Spring 2025

International Monetary Economics, Parthenope University of Naples

Monetary Economics, University of Naples Federico II

Publications

• Emmanuel Caiazzo, Leonardo Gambacorta, Tommaso Oliviero, Hyun S. Shin, Corporate payout policy: are financial firms different?, Forthcoming, The Review of Corporate Finance Studies,: https://doi.org/10.1093/rcfs/cfaf025

• Emmanuel Caiazzo, and Alberto Zazzaro, Bank diversity and financial contagion, Journal of Financial Stability, Volume 77, 2025,ISSN 1572-3089, https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfs.2025.101392

• Emmanuel Caiazzo and Claudio Chino and Raffaele Mattera and Chiara Scarfato, (2022) ''Social pressure and home bias in football: evidence from Italy'', Economics Bulletin, Vol. 42 No. 2 pp. 1081-1091

• A research On Odd Couples in Loan Market, Minerva Bancaria no. 5-6, pp 43-57,2019

Working Papers

• Emmanuel Caiazzo, and Alberto Zazzaro, Price Stability and Financial Stability: Designing the Central Bank Mandate. No. 767. Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy, 2025. [Link ]

• Emmanuel Caiazzo, The Financial Fragility of Complex Economies, Under Review on Bulletin of Economic Research. [Link ] 

On Going Projects

• The Geopolitics of Aid: U.S. and China’s Strategic Financial Flows,with P. Panizza, and  A. Zazzaro 

Abstract: The US-Sino competition is poised to influence the course of history in the near future. In this article, we discuss whether—and to what extent—China and the United States compete in the realm of international aid. By analyzing the Creditor Reporting System dataset by OECD and the Global Chinese Development Finance Dataset over a 20-year period (2000-2019), we investigate whether aid commitments allocation strategies reflect competitive dynamics or attempts at sphere-of-influence consolidation. Employing an instrumental variable approach, we document that U.S. increases its aid commitment in recipient countries where China commits more funds. Moreover, we document that the U.S. response to Chinese financing is greater with strong political or commercial ties to the U.S., and increased following Xi Jinping's election. Overall, our findings are consistent with the view that U.S. international aid allocation criteria were oriented to counter the expansion of the Chinese influence.

• Chinese International Aid and the decline of American Soft Power, with M.R. Carillo 

Abstract: In this paper, we provide evidence suggesting that in countries where China commits to allocate more funds in the form of international aid, American soft power declines. To address the endogeneity issue, we perform an instrumental variable regression where Chinese financing is instrumented with a composite term reflecting Chinese overproduction of raw materials and the diplomatic relationship between the recipient country and the government of Taiwan. The results are stronger for developing countries and for countries at the bottom of the distribution in terms of natural resources. Our findings are consistent with a framework whereby the presence of a contender to a hegemonic power increases the ability of subordinated countries to make decisions without incurring in retaliation from the hegemonic country.

• Market Liquidity and Liquidity Risk: Implications For Banks’ Asset Allocation

Abstract: The paper presents a three-period model in which a bank aiming to minimize liquidation losses allocates deposits between two risky assets. Market liquidity conditions and depositors’ liquidity demand depend on the return of one of the two assets. In the event of a low return of this asset, a run on a solvent institution may occur, thereby creating liquidity risk. The model characterizes conditions such that the bank overweights the asset affecting market liquidity and depositors’ liquidity demand relative to the minimum variance portfolio. Although stylized, the model offers insight into the relationship between banks’ liquidity risk and asset allocations.