CES Economic Theory Seminar

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The Economic Theory workshop is a weekly seminar taking place on fridays 12-13h at the Maison des Sciences Economiques (106-110 Boulverd de l'Hopital). This seminar is a venue for theoretical work in Economics and for work drawing on quantitative methods in Economics. Defined by an approach rather than by a specific theme, the topics of the seminar can concern a variety of areas in Economics, such as (non exhaustively), micro economics, game theory, mathematical economics, decisions theory, finance or macro economics. The seminar functions as an internal workshop but also regularly greets speakers from other institutions.

If you want to be added to the seminar mailing list, or for any other query about the Economic Theory seminar, please feel free to contact Emily Tanimura (emily(dot)tanimura(at)univ-paris1(dot)fr) or Xavier Venel (xavier(dot)venel(at)univ-paris1(dot)fr).


It is supported by the Centre d'économie de la Sorbonne, CNRS and Université Paris 1 Panthéon-Sorbonne.

Forthcoming:

  • Friday 25 Mai 12h-13h

Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Salle S/17

René Von Den Brink (VU Amsterdam)

Title: Interval Solutions for TU-games (joint work with Osman Palanci and S. Zeynep Alparslan Gok)

Abstract: Standard solutions for TU-games assign to every TU-game a payoff vector. However, if there is uncertainty about the payoff allocation then we cannot just assign a specific payoff to every player. Therefore, in this paper we introduce interval solutions for TU-games which assign to every TU-game a vector of payoff intervals. Since the solution we propose uses marginal vectors of the interval game, we need to apply a difference operator on intervals. Applying the subtraction operator of Moore (1979), we define an interval solution for TU-games, and we provide an axiomatization.

  • Friday 25 Mai 12h-13h

Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Salle S/17

Ludovic Renou (Queen Mary University Of London)

Title: Information design in multi-stage games

Abstract: We consider multi-stage games, where at each stage, players receive private signals about past and current states, past actions and past signals, and choose actions. We fully characterize the distributions over actions, states, and signals that obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive additional signals. We interpret our results as revelation principles. We apply our characterization to bilateral bargaining problems.

  • Friday 1 June 12h-13h

Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Salle S/17

Ludovic Renou (Queen Mary University Of London)

Title: Information design in multi-stage games

Abstract: We consider multi-stage games, where at each stage, players receive private signals about past and current states, past actions and past signals, and choose actions. We fully characterize the distributions over actions, states, and signals that obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive additional signals. We interpret our results as revelation principles. We apply our characterization to bilateral bargaining problems.

  • Thursday 7 June 11h30-13h (Séance exceptionnelle)

Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, Salle 117

Paolo Siconolfi (Columbia Business School, Columbia University NY)

Title: Lecture on General Equilibrium and Asymmetric Information

Abstract: We consider multi-stage games, where at each stage, players receive private signals about past and current states, past actions and past signals, and choose actions. We fully characterize the distributions over actions, states, and signals that obtain in any (sequential) communication equilibrium of any expansion of multi-stage games, i.e., when players can receive additional signals. We interpret our results as revelation principles. We apply our characterization to bilateral bargaining problems.