Publications

NOTE: The link for each paper leads either to the journal website (if open access) or to a preprint.

• Revencu, B., Pajot, M., & Dehaene, S. (2026). Representations of geometric shapes have syntactic structure. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 155(4), 1081–1102. (link)

• Revencu, B. (2026). Object substitution pretense reflects a general capacity to interpret objects as symbols. Psychological Review, 133(1):66–80. (link)

• Recanati, F. (2026). La première personne. Annuaire du Collège de France. Résumé des cours et travaux 123, p. 311-23. (link)

• Recanati, F. (2026). Cartesian Perspectives on Consciousness and Introspection. In A. Giustina (ed.) The Routledge Handbook of Introspection. London, Routledge, p. 41-50. (link)

• Tamburini, V. (2026). The determination of what is said and what is implied. Mind & Language. (link)

• Tamburini, V.  (2026). Semantic intentions: still missing. Synthese. (link)

• Recanati, F. (2026). Emmanuel Fournier: Penser à l'infinitif. In Dire et Lire Emmanuel Fournier. Paris: Editions de l'Eclat, p. 65-78. (tbd)

• Jin, Z. (2026). Embedding mental files in the world. Mind & Language. (link)

• Recanati, F. (2025). Fiction, simulation, faire comme si. Annuaire du Collège de France. Résumé des cours et travaux 122, p. 273-81. (link)

• Recanati, F. (2025). Consciousness and the Cogito: The Huet/Régis controversy. In V. Lähteenmäki, J. Sinokki, and O. Marrama (eds.) Cartesianism and Philosophy of Mind. London: Routledge, p. 100-18. (link)

• Roy, I. & Murez, M. (2025). Equative Sentences: Linguistic and Philosophical Perspectives. Annual Review of Linguistics. (link)

• Recanati, F. (2025). Sameness of Mode of Presentation. In J.L. Bermudez, M. Valente & V. Verdejo (eds) Sharing Thoughts: Philosophical Perspectives on Intersubjectivity and Communication. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 193-217. (link)

• Tamburini, V. (2025). Referential Understanding, Luck, and Knowledge of Reference. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. (link)

• Landrum, K. (2025). Good Explanations and the Causal Metasemantics of Inductive Concepts. Mind 134:535, p. 735–757. (link)

• Recanati, F. (2025). IEM Explained. Philosophical Psychology 38:3, p. 1250-1269. (link) 

• Recanati, F. (2025). Relations infogénératives. Klēsis. (link)

• Murez, M. (2025). Le contextualisme conceptuel et la polysémie mentale. Klēsis. (link)

• Bochner, G. (2025). Sens, référence et propositions austiniennes : Réflexions autour des théories de François Recanati. Klēsis. (link)

• Recanati, F. (2024). Dossiers mentaux (suite). Annuaire du Collège de France. Résumé des cours et travaux 121, p. 299-311. (link)

• Recanati, F. (2024). Memory-based modes of presentation. Synthese. (link)

• Recanati, F. (2024). Individuating (and typing) mental files. In A. Grzankowski & A. Savile (eds.) Thought: Its Origin and Reach. Essays for Mark Sainsbury. London: Routledge, p. 100-18. (link)

• Murez, M. (2024). The transparency of mental vehicles. Noûs. (tbd)

• Murez, M. & Strickland, B. (2024). Event completion: a test case for theories of reference in memory. Synthese. (tbd)

• Murez, M. & Thouzeau-Corpel, E. (2024). Incroyables mais vraies : les identités physico-phénoménales et le modèle des fichiers mentaux. Revue de métaphysique et de morale. (link)