Abstracts

William Bechtel

Title: Model Organisms for Cognitive Science

Abstract: It is common practice in most biological disciplines to study the phenomenon of interest in one or more model organisms—species in which the responsible mechanism is assumed to be simpler and easier to study. Even neuroscience makes extensive use of model organisms, albeit typically limited to other mammals or at least vertebrates. But cognitive science has tended to restrict its focus to the target organism—human beings. To the extent it uses models, it uses some humans (e.g., undergraduates taking psychology courses) as models for others. The justification for not studying cognition in other species is that no other species exhibits the phenomena of interest. But many cognitive phenomena—perception, problem solving, decision making, remembering—are exhibited in other species, including invertebrates and even prokaryotes and plants. And those that are arguably distinctive of humans build upon capacities found in other species. The basis for this is that evolution is a conservative process—retaining mechanisms while adding more complex regulation of them that enables their reuse for new purposes. This talk will make the case for studying cognition in prokaryotes and invertebrates and illustrate what cognitive science can hope to gain by adopting some of these species as model organisms.

Lisa Bortolotti

Title: Are Conspiracy Theories Irrational?

Abstract: In this paper I consider the status of conspiracy theories. According to recent philosophical and empirical research on the phenomenon, conspiracy theories have been described as irrational due to being ill-grounded and irresponsive to evidence, and even as akin to delusional beliefs that are symptomatic of mental disorders. A collaboration involving philosophers of mind, epistemologists, and social and cognitive psychologists is central to gaining a better understanding of the nature of conspiracy theories and the mechanisms responsible for their formation. I examine in some detail the case of COVID-19 related conspiracy theories and other ‘alternative’ theories on the origin and expected risks of the virus that have gained popularity since the beginning of the pandemic. I conclude that conspiracy theories are not necessarily false or irrational and that they are developed in response to basic epistemic and psychological needs that we all share. This picture of continuity may help us adopt effective measures for their containment, at the societal and individual level.

Anthony Chemero

Title: Explanation and Evidence in Dynamical Cognitive Science: Notes from a Participant-Observer

Abstract: This talk will begin by replaying a controversy in early 21st century cognitive science over the relationship between interaction dominance and fractal structure in time series. This controversy begins as the sort of “alternative-hypothesis generation” taught to first-year psychology students, but quickly transforms into a debate over abduction (in Peirce’s sense) and experimental evidence. Several years later, the controversy is wrapped up definitively with a methodological innovation. The second part of the talk will discuss the consequences of that methodological innovation, especially in relation to the methodological individualism that still dominates the sciences (and analytic philosophy).

Lindley Darden and John Moult

Title: Assessment of Evidence for Proposed APOE4 Mechanisms for Alzheimer's Disease

Abstract: Why is it proving so difficult to discover the mechanisms causing Alzheimer's disease (AD)? One obvious and of course correct answer is that this is a very complex disease that happens in the most complicated organ, the human brain. But other factors stand out. First, even the best review papers are overwhelmed when attempting to summarize the relevance of tens of thousands of papers on Alzheimer’s disease mechanism(s). Second, it is seldom possible to make observations and measurements in an in-vivo situation such that one can say "Here is a hypothesis for a mechanism contributing to the disease. Here is the result of an experiment that leaves essentially no doubt that the hypothesis is correct." Rather, almost all observations and experiments unavoidably contribute partial evidence in support of a mechanistic hypothesis. Some evidence is stronger than others. For example, direct observation of tau tangles in post-mortem AD brains provides strong evidence of the relevance of that phenomenon, whereas a moderate expression level difference of a gene in cell culture may be useful but not provide conclusive evidence of disease relevance. Yet at present, there is no means of weighting evidence appropriately in evaluating alternative disease mechanism hypotheses.

The project focuses on a particularly unclear aspect of Alzheimer’s disease: the mechanism(s) by which the e4 allele of the gene APOE confers increased risk of the disease. Mechanism schemas for different APOE mechanism hypotheses are drawn utilizing a purpose built digital platform (Darden et al. 2018, PLOS Computational Biology). The platform has a clear and intuitive formalism for representing precisely what mechanism hypotheses are proposed (MDC 2000 Philosophy of Science). Evidence for each component of a proposed mechanism schema is separately indicated and evaluated. Each schema yields a list of key outstanding questions on uncertain and ambiguous aspects of the mechanism. Goals of this project are (a) developing evidence-based mechanistic explanations and (b) suggesting intervention sites in the mechanisms for effective therapies.

Edouard Machery

Title: Yes You Can! A Plea for Reverse Inference in Cognitive Neuroscience

Abstract: Reverse inference is the most commonly used inferential strategy for bringing images of brain activation to bear on psychological hypotheses, but its inductive validity has recently been questioned. In this talk, I show that, when it is analyzed in likelihoodist terms, reverse inference does not suffer from the problems highlighted in the recent literature, and I defend the appropriateness of treating reverse inference in these terms.

Bence Nanay

Title: How Philosophy, Psychology and Neuroscience interact. A case study of object files

Abstract: Empirically grounded philosophy of mind needs to pay attention both to psychology and to neuroscience. But how should evidence from these two disciplines be weighed and combined? I give a case study of the research on object files, which shows how things can go horribly wrong if philosophy and psychology ignore the neurosciences and outline an alternative of how this three-way interaction could be done better.

Richard Samuels

Title: The Semantic and the Conceptual: Should Linguistic Semantics Constrain Theories of Conceptual Development?

Abstract: Issues about the relationship between linguistic semantics and psychology have a long and vexed history. In this talk we first consider and reject some influential reasons for supposing that research in mainstream semantics is largely irrelevant to the study of cognition. Having done so, we take the development of number cognition as a case study, and argue that extant research in semantics may be relevant in a number of important respects.

Samuel Taylor and Jon Williamson

Title: Evidence and Cognition

Abstract: Cognitive theorists routinely disagree about the evidence supporting cognitive scientific explanations. For example, they disagree about whether evidence of mechanisms, propositional attitudes, or mental representations plays a role in cognitive science. Here, we first argue that some disagreements about evidence in cognitive science are about the evidence available to be drawn upon by cognitive theorists and not merely the evidence that should be drawn upon by cognitive theorists. Then, we show that one’s explanation of why this first kind of disagreement obtains will cohere with one’s theory of evidence. We argue that the best explanation for why cognitive theorists disagree in this way is because their evidence is what they rationally grant about cognition. Finally, we defend our view against anticipated objections.

Daniel Weiskopf

Title: Trading Evidence: The Role of Models in Interfield Coordination

Abstract: Cognitive science initially aspired to provide a unified theoretical framework within which facts about mind, brain, and behavior could be related and explained. Yet cognitive science as it actually exists is a patchwork of fields related in a motley of ways. To illustrate the epistemic texture of this patchwork I turn to model-based neuroscience, which offers a well-formalized example of interfield evidential integration in practice. I consider when and why modelers draw on evidence from different fields, how this evidence is combined, and what the epistemic value of model-based integration is meant to be. A core lesson that emerges is that model-based neuroscience exemplifies the multitude of ways that evidence from different fields can be brought together without converging on any single common framework. Cognitive science is an irremediably chimeric figure that nevertheless has many ways of coordinating the fields that comprise it.