Research
Research
Trade and Protectionist Backlash: The Redistributive Role of Democracy (R&R European Economic Review)
Abstract. This paper combines theory and evidence to study how democratic institutions mitigate the political effects of trade shocks through redistribution. I develop a model that embeds a factor-proportions framework into a political economy setting where political power may be unevenly distributed. Voters choose between pro-trade and protectionist parties based on expected after-tax income, with redistribution determined by the strength of democracy. In the model, trade integration with lower-skilled countries reduces the pre-tax income of less-skilled workers but can raise their after-tax income when redistribution is effective. Strong democracies redistribute trade gains and dampen protectionist backlash, while weak democracies fail to do so, increasing support for protectionism. I test these predictions using a new panel of 581 parliamentary elections in 55 democracies from 1950–2020, leveraging variation in trade costs from air transportation innovations as an instrument. Consistent with the model, trade integration raises protectionist voting in weak democracies but lowers it in strong ones. Decomposing the democracy index shows that equal access to power and redistribution across groups drive the result, which is robust to measures of redistribution to the bottom 50% and post-tax inequality.
Presentations. CEPII (2025), Annual Research Conference, European Commission, Ispra, Italy (2024), ETSG (2024), EDGE Jamboree (2024), Bocconi Trade Tea seminars (2024), Bocconi Politics and Institutions seminar (2024), RIEF Bruxelles (2023), LAGV (2023), AMSE PhD seminar (2023), PSE trade summer school (2022), ADRES (2022), LAGV (2022), ASSET (2022), AMSE PhD seminar (2022)
The General Equilibrium Effect of Trade Shocks: an Empirical Approach (with Priyam Verma)
[Draft available under request]
Abstract. We develop an empirical strategy to estimate the general-equilibrium effects of trade shocks on local labor markets, enabling direct comparison with partial-equilibrium estimates. Using a quantitative trade model, we show that employment responses are fully captured by a market-access measure that incorporates input–output linkages and domestic trade costs. Applying this framework to the China Shock, we quantify changes in market access across 722 U.S. commuting zones and 22 sectors, regress them on exposure to Chinese imports, and trace how the shock propagates through trade and production linkages to generate predicted general-equilibrium effects for each labor market. Accounting for these spillovers reduces the estimated negative effect on manufacturing employment by a factor of 2.5. While upstream contractions amplify the shock through input–output linkages, reductions in domestic competition redirect demand toward less-affected regions, where producers expand. These findings underscore the importance of general-equilibrium and spatial adjustments when assessing the labor-market consequences of globalization.
Presentations. UEA Montreal (Oct 2025), Economics of Global Interaction Bari Italy (Sept 2025)
From Ballots to Beliefs: Short- and Long-Term Effects of Development Projects
[Draft available under request]
Abstract. This paper investigates the impact of foreign aid on democratic engagement in Sub-Saharan Africa, focusing on electoral participation and individual attitudes toward democracy. To understand how development aid affects turnout, we analyze subnational lower-house electoral data from 19 African countries, combined with a comprehensive dataset of World Bank and Chinese-funded projects spanning 2000–2021. Using a regression discontinuity design based on project completion timing relative to election dates, we find that the completion of aid projects before elections significantly reduces voter turnout. This decline may be driven by perceptions of foreign aid as a threat to national sovereignty rather than a tool for development. To further explore this, we plan to examine whether long-term exposure to aid projects erodes trust in local governments and shapes support for democracy using survey data from 34 African countries.