it is the outcome. The basin of attraction of a Nash equilibrium under replicator dynamics and best-response dynamics can differ a lot. Under an indifference assumption, it is possible to determine how much the basins of attraction under these two dynamics coincide.
Increasing pressure to reduce plastic pollution has led to the adoption of policy instruments such as recycling quotas and minimum recycled content targets in plastic packaging production within the European Union. Minimum recycled content policies are intended to stabilize demand for recyclates and to shield the recycling sector from market distortions, including price volatility and sharp declines in primary plastic prices, such as those observed following the crude oil price drop after the COVID-19 pandemic. However, the effectiveness of these measures in stimulating plastic recycling remains insufficiently understood. In our work, we develop an integrated modeling framework that combines material flow analysis with a general equilibrium model to jointly represent physical material flows, economic market structures, price formation mechanisms, and policy constraints within the plastic packaging system in Austria. By embedding empirically observed material flows into an economically consistent macroeconomic setting, the model bridges a key knowledge gap between physically grounded waste flow analyses and abstract economic modeling approaches. As a result, it enables a systematic and analytical evaluation of policy instruments aimed at promoting a circular economy in plastic packaging.
Suppose agents are to be matched to objects and arrive over time without a definite terminal date. Although the set of core matchings can then be empty, a transfinite version of the top trading algorithm shows that Pareto-optimal weak-core matchings always exist. Optimal matchings face a difficulty however: some of the agents linked by chains of trades may have lifespans that do not overlap, thus obstructing their trades. To address this problem, we let matchings be implemented via competitive markets. Competitive equilibria always exist and any matching in the core can be competitively implemented. Moreover full core equivalence, where allocations are in the core if and only if they can be competitively implemented, holds for a dense set of models. The extended algorithm also yields a strategyproof mechanism, comparably to the finite model.
Joint work with Michael Mandler.
Mortality dynamics are a key component of demographic economics, actuarial valuation and longevity-risk assessment. Long-term projections, however, are affected by model uncertainty and by behavioural factors that may influence the evolution of mortality over time. This talk presents a game-theoretic perspective on both dimensions. I discuss a cooperative game-theoretic approach to mortality forecast combination. Individual mortality models are viewed as players in a forecasting game, and Shapley values are used to assign weights according to each model's average marginal contribution to predictive accuracy. This provides a transparent method for addressing model uncertainty and constructing ensemble forecasts relevant for life expectancy, annuity valuation and pension-related applications. Moreover, I consider a game-theoretic extension of the Lee-Carter model in which mortality dynamics are affected by strategic prevention choices. Individuals receive private information about the mortality environment and choose prevention efforts under incomplete information. Their aggregate behaviour then feeds back into the mortality index, linking individual incentives, prevention behaviour and long-term demographic outcomes. The integration of cooperative and non-cooperative game-theoretic tools enriches mortality modelling by addressing both model uncertainty and strategic behavioural mechanisms. In this way, Shapley-based model-risk analysis and strategic prevention can be viewed as complementary components of a unified mathematical framework for studying longevity risk and demographic change under uncertainty.